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Monisms and Pluralisms 
in the History 
of Political Thought
Political SciencesC
atanzaro | Lagi
M
onism
s and Pluralism
s in the H
istory of Political Thought
ISBN 978-88-99647-11-7
Political ScienceS

Edited by 
Andrea Catanzaro
Sara Lagi
Monisms and Pluralisms
in the History of  Political Thought
edizioni epoké
ISBN 978-88-99647-11-7
©2016 Edizioni Epoké
First edition: 2016
Edizioni Epoké. Via N. Bixio, 5
15067, Novi Ligure (AL)
www.edizioniepoke.it
epoke@edizioniepoke.it
Graphic project and layout: Simone Tedeschi and Edoardo Traverso
Cover picture: «Paesaggio giallo», oil on board by Alberto Boschi (2011) in 
Alberto Boschi, Edizioni Epoké (2015), Novi Ligure
 
I edition
Printed in May 2016
Pressup s.r.l., Rome
All Rights reserved. No part of  this book may be reprinted or reproduced 
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now 
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any 
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from 
the publisher.

Sara Lagi wrote the essay Sir Isaiah Berlin: against Monism (1953-1958) and 
the Afterword entitled Monisms and Pluralisms in the History of  Political 
Thought: some (not conclusive) remarks. She also edited the essays of  Andrea 
Catanzaro, Iolanda Richichi, Nicoletta Stradaioli, Federica Falchi, Stefano Pa-
rodi and Pejman Abdolmohammadi.
 
Andrea Catanzaro wrote the essay The Achaeans of  Homer and those of  
Hobbes: from a pluralistic monism to absolutism and the Preface entitled Why 
monisms and pluralisms? Reasons and purposes of  a path. He also edited the 
essays of  Sara Lagi, Carlo Morganti, Carlotta Stegagno, Davide Suin, Giusep-
pe Sciara and the Bibliography.
Contents
Preface
Why monisms and pluralisms? 
Reasons and purposes 
of  a path p. 11
Andrea Catanzaro
chaPter one
The Achaeans of  Homer 
and those of  Hobbes: 
from a pluralistic monism 
to absolutism p. 17
Andrea Catanzaro
chaPter two
Nicolas Antoine Boulanger’s portrait 
of  “irrational monism” 
in postdiluvian humanity p. 29
Iolanda Richichi
chaPter three
Religious pluralism 
and the International community: 
Alberico Gentili’s contribution p. 39
Davide Suin
chaPter four
Benjamin Constant the “fox” 
and the ideal of  freedom 
between politics, history 
and religion p. 57
Giuseppe Sciara
chaPter five
Frances Wright: 
Liberty as a founding principle 
of  Republican America p. 69
Federica Falchi
5.1 The Republican spirit p. 73
5.2 The Declaration of  Independence 
and the Constitution p. 76
5.3 The birth of  
the Constitution p. 79
5.4 Broad consensus p. 80
5.5 Conclusion p. 82
chaPter Six
Plurality and Decision. 
State and Society 
in Romano Guardini p. 85
Carlo Morganti
8 MoniSMS and PluraliSM in the hiStory of Political thought
chaPter Seven
Monism and Pluralism: 
Eric Voegelin’s contribution p. 95
Nicoletta Stradaioli
7.1 A new science of  politics 
and a new philosophy of  history p. 96
7.2 The theory 
of  representation p. 99
chaPter eight
Beyond Politics: Organizational 
Pluralism and Technocratic Monism 
in the Functionalist Proposal 
of  David Mitrany p. 105
Stefano Parodi
chaPter nine
Polytheism vs. Monotheism: 
some ideas regarding 
the pastoral form of  power p. 119
Pejman Abdolmohammadi
chaPter ten
Political and religious monism 
in Michel ‘Aflaq’s 
political thought p. 127
Carlotta Stegagno
10.1 The foundation 
of  the Ba’th Party p. 127
10.2 The ideology 
of  Michel ‘Aflaq p. 130
10.3 The monist content of  Michel 
‘Aflaq’s political thought  p. 132
10.4 Conclusions p. 136
chaPter eleven
Sir Isaiah Berlin: 
against Monism (1953-1958) p. 139
Sara Lagi
11.1 Introducing the person 
and his work p. 139
11.2 Berlin and the importance of  
thinking like a “fox”... p. 142
11.3 Two concepts of  Liberty: 
against monism p. 147
chaPter twelve
Monisms and Pluralisms 
in the History of  Political Thought: 
some (not conclusive) 
remarks  p. 155
Sara Lagi
BiBliograPhy
p. 163
index
p. 185
the editorS
p. 193
the authorS
p. 195


Preface
Why monisms and pluralisms? 
reasons and purposes of a path
Andrea Catanzaro
“That depends, a good deal,
on where you want to get to”
(L. Carroll)
The backbone of  this work lies in the dichotomy between monism and plu-
ralism. That being stated, in order to produce some curiosity and appeal, it 
would have been better to write “in the misleading dichotomy”, though just 
for a while. Due to this, some preliminary remarks are needed: the adjective 
misleading is here clearly used as a part of  a bait-and-switch strategy and the 
consequent choice of  opening with such a provocative and apparently unre-
asonable assertion deserves to be carefully delimited and explained. How is it 
possible to define misleading such a crucial distinction from the perspective 
of  political thought? How can this choice, clearly at odds with the title of  the 
book, not sound as a sort of  nonsense? 
Both questions are correct. The clash between monism and pluralism 
should not be considered as misleading: it does exist, it deals with something real, 
it has allowed the emergence of  pivotal political theories during the centuries. 
It has imbued, marked and shaped political debate, has contributed to the 
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construction of  political models, societies and identities, has inspired authors, 
thinkers and philosophers. Above all, it has instilled actions with consequences 
– sometimes dramatic consequences – on human beings. So, why might it be 
deemed as misleading? 
There is a main reason that can partially justify this claim that is – and re-
mains – clearly provocative; in order to appreciate it, however, a lexical remark 
is needed. The Oxford English Dictionary writes about monism: “any theory or 
system of  thought or belief, that assumes a single ultimate principle, being, force, 
etc., rather than more than one”1. Regarding pluralism, we read: “any theory or 
system of  thought which recognizes more than one irreducible basic principle”2. 
If  the dichotomy is clear-cut from a linguistic perspective, from a political 
one it is not as evident: monism and pluralism as previously defined appear 
more similar to empty boxes than to something able to influence the real lives of  
people and, accordingly, to be significant from a political-historical perspective. 
So, their dichotomy might be regarded as misleading if  they are taken 
into account as mere categories – the monism or the pluralism as theoretical 
entities – unlinked to history and, particularly, to the History of  Political 
Thought. It might not be, instead, if  we consider them – as they really are – 
as something different, that is, a sort of  simplifying label wisely created and 
used in order to summarise and classify the more multifaceted and many-si-
ded applied natures of  those monisms and pluralisms that have appeared 
over the centuries in the course of  history. 
That said, the adjective misleading and its provocative role can be put aside 
and forgotten; what remains, the idea of  the existence of  historically framed 
monisms and pluralisms, is instead the load-bearing axis of  this work. Such 
a peculiar reading implies the movement from the theoretical dimension and 
the entrance into the historical one, where the ideas of  monism and pluralism 
become worth analysing from a political thought perspective because of  their 
consequences on people’s lives. This was the starting point from which this 
work was born, the idea taken as a cornerstone by all the scholars involved in 
the project.
If  it is true that each title entails – less or more evidently – a question, 
the title we chose for this project perfectly fits this definition. The birth of  a 
research-group to work on monisms and pluralisms through a perspective of  
1 Cf. Oxford English Dictionary, link: http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/121244?redirecte-
dFrom=monism#eid; date of  the query, 09/12/2015.
2 Cf. Oxford English Dictionary, link: http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/121244?redirecte-
dFrom=monism#eid; date of  the query, 09/12/2015.
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history of  political thought is not coincidence. It has a lot to do with a fun-
damental scientific and personal interest shared by the people involved in this 
project, the interest not so much in abstract questions – as we might consider 
at first glance the topic of  our book – as much as in our current reality – cha-
racterized by growing turmoil, instability, contrasts – within which the term 
and the concept of  monism and pluralism have been consolidating powerfully, 
so much that both terms have penetrated into our language through mass me-
dia, scholarly works, magazines etc. 
In the fluid, complex context we all live in, one tends to associate monism 
with ideologies, theories, movements supposed to be inevitably fanatic, into-
lerant, just because of  their monistic root, whereas pluralism is advocated as a 
positive value, as an intrinsic and positive connotation of  free, open, tolerant 
societies and political systems. There is much truth in this (oversimplified) 
dichotomy but the point is: how helpful can these two terms – and the inter-
pretative categories they represent today – be in order to “read” our current 
world? What do the term and concept of  monism as well as of  pluralism – as 
they are commonly perceived nowadays – say which is relevant to the world 
we live in? Aren’t they more complex and rich in nuances than what one might 
think? And if  they are, in what sense? 
In this work we tried to respond to these questions by analyzing and inve-
stigating the term and the concept of  monism and pluralism as “living enti-
ties” having an historical dimension, changing over centuries, differently inter-
preted according to the author, ideology, cultural context we have taken into 
account. That is why we chose to talk about monisms and pluralisms.
Nonetheless, having said that, we have not completely explained the ulti-
mate sense of  our research project yet. The above mentioned questions have a 
sense, because – in our opinion – what makes monism and pluralism so inte-
resting from a perspective of  history of  political thought is the fact – as we are 
going to show – that over centuries both have been (and continue to be) used 
as conceptual frameworks to propose, discuss, reflect about long-term issues 
such as power and its legitimacy, the meaning of  freedom (collective and in-
dividual), the relationship between rulers and ruled, between community and 
individuals, the meaning of  tolerance and the sense of  living together within 
contexts of  religious, ethnic, national homogeneity as well as within contexts 
of  diversity. All issues and problems concerning all of  us, now, and far from 
being merely academic questions.
In this book, the choice of  collecting works linked to each other by the 
analysis concerning specific historical readings of  this dichotomy, but very 
14 MoniSMS and PluraliSMS in the hiStory of Political thought
different from the perspectives of  times, places and cultural contexts, arises 
from the desire to show how people, moving from the theoretical concepts of  
monism and pluralism, have adapted them to the real situations that, during 
the centuries, needed to be faced. 
Accordingly, it does not appear so important whether these texts focus 
on the War of  Troy or the Cold War, take into account Europe, U.S. or Mid-
dle East, analyse secular or religious political thoughts: each research work 
published in this book is aimed at freezing a clear-cut historical moment, ex-
amining a single face of  the above-mentioned many-sided applied natures of  
monisms and pluralisms, highlighting how and why people – moving from theo-
retical ideas – have chosen to implement and apply them to specific contexts. 
This was the common denominator that inspired the conference day 
entitled Monismo e pluralismo nella storia del pensiero politico which took place at the 
University of  Genova last October. This event came after a long preparatory 
path, which started in the spring of  2015. This path involved several scholars 
of  History of  Political Thought who were interested in the subject, though in 
different ways. It was a sort of  experiment, an attempt to create a unicum made 
up of  different frames of  the same topic analysed in various and peculiar 
historical moments and contexts, but unified by the same methodological 
perspective.
The suggestions coming from that preparatory path, the debate generated 
on the conference day and the discussions which arose after it, have allowed 
an in-depth-analysis of  this topic. This book represents the natural outcome 
of  the course, a work where the initial idea – grown, developed and enhanced 
through the debate – is the convergence point, which can join scholars with 
different peculiar research interests and show how the theme in question can 
be multifaceted, broad and wide depending on the various contexts. 
As often happens, things balloon: new issues and questions emerged 
during the individual research work and collective discussions; new problems, 
subjects and themes would have been worth analysing and including in the 
book; other thinkers, situations and theories still need to be taken into account 
and sounded out in depth. In short, this book is far from being exhaustive, 
nor does it claim to be so; it represents a step, maybe a first step, in a wider 
path which was and is growing day after day and, because of  its own nature, it 
remains a sort of  long-time work in progress.   
A last remark is needed: the choice of  focusing on monism and pluralism 
not as theoretical entities detached from history but as monisms and pluralisms 
inside it, has given us the opportunity of  avoiding a rigid black-and-white 
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viewpoint in favour of  a more flexible grey-scale perspective. It has paved the 
way to further queries, whose summary – short but effective – can be easily 
explained through wondering if  something exists between the two extremes 
and what its nature and distinctive elements are. 
Each single work included in this book represents a piece of  the answer to 
these questions.  

Chapter One
the aChaeans of homer 
and those of hobbes: 
from a pluralistiC monism to absolutism
Andrea Catanzaro
The political structure of  the Achaean army in the Iliad shows us a peculiar 
idea concerning the political power. The Achaeans who are besieging the city 
of  Troy undoubtedly appear as a sort of  alliance of  different groups led by 
Agamemnon, king of  Mycenae. Although it cannot be denied that the Homeric 
text is clear about the political supremacy of  the Atrides, it does not allow us 
to think that the internal organization of  the army is so simple, monolithic and 
led by only one man as it might appear. 
The poem, for example, opens with the quarrel between Agamemnon 
and Achilles, a struggle that is far from being a mere fight for a woman: 
though the contenders are apparently clashing for Briseis, they are really 
battling for supremacy in the Achaean group. It implies that the regime in 
force is not so solid, defined and stable as it might seem, but hides some 
critical elements right inside. They are remarkable from the perspective of  
the political thought. The apparently monistic regime that characterizes the 
army besieging Troy is not so homogeneous, centralised in Agamemnon’s 
hands and ordered in a stable strictly vertical dimension, but presents a 
many-sided and problematic structure that can perhaps be labelled as a sort 
of  pluralistic monism. 
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In my opinion, the most important evidence that allows us to understand 
this situation, is the presence of  a plurality of  basiléis who lead the various 
people forming the Achaean army. Atrides is the commander-in-chief, but 
other heroes – Achilles, Ajax, Odysseus, Diomedes, Menelaus, Nestor, only 
to mention the most famous ones – have a quantum of  partially autonomous 
power that they are used to exercising on the people they have guided under 
the walls of  Troy. 
After the quarrel, for example, Achilles chooses to get out of  war and 
makes the people he governs, the Myrmidons, get out too. It makes sure 
evidence that, although Agamemnon holds a monocratic power, it is not 
completely absolute. The other Achaean basiléis have autonomous spheres 
where the Atrides cannot manage any authority. 
Political decisions concerning war, strategies and relations against or 
with the enemies are Agamemnon’s duty, though collegial consultations 
often take place between the basiléus and the basiléis. Despite that, in internal 
questions, as the quarrel is, the Atrides’ position of  power appears less 
monocratic than in the above-mentioned situations and the most important 
heroes act as if  they were almost on a similar level to their leader. The Iliad 
describes criticisms during the assemblies, violent protests and discontent 
towards Agamemnon. His power runs even the risk of  slipping away from 
his hands (cf. Il., II, 142-277). However it cannot be overlooked that he is 
the commander in chief  and the man who holds the pivotal power inside 
the Achaean army. 
When in the 70s of  the XVII century Thomas Hobbes started to translate 
the Homeric poems from Greek into English, this question put him in trouble; 
obviously it could not be a problem in itself, but it was because of  the possible 
significance that the philosopher seems to have ascribed to this work. If  we 
accept Eric Nelson’s suggestion by which “Hobbes’s Iliads and Odysses of  Homer 
are a continuation of  Leviathan by other means”1, it appears clear enough that 
the situation becomes different. 
The theme of  the possible political value of  the Hobbesian translations of  
the Homeric poems has started to be studied and debated only in recent times 
in literature2. It is based on the idea that these texts are not simply the outcome 
1 e. nelSon, Translations of  Homer. Iliad, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. XXII.
2 Nelson mentions these texts in his book (op. cit., p. XIV): g. B. riddeough, Thomas Hobbes’ 
Translations of  Homer, “Phoenix”, XII, 1958, pp. 58-62; e. and i. KontiadoS, Thomas Hobbes ὡς 
μεταφραστὴς τοῦ Ὸμήρου, “Parnassos”, VIII, 1966, pp. 277-299; J. Ball, The Despised Version: 
Hobbes’s Translation of  Homer, “Restoration”, XX, 1996, pp. 1-17; P. daviS, Thomas Hobbes’s 
Translations of  Homer: Epic and Anticlericalism in the Late Seventeenth Century England, “Seventeenth 
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of  the work of  an old man who chose to translate the Iliad and the Odyssey 
in order to spend also the last years of  his life in studying or, as the same 
philosopher wrote in an essay, “because I had nothing else to do”3. Blocked 
by the censorship, Hobbes was to bypass this hindrance using an alternative 
means for spreading his political ideas; this tool was the English translation of  
the Homeric poems. 
Due to this intention, however, a great problem was added to the obvious 
linguistic problems usually linked to any translation works. Hobbes did 
not simply want to translate the Iliad and the Odyssey: from a socio-political 
perspective, he wanted to teach moral virtue through them4. So he had to work 
hard on these texts in order to make them comply as much as possible to the 
ideas he had explained in his previous political works. 
For the purpose of  making the translations “a continuation of  Leviathan by 
other means”5, Hobbes was compelled to modify a lot of  those Homeric lines 
that were at odds with his political theories. He had to manage the original texts 
very carefully because the story could not be changed in its essential passages6, 
but he was obliged to do it, since some considerable incompatibilities threatened 
to undermine the moral and the political intents he had set as his goals.
One of  the most remarkable elements that the philosopher needed to 
underline was the absolutist conception of  political power. As he wrote in the 
Leviathan, in order to allow the community to live safely and in peace, people, 
through the covenant, must ratify that they accept to be ruled by a man, or a 
group of  men, who holds the whole sovereignty7. In chapter XVII, Hobbes 
Century”, XII, 1997, pp. 231-255; a. P. Martinich, Hobbes’s translations of  Homer and anticlericalism, 
“Seventeenth Century”, XVI, 2001, pp. 147-157; on the same topic, have to be also mentioned 
e. faBBri, Le translations of  Homer: passioni, politica e religione nel pensiero maturo di Hobbes, “Humana.
Mente”, XII, 2010, pp. 151-155; e. nelSon, Translations as correction: Hobbes in the 1660s and 
1670s, in M. J. BurKe – M. richter (edited by), Why concept Matter. Translating Social and Political 
Thought, Leiden, Brill Academic Pub., 2012, pp. 119-139; c. condren, The philosopher Hobbes as 
the poet Homer, “Renaissance Studies”, XXVIII, 2013, pp. 71-89. 
3  t. hoBBeS, To the reader, concerning the virtues of  an heroic poem, in w. MoleSworth (edited by), 
The English Works of  Thomas Hobbes of  Malmesbury, vol X, London, Longman, Brown, Green, and 
Longmans, 1844, p. X; cf. e. nelSon, Thomas Hobbes Translations of  Homer. Iliad cit., p. XV and 
XCIX; J. Ball, op. cit., p. 2; P. daviS, op. cit., p. 233; a. P. Martinich, op. cit., p. 147; l. StrauSS, 
Che cos’è la Filosofia Politica, Urbino, Argalìa Editore, 1977, p. 189; l. Borot, The poetics of  Thomas 
Hobbes by himself: an edition of  his preface to his translations of  Homer, “Cahiers Élisabéthains”, LX, 
2001, p. 67 and, concerning the text of  the To the reader, pp. 74-81.
4 Cf. e. nelSon, Translations as correction: Hobbes in the 1660s and 1670s cit., p. 127 and id., 
Translations of  Homer. Iliad cit., p. XXXIII. 
5 Cf. footnote n. 1.
6 Cf., for example, e. nelSon, Translations of  Homer. Iliad cit., p. LXII.
7 t. hoBBeS, Leviathan, XVII, in J. c. a. gaSKin, Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, Oxford, Oxford 
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makes it clear that this man, or this group, is the sovereign; all the other people, 
without any exceptions, are subjects8. 
In translating the Iliad the philosopher chose Agamemnon as the model 
of  the real king and tried to make him become as similar as possible to the 
sovereign he had described in the Leviathan9. 
In his article entitled Political Ideology in Translations of  the Iliad, 1660-171510, 
J. Lynch highlights that, it was rather a usual custom by authors involved in 
the debate between Royalists and supporters of  the Parliament to mention the 
heroes and the events of  the Iliadic saga in order to support their arguments 
or discredit the adversaries’ ones. 
However Hobbes did not limit himself  to quoting excerpts or mentioning 
characters and facts able to endorse his political theories. He went down an 
alternative path: he chose to work on the entire texts, altering what he did not 
consider useful to his purposes and in compliance with his political theories11. 
Obviously, if  Agamemnon had to become the archetypal model of  the 
king, the situation of  pluralistic monism previously sketched out could not 
remain unvaried. 
If  in Hobbesian political thought peace and safety are consequences of  the 
clear-cut distinction between sovereign and subjects, the political structure of  
the Achaean army does not fit well with this idea. The philosopher’s absolutist 
conception, that he had explained and developed in his previously political 
works, compelled him to move from the original model of  pluralistic monism to 
a new one, where the holder of  sovereignty was unique and clearly identified. 
In my opinion, the passage from the Homeric pluralistic monism to a more 
absolutist vision is one of  the most remarkable pieces of  evidence that 
Hobbes really wants to use the Iliad and the Odyssey as “a continuation of  
Leviathan by other means”12.
Since he cannot completely modify the text so as not to distort the original 
Iliadic plot – he is translating the poem and not rewriting it –, Hobbes tries 
to stress all the monocratic aspects concerning Agamemnon and, at the same 
University Press, 1998, p. 114.
8 Ivi.
9 Cf. e. faBBri, op. cit., pp. 151-153; id., Dal realismo politico di Tucidide a quello di Hobbes, “Annali 
del Dipartimento di Filosofia” (Università degli Studi di Firenze), XV, 2009, p. 23; J. lynch, 
Political Ideology in Translations of  the Iliad, 1660-1715, “Translation and Literature”, VII, 1998, p. 
27, p. 30 and p. 34; e. nelSon, Thomas Hobbes. Translations of  Homer. Iliad cit., p. LXII.
10 J. lynch, op. cit., pp. 23-41.
11 Cf. for example e. nelSon, Translation as Correction: Hobbes in the 1660s and 1670s cit., p. 139; 
id., Translations of  Homer. Iliad cit., p. XXII.
12 Cf. footnote n. 1.
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time, to decrease the power of  the other Achaean basiléis in order to support 
the Atrides. 
He principally reaches this target through linguistic tools that allow him 
to alter the Homeric lines without modifying the story as a whole. In his 
work, one of  the most difficult situations that the philosopher has to bypass 
concerns exactly the simultaneous presence of  a plurality of  basiléis inside the 
same group. 
If  we focus on the Iliad II book we can find a clear example of  it. During 
the assembly where he makes the fake announcement concerning the 
abandonment of  the war, Agamemnon loses the control of  the army. The 
order is restored by the intervention of  Odysseus that allows Atrides to get 
back into power. 
All of  this notwithstanding, someone starts to publicly thwart Agamemnon 
and the other basiléis. He is Thersites, whose words surely could not sound 
good to Hobbes: the soldier does not only criticize his king in assembly, but 
also shoots the other Achaean kings with his verbal arrows. It was stopped by 
Odysseus, whose speech, however, clearly reveals the existence of  a plurality 
of  men who hold power and are called by the name of  basiléis the same one 
used to denote Agamemnon. 
So the philosopher, who wants to move from the pluralistic monism of  the 
original texts, to the absolutisms, has to solve two relevant problems. The 
former, which I will not consider in this essay since it does not concern the 
theme I chose to discuss, deals with the protests against the holder – or 
holders – of  sovereignty. The latter, instead, appears very remarkable under 
the perspective of  the transition from the original structure of  power to a 
new one that matches better with the Hobbesian absolutist theory. We read 
in the Iliad:
Θερσῖτ᾽ ἀκριτόμυθε, λιγύς περ ἐὼν ἀγορητής, 
ἴσχεο, μηδ᾽ ἔθελ᾽ οἶος ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν: 
οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ σέο φημὶ χερειότερον βροτὸν ἄλλον 
ἔμμεναι, ὅσσοι ἅμ᾽ Ἀτρεΐδῃς ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον. 
τὼ οὐκ ἂν βασιλῆας ἀνὰ στόμ᾽ ἔχων ἀγορεύοις, 
καί σφιν ὀνείδεά τε προφέροις, νόστόν τε 
φυλάσσοις.
[...]
What a flood of  abuse. Thersites! Even for you,
fluent and flowing as you are. Keep quiet.
Who are you to wrangle with kings, you alone?
No one, I say—no one alive less soldierly than you,
none in the ranks that came to Troy with Agamemnon.
So stop your babbling, mouthing the names of  kings, 
flinging indecencies in their teeth, your eyes
peeled for a chance to cut and run for home. 
[…] 
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Hobbes translates:
Prater, that to thy self  seems eloquent, 
How darest thou alone the King t’upbraid? 
A greater Coward than thou art there’s none 
’Mongst all the Greeks that came with us to Troy. 
Else ’gainst the King thy tongue would not so run. 
Thou seek’s but an excuse to run away. 
[…] 
And, Oh said one t’another standing near; 
Ulysses many handsome thing has done, 
When we in Councel or in Battle were, 
A better deed than this is he did none, 
That has so silenced this railing knave, 
And of  his peevish humour stay’d the flood,
As he no more will dare the King to brave15.
In the original text the safeguarding of  monocratic power concerns Achaeans 
kings as a whole and does not exclusively refer to Agamemnon: though the 
basiléus in trouble is the Atrides in this section of  the poem, the triple use of  
the plural form basiléis makes it clear that he is not the only man who holds 
royal power among the Achaeans. 
13 Il., II, 246-251 e 272-277; the excerpts coming from the original Iliad that I quoted in this 
article are shown according to the Greek text edited by Rosa Calzecchi Onesti (Omero. Iliade, Tu-
rin, Einaudi, 1950); modern English translations of  the quoted excerpts come from this text: R. 
FAGLES – B. KNOX (edited by), Homer. The Iliad, London, Penguin, 1991 (henceforth [F.K.]); 
from this point forward, bold text both in Greek and in English is mine.
14 Il., II, 285-292 and 319-324 [F.K.]; from this point forward the Hobbesian translations of  the 
Iliad are shown according the critical edition by Eric Nelson (Translations of  Homer. Iliad, cit.); 
the symbol “*” placed after a line number denotes that the quotation come from this edition.
15 Il., II, 219*-224* e 241*-247*. 
ὢ πόποι ἦ δὴ μυρί᾽ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργε 
βουλάς τ᾽ ἐξάρχων ἀγαθὰς πόλεμόν τε 
κορύσσων: 
νῦν δὲ τόδε μέγ᾽ ἄριστον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν, 
ὃς τὸν λωβητῆρα ἐπεσβόλον ἔσχ᾽ ἀγοράων. 
οὔ θήν μιν πάλιν αὖτις ἀνήσει θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ 
νεικείειν βασιλῆας ὀνειδείοις ἐπέεσσιν13.
A thousand terrific strokes he’s carried 
off—Odysseus,
taking the lead in tactics, mapping battle-plans. 
But here’s the best thing yet he’s done for 
the men—
he’s put a stop to this babbling, foulmouthed fool!
Never again, I’d say, will our gallant comrade
risk his skin to attack the kings with insults14.
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φεῦγε μάλ᾽ εἴ τοι θυμὸς ἐπέσσυται, οὐδέ σ᾽ ἔγωγε 
λίσσομαι εἵνεκ᾽ ἐμεῖο μένειν: πάρ᾽ ἔμοιγε καὶ ἄλλοι 
οἵ κέ με τιμήσουσι, μάλιστα δὲ μητίετα Ζεύς. 
ἔχθιστος δέ μοί ἐσσι διοτρεφέων βασιλήων: 
αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε16.
Desert, by all means—if  the spirit drives you home!
I will never beg you to stay, not on my account.
Never—others will take my side and do me honor,
Zeus above all, whose wisdom rules the world.
You—I hate you most of  all the warlords
loved by the gods. Always dear to your heart,
strife, yes, and battles, the bloody grind of  war17.
The choice of  removing the plural forms and using the singular ones 
in order to show a political system centralized in the Atrides’ hands is so 
frequent in the translations that we cannot consider the quoted example as 
an exception. 
There is another tool, whose usage is more frequent than this one, which 
allows Hobbes to bypass the problem of  the presence of  several basiléis in 
the Achaean army. It is really used to remove several hindrances preventing 
the philosopher from making the translations a vehicle for his political ideas; 
however I focus here only on its value as a means employed to simplify the 
unwanted structure of  the Achaean society. 
The tool is excision of  those words, portions of  lines and, though rarely, 
small sections of  text that Hobbes deems not to be in compliance with his 
political theory. 
A significant example comes from book I of  the Iliad: during the quarrel, 
Achilles says to his commander in chief  that he is ready to retire from war 
because of  the insult suffered. Agamemnon replies: 
In the Hobbesian translation we read:
Go when you will, (said Agamemnon) fly,
Ile not entreat you for my sake to stay.
When you are gone more honour’d shall be I,
Nor Jove (I hope) will with you go away.
In you I shall but loose an enemy
That only loves to quarrel and to fight18.
16 Il., I, 173-179.
17 Il., I, 204-210 [F.K.].
18 Il., I, 169*-174*.
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The words of  Atrides entail the presence of  several basiléis in the Achaean 
army, since he mentions Achilles as the worst one among them. The original 
text is clear about this question, but the Hobbesian one is clearer, although in 
a different way. The philosopher chooses to drastically remove the expression 
diotrephés basiléis – kings fed by Zeus – and avoid maintaining something he 
considers dangerous. 
There must be only one single and well identified holder of  sovereignty 
in the same political community: it can be a single man or a group of  men, 
but it is not possible that the distinction between sovereign and subjects is 
not clear cut. 
In the case of  the Achaean army, the basiléis authorities potentially run the 
risk of  appearing in competition with Agamemnon’s one. It is not a group that 
holds sovereignty, but a number of  detached heroes whose powers overlap 
each other. In other words, the system appears as a pluralistic monism and this 
is an unacceptable situation for Hobbes. So excisions and modifications in 
words or lines allow him to change it. 
Another tool that Hobbes often uses to reach this target is the downgrading 
of  those basiléis that he does not want to present as holders of  sovereignty. It 
is also strictly related to the question of  the distinction between king and 
subjects explained in the Leviathan. 
The ratio which inspires this Hobbesian choice is shown by the philosopher 
both in that work and in the Behemoth. In the former he writes:
For in the sovereignty is the fountain of  honour. The dignities of  lord, earl, duke, 
and prince are his creatures. As in the presence of  the master, the servants are equal, 
and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the presence of  the sovereign. 
And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of  his sight; yet in his 
presence, they shine no more than the stars in the presence of  the sun19.
In the second one we read:
King they thought was but a little of  the highest honour, which Gentleman, Knight, 
Baron, Earle, Duke were but steps to ascend to, with the helpe of  Riches; and had 
no rule of  equity but presidents and custome, and he was thought wisest and fittest to 
be chosen for a Parliament, that was most auerse to the granting of  Subsidies or other 
publick payments20.
19 t. hoBBeS, Leviathan, XVIII, in J. c. a. gaSKin, op. cit., pp. 121-122. 
20 t. hoBBeS, Behemoth, I Dialogue, in P. Seaward (edited by), Thomas Hobbes. Behemoth, Oxford, 
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So Achaean famous basiléis often become princes or lords in the Hobbesian 
translations21; through downgrading, the philosopher does not need to 
intervene heavily on the text; he makes only small focused changes that do 
not substantially modify the story; however they radically change the sense of  
the Homeric lines, making them in compliance with Hobbes political theories. 
We find a significant use of  this tool in book II of  the Iliad: Agamemnon 
is seriously about to lose his authority over the army because of  his fake 
announcement of  the abandonment of  the war and Odysseus tries to stop 
both the soldiers and the basiléis running away to the ships. We read in the Iliad:
Hobbes translates:
And when he met with any Prince or Peer,/He gently said24.
These Iliadic lines mention the existence of  several kings in the Achaean army 
and, as in above mentioned examples, this situation is completely at odds with 
Hobbesian theories. However the philosopher cannot remove or modify this 
episode in depth because it is a crucial and famous event of  the story. So he 
acts in another way: the men Odysseus meets are not called basiléis, but princes 
or peers in the translations. 
This expedient allows Hobbes to reach two different and remarkable targets: 
firstly he removes the problem of  plurality of  kings in the same group, since only 
one man can be the king and “the dignities of  lord, earl, duke, and prince are his 
creatures”25. Secondly, using the noun peer related to Odysseus, the philosopher 
puts him – a potentially dreadful Agamemnon’s competitor – on the same level of  
the other Achaean leaders and, accordingly, makes him a subject of  Agamemnon. 
In line 309 of  the book XIX of  the Iliad, the text says that there are other 
kings – állous (…) basiléas26 – surrounding Achilles; both the adjective, which 
highlights the presence of  several basiléis, and the noun, whose significance 
Clarendon Press, 2014, p. 111. 
21 Cf. for example IX (699*/710 [S. 706]), XII (302*/319), XIV (346*/379), XIX (289*/309).
22 Il., II, 188-189.
23 Il., II, 218-219 [F.K.].
24 Il., II, 165*-166*.
25 Cf. footnote n. 17.
26 Il., XIX, 309.
ὅν τινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχείη 
τὸν δ᾽ ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς22
Whenever Odysseus met some man of  rank, a king,
he’d halt and hold him back with winning words23. 
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appears unequivocal, are removed. Hobbes simply translates “other Princes”27 
and avoids maintaining elements seriously dangerous from his perspective. 
Also on this occasion, he seems to aim to change the original pluralistic 
monism in an absolutism more in compliance with what he wrote in chapter 
XVII of  the Leviathan. 
This transition work might have particularly troubled the philosopher on 
the four occasions where the Homeric Greek used the comparative and the 
superlative forms of  the noun basiléus28. He had to face expressions like “to be 
more king than someone else” (basiléuteros) or “to be the most king among the 
other ones” (basiléutatos). Both basiléuteros and basiléutatos suggest the existence 
of  a political system where sovereignties potentially overlap. 
In book IX of  the Iliad, Nestor, talking to Agamemnon, says:
Hobbes translates:
And let them all from you (Atrides) take /Their Orders. For you are our General31.
He cannot use here, as he can in other passages, the tool of  downgrading: 
although he could take advantage from calling Agamemnon “the greatest 
king”32, he would have confirmed through this translation that there are also 
other kings in the Achaean army. So he chooses to move from the political 
dimension to the military one: the use of  the expression “you are our General”33 
anyway highlights the supremacy of  the Atrides, but omits whatever reference 
to the existence of  other kings. 
Line 392 of  the same Iliadic book, allows us to appreciate a similar 
translation though it does not apply to a superlative but a comparative form. 
27 Il., XIX, 289*.
28 Cf. Il., IX, 69 (basiléutatos); Il., IX, 160 and 392; X, 239 (basiléuteros).
29 Il., IX, 69.
30 Il., IX, 80-81 [F.K.].
31 Il., IX, 61*-62*; cf. e. nelSon, Translations of  Homer. Iliad cit., p. 134: “The Greek term is 
‘the greatest king’” (βασιλεύτατος) (IX. 69). Again, Hobbes translates his way around the fact 
that Agamemnon is one king among many”; e. faBBri, Le translations of  Homer: passioni, politica e 
religione nel pensiero maturo di Hobbes cit., p. 153.
32 Cf. footnote n. 27.
33 Cf. footnote n. 28.
Ἀτρεΐδη σὺ μὲν ἄρχε: σὺ γὰρ βασιλεύτατός ἐσσι29. Atrides. lead the way – you are the greatest 
king – 
spread out a feast for all your senior chiefs30.
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Achilles, who was offered to marry one of  Agamemnon’s daughters as a 
compensation for the insult received by Atrides, replies:
The expression “other Argive”37 becomes “some Prince”38 and “basiléuterós 
estin”39 is translated “king of  greater power”. Hobbes cannot directly 
downgrade Achilles, a possible husband of  the king’s daughter, considering 
him less than a king: this could damage the image of  Agamemnon. So, he 
transfers the idea of  greater from the dimension of  kingship to the more 
ambiguous level of  power and makes a potentially dangerous Homeric verse 
useful to reaffirm the supremacy of  Atrides. 
In book X of  the Iliad, the expression “basiléuterós estin”40 referred to 
a generic Achaean basiléus is not translated at all but substituted with a more 
neutral verse41. 
Despite these translations, there is an occasion when the comparative 
form is duly translated. Although it seems to be a sort of  exception, it is 
possible to find an explanation for this Hobbesian choice, an explanation 
that once again can be related to the theme of  the passage from pluralistic 
monism to absolutism. 
34 Il., IX, 388-392.
35 Il., IX, 474-479 [F.K.].
36 Il., IX, 386*-388*.
37 Cf. footnote n. 31.
38 Cf. footnote n. 32.
39 Cf. footnote n. 30.
40 Cf. Il., X, 234-239.
41 Cf. Il., X, 213*-215*.
κούρην δ᾽ οὐ γαμέω Ἀγαμέμνονος 
Ἀτρεΐδαο,
οὐδ᾽ εἰ χρυσείῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ κάλλος 
ἐρίζοι,
ἔργα δ᾽ Ἀθηναίῃ γλαυκώπιδι ἰσοφαρίζοι:
οὐδέ μιν ὧς γαμέω: ὃ δ᾽ Ἀχαιῶν 
ἄλλον ἑλέσθω,
ὅς τις οἷ τ᾽ ἐπέοικε καὶ ὃς βασιλεύτερός 
ἐστιν34.
His daughter ... I will marry no 
daughter of  Agamemnon.
Not if  she rivaled Aphrodite in all 
her golden glory,
not if  she matched the crafts of  
dear-eyed Athena,
not even then would I make her 
my wife! No.
let her father pitch on some other 
Argive – 
one who can please him, 
a greater king than I35.
I’ll not his Daughter take. 
Bid him bestow her
Upon some Prince he 
thinks more worthy. Let her
For Husband have a King 
of  greater power36.
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Agamemnon was thinking to send Achilles a delegation in order to persuade 
him to come back to fight. He said:
By maintaining the original expression, Hobbes surely cannot be as strict as on 
other occasions about the presence of  a plurality of  kings inside the Achaean 
army. However the advantage in doing so comes from the particular sequence 
told in these lines. Agamemnon is speaking about himself  and says that he is 
basiléuteros – literally more king – than Achilles. In the Hobbesian perspective, 
this claim, though problematic for the overlapping sovereignties, is useful to 
restate the supremacy of  the Atrides over his dangerous competitor. On this 
occasion, extinguishing Achilles’s ambitions sounds better than removing a 
reference to an unwanted situation. Though in a different way from what we 
have previously seen, this translation too appears consistent with the idea of  
transition from the original pluralistic monism to an absolutist vision. 
To sum up: through his translation work of  the Homeric poems, Hobbes 
aspires to the ambitious purpose of  teaching his political ideas; among them the 
dichotomy sovereign-subjects surely represents a cornerstone. However the Iliad 
and the Odyssey are often far from being in compliance with it. Particularly, the 
structure of  power inside the Achaean army appears at odds with the absolutism 
explained in the Leviathan. So the pluralistic monism that can be found in the 
original texts has to be changed. Due to this, the philosopher modifies those 
Homeric lines that he considers problematic, in order to reach the target of  
really creating “a continuation of  Leviathan by other means”45.
42 Il., IX, 158-161.
43 Il., IX, 189-193 [F.K.].
44 Il., IX, 154*-156*; cf. E. NELSON, Translations of  Homer. Iliad cit., p. 137: “Hobbes 
softens Agamemnon’s remarks here. In the Greek he does not ask Achilles to ‘consider this’, 
but rather to ‘submit’ (ὑποστήτο) (IX. 160)”.
45 Cf. footnote n. 1.
δμηθήτω‒ Ἀΐδης τοι ἀμείλιχος ἠδ᾽ 
ἀδάμαστος,
τοὔνεκα καί τε βροτοῖσι θεῶν ἔχθιστος 
ἁπάντων‒
καί μοι ὑποστήτω ὅσσον βασιλεύτερός εἰμι
ἠδ᾽ ὅσσον γενεῇ προγενέστερος 
εὔχομαι εἶναιn.
Let him submit to me! Only 
the god of  death
is so relentless, Death 
submits to no one – 
so mortals hate him most of  
all the gods.
Let him bow down to me! I 
am the greater king, 
I am the elder-born, I claim 
– the greater mano.
Inexorable none but Pluto is,
But hated for’t. I am the 
greater King,
And elder man; he should 
consider thisp.
Chapter Two
niColas antoine boulanger’s portrait 
of “ irrational monism” 
in postdiluv ian humanity
Iolanda Richichi
Secularization is one of  the key issues considered by historians analyzing the 
modern era. In 1598, Alberigo Gentili claimed “Silete theologi in munere 
alieno”1 to order theologians to keep silence about topics outside their domain. 
The historiography has often attributed the clear separation of  religious 
discourse from political debate to this time. Thus, Gentili’s works became the 
manifesto of  this secularization. 
However, an intense cross talk between politics and religion was still evident 
in Europe at the beginning of  the seventeenth century. Secularization is a 
complex phenomenon that fully became true only at the end of  the eighteenth 
century. Indeed, it was only at the end of  this century that the value of  the 
Bible concerning topics not directly connected to this rule, like chronology, 
was questioned.
During this period a lot of  papers, diaries and travel narratives about the 
East culture were published. Reading these papers the attention of  European 
culture switched to the Chinese, Chaldean, Egyptian “endless antiquities”2. 
1 a. gentili, De iure belli libri tres (1598), introduction by d. Quaglioni; trad. by P. nencini; 
edited by g. Marchetto - c. Zendri, Milano, Giuffré, 2008, p. 83.  
2 See P. roSSi Monti, Le sterminate antichità e nuovi saggi vichiani, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1999; 
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These facts prompted out some doubts about the reliability of  biblical 
chronology. Compared to monistic-reductive point of  view, where the history 
of  all peoples was reduced in a universal archetype, founded by the story of  
the Old Testament, these works established a new and pluralistic point of  
view. As Alexander Koyré asserted:
No one had the idea of  counting, of  weighing and of  measuring. Or, more exactly, 
no one ever sought to get beyond the practical use of  number, weight, measure in the 
imprecision of  everyday life - to count months and beasts, to measure distances and 
fields, to weigh gold and corn - in order to turn it into an element of  precise knowledge3.
Koyré observed the fundamental transition of  the conception of  science in 
the seventeen century “from the world of  the ‘more-or-less’ to the universe 
of  precision”. 
The topic was complex, but it was much discussed in depth during that 
time. The Bible was held to be the oldest record of  human history. After the 
circulation of  new chronology it was necessary to fit the origin of  different 
peoples to the Bible’s content. When in 1653 Martino Martini arrived in 
Amsterdam after his trip in China, he brought with him his knowledge of  
the antiquity of  that land. Taking account of  these new ideas, the European 
intelligentsia pointed out some doubts about the ancient history4. 
The undermissed concepts were focused on the issue claimed by Le Comte 
called “prejudices of  childhood”.5 The idea of  right and wrong, of  ancient and 
modern, the geographical limits of  the world, the classification of  a government 
in good or bad: everything had always been built on a speculative basis. Until 
now, the power of  the Bible, always related to its sacredness, had been a reason to 
justify its veracity. However, at the end of  the seventeenth century, its sacredness 
was no longer a sufficient reason and the Bible’s content became the subject of  
scholarly scrutiny. For the first time, its contents were questioned, examined and 
compared with centuries of  history until now completely ignored.
c. herManin, l. SiMonutti (edited by), La centralità del dubbio. Un progetto di Antonio Rotondò, 
Firenze, Olschki, 2010, 2 voll.
3  a. Koyré, Dal mondo del pressappoco all’universo della precisione, Torino, Einaudi, 1992, pp. 97-98.
4 See a. roMano, La contre-réforme mathématique. Constitution et diffusion d’un culture mathématique 
jésuite à la Renaissance (1540-1640), Rome, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et Rome, 
1999; a. roMano, Multiple Identities, Conflicting Duties and Fragmented Pictures: the Case of  the Jesuits, 
in Le monde est une peinture. Jesuitische Identität und die Rolle der Bilder, e. oy-Marra und v. r. 
reMMert (Gg.), Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2011, pp. 45-69.  
5 l. le coMte, Des cérémonies de la Chine, Liege, Daniel Moumal, 1700, p. 6.
nicolaS antoine Boulanger’S Portrait of “irrational MoniSM” in PoStdiluvian huManity 31
In particular, the topics discussed were the content of  the Pentateuch and 
of  the historical books of  the Old Testament. The attention was focused on 
the books of  Leviticus and Deuteronomy, therefore on the origin of  the Jewish 
people. The Bible’s content was compared with the records, the myths, the 
stories of  other peoples. The assessment allowed to shift the Jewish’s history 
in the chronological axis of  the formation of  civilization, which proved to be 
less ancient than they had always believed.
Isaac La Peyrère’s, an Huguenot writer, aroused considerable interest in 
seventeenth century in Europe. The theory claimed by La Peyrère in his work 
Praeadamitae (1655) was essentially based on the possibility that Adam was 
the father only of  the Jewish people. The humanity that had preceded Jewish 
people, the Gentile descendants, belonged to another race of  men. The Bible 
concerned only the Jewish history, while the other peoples were this way 
released from the God’s Providence. As Zoli has shown, the gentiles became 
“participating actors of  a different story compared to the Bible description”6. 
This was the theory of  polygenism and pre-adamism, in which even the 
Flood became a local phenomenon, which belonged only to the Jewish history. 
In agreement with La Peyrere’s thought, in 1672 the English chronicler 
John Marsham presented the sacred history like a narration only of  the Jewish’s 
events in his work, the Canon chronicus Aegyptiacus, hebraicus, Graecus. Marsham 
refused the idea that Jewish history was the universal beginning of  the history 
of  all peoples and he attributed to the Egyptians the temporal superiority over 
all the other peoples.
As Marsham claimed, the Egyptians had a decisive influence on the law, 
the precepts and the rites of  the Jewish people. By following this idea, he 
emphasized also a key issue in religious field. The question was: did the 
Egyptian origin of  Moses have an impact on the customs and the rituals of  
Jewish people? Thus, Marsham maintained that the Egyptians were the most 
ancient people but also that the Jewish religion derived from the Egyptian. 
Conversely, Georg Horn presented a strong argumentation in favor of  
orthodoxy. As he claimed, the pagan history was originated by sacred history, 
so the Gentiles received the elements of  sacred history from the Jews. Horn 
added that the Gentiles afterwards had corrupted these elements, making 
them unrecognizable.
Another excellent example was Daniel Huet, the bishop of  the French 
church in 1685, who was one of  the strongest representatives of  apologetic 
6 S. Zoli, Il preadamitismo di Isaac de La Peyrère nell’età previchiana e il libertinismo europeo del Seicento, 
“Bollettino del Centro Studi Vichiani”, XXI, 1991, p. 62.
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tradition. In 1679, he published his Demonstratio Evangelica where he 
demonstrated that pagan history and mythology were based on the Old 
Testament. Huet’s attempt was to establish the truth of  the Christian religion 
above any other religion and to prove the authenticity of  the Bible’s contents.
The debate about the reconsideration of  human history concerned a 
broad range of  secondary topics: the origin of  the first human society, the 
birth of  languages, the basis of  knowledge, the foundation of  religions, the 
creation of  life. The source of  all these subjects had been always the same, 
the Bible, that was more and more questioned. In particular, the analysis 
was focused on the Genesis and on the description of  the Great Flood. 
The physical and material explanation of  the Flood took a very important 
place within these debates. Until now, the Jewish history had represented the 
history of  the first and most ancient people in the Earth, so the Flood was 
considered the starting point of  human history. In the eighteenth century, 
not only the uniqueness of  the Flood during human history was questioned 
but also its geographical extension. 
According to Maria Susanna Seguin “if  there is a subject that could attract 
the attention of  the XVIII century it is the Great Flood”7. In the eighteenth 
century the thinkers accomplished an extraordinary effort to impose critical 
thinking, historical scholarship, scientific precision in areas where religion has 
predominated for a long time. The biblical account of  the Flood contained, 
in its complexity, all the topics of  the age: the Universe, the Earth, God, man.
The sacredness of  the Holy Scripture was no longer the only source, for 
example identifying enough to prove what really happened, or to recognize 
in the presence of  fossils on the mountains as evidence of  the submergence 
of  the Earth during the cataclysm. The new chronology questioned the value 
of  the biblical account: the new theories on fossils had revealed many valid 
explanations of  their origin, due to some revolutions of  the Earth and not 
only to one phenomenon.
In the early eighteenth century, Nicolas Antoine Boulanger, French 
philosopher and engineer8, was the first to link the geological results related to 
the myth of  the Flood to its consequences for the humanity on social, political 
and religious plans.
7 M. S. Seguin, Science et religion dans la pensée française du XVII siècle: le mythe du Déluge universel, 
Paris, Honoré Champion, 2001, p. 38 (the english translation is mine).
8 Nicolas Antoine Boulanger, engineer of  Ponts et chaussée, lived in the first half  of  the eighteenth 
century. He published in life only some conclusions related to geological studies on the history 
of  the Earth collected in Mémoire sur une nouvelle mappemonde (1753) and the articles “Corvée” 
(1754) and “Guebres” (1757) for the Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire des arts, des sciences et des métiers.
nicolaS antoine Boulanger’S Portrait of “irrational MoniSM” in PoStdiluvian huManity 33
From a political point of  view, the identification of  the first people in human 
history allowed to determine the first government in history and therefore to 
identify the nature and the principle of  political power. Boulanger was the 
first to offer detailed explanation of  the origin of  the different political forms 
from the geological disasters, particularly since the Great Flood, identifying 
the principle of  political power in religion.
Boulanger died very young of  a debilitating disease in 1759. Nevertheless, 
he was one of  the most fascinating figures of  the French Enlightenment for 
his posthumous story. After his death, his works were edited and published by 
Baron d’Holbach and Diderot. In d’Holbach’s country residence in Grandval, 
a great work of  editing on Boulanger’s texts took place, made by the coterie 
d’holbachique, defined by the Abbé Galiani “la grande boulangerie”9.
This work of  editing produced by d’Holbach, Diderot and the coterie gave 
the opportunity to Boulanger’s text to circulate. The two principal Boulanger’s 
works, published posthumously by d’Holbach, were the Antiquité dévoilée par ses 
usages (1764) and the Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme oriental (1761)10. Besides, 
according to Franco Venturi – his interpretation found ample confirmation 
and remains the most supported by the contemporary historiography – they 
accomplished a transformation of  Boulanger’s figure. In 1791, Naigeon wrote 
an article Boulanger in Encyclopédie methodique where he described Boulanger as 
«une espèce de phénomène littéraire»11.
Persuaded by Boulanger’s genius, d’Holbach and the coterie made him the 
cornerstone of  the reaction of  the Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire des arts, des sciences 
et des métiers to the crisis of  1759. On January 23, the Attorney General offered 
to Paris parliament to condemn the Encyclopédie, as well as Helvétius’s De l’Esprit 
and six other books. He described the Encyclopédie as a conspiracy “a Society 
organized to propagate materialism, to destroy Religion, to inspire a spirit of  
independence and to nourish the corruption of  morals”12. On March 8th the 
work’s press privileges were revoked and the publication of  the others volumes 
prohibited.
9 See a. c. KorS, D’Holbach’s coterie: an Enlightenment in Paris, Princeton, Princeton University, 
1976; r. darnton, The Business of  Enlightenment: A Publishing History of  the Encyclopédie, 1775-
1800, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.
10 Naigeon asserted that they should have been, respectively, the first and the second part of  a 
larger project dedicated to Histoire de l’homme en société. 
11 “Boulanger”, in J. A. Naigeon, Encyclopédie méthodique: Philosophie ancienne et moderne, Paris, 
Panckoucke, 1791, vol. I, p. 534.
12 Arrests de la Cour de Parlement, portant condamnation de plusieurs Livres & autres Ouvrages imprimés. 
Extrait des Registres de Parlement. Du 23 Janvier 1759, pp. 1-2.
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In the midst of  this crisis, when philosophers such as Voltaire, Rousseau 
and d’Alembert left the project, Diderot and d’Holbach celebrated Boulanger 
as the great Enlightenment philosopher. His work became the manifesto of  
the movement of  renaissance of  knowledge promoted by Encyclopédie13. 
Some articles in the Encyclopédie were associated to Boulanger. The 
historiography analysis demonstrated that the engineer composed during his 
life “Corvé”, “Deluge” and “Langue hébraïque”. However, a lot of  papers 
were incorrectly related to Boulanger14. In particular, the articles “Vingtième” 
or “Society” were actually realized by the coterie. Instead, “Theocracy” or 
“Oeconomie politique” were written after his death by Diderot retrieving the 
contents of  Boulanger’s texts15. 
The interest of  historiography was not focused on Boulanger’s thought 
for a long time. The principal problem was to distinguish the works really 
composed by him from these texts. At the beginning of  the twentieth century, 
a French historian, Henri Lion, was the first to recognize the intellectual 
autonomy to Boulanger16, followed by Franco Venturi and John Hampton at 
mid-century. More recently Boulanger’s thought was analyzed by Paul Sadrin 
and Pierre Boutin17. Their interpretation has delineated a description of  
Boulanger “naturalist” and “anthropologist”, but also a thinker committed 
to the fight against the revealed religions.18 They identified the key to the 
interpretation of  Boulanger’s thought in the myth of  the Flood. 
Little or no attention, however, has been paid so far to Boulanger’s 
political thought and the importance that he attributed to the theocratic 
13  See f. venturi, L’Antichità svelata e l’idea del progresso in N. A. Boulanger, Bari, Laterza, 1947, 
p. 69.
14  Many works were associated to the engineer as, for example, Le Christianisme dévoilé - wrote in 
1756 and published after 1760 - actually composed by Baron d’Holbach.
15  For more details, see i. richichi, Quale «Economia politica» per l’Encyclopédie? Rousseau e 
Boulanger tra l’Economia politica degli antichi e dei moderni, “Il pensiero politico”, XLVII, 2014, pp. 
60-78.  
16  See h. lion, N. A. Boulanger (1722-1759). Contribution à l’histoire du mouvement philosophique au 
XVIII siècle, “Annales révolutionnaires”, t. VII, 1914, n. 4, pp.469-484; n. 5, pp. 617-645; H. 
Lion, N. A. Boulanger (1722-1759). Contribution à l’histoire du mouvement philosophique au XVIII siècle, 
“Annales révolutionnaires”, t. VIII, 1915, n. 1, pp. 47-78; n. 3, pp. 377-404.
17  See f. venturi, L’Antichità svelata e l’idea del progresso in N. A. Boulanger, Bari, Laterza, 1947; 
J. Hampton, Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger et la science de son temps, Geneve-Lille, Droz-Giard, 1955; P. 
Sadrin, Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger ou avant nous le déluge, Oxford, The Voltaire Foundation, 1986; P. 
Boutin, N. A. Boulanger. Oeuvres completes, édition critique: textes établis et commentés par Pierre 
Boutin, Paris, H. Champions, 2006 (vol. II), 2011 (vol. I).
18 The historiography emphasized the image of  a brilliant young thinker, very interested in 
examining in depth the physical history of  the Earth and the effects of  natural events on the 
development of  civilization. 
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model, as a consequence of  social, political and religious mistakes in the 
human history. 
Boulanger had a cyclical point of  view about history. He believed that 
various human eras were occured and separated from each other by revolutions 
of  nature, such as earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions. In the Antiquité 
dévoilée he asserted:
Tout ce que nous avons vu jusqu’à présent nous montre que les hommes ont été si vive-
ment frappés de la destruction de leur ancienne demeure, que non-seulement ils en ont 
long-tems conservé le souvenir, mais encore qu’ils ont long-tems cru qu’ils avoient une 
nouvelle destruction à craindre19.
According to Boulanger, every time regeneration was followed by destruction. 
The Flood was the regeneration of  our era and thus he found the celebration 
of  this event in the rites and traditions of  ancient peoples. In Boulanger’s 
opinion, the Flood was a crucial moment in the history of  all peoples in the 
Earth. Indeed, the story of  all people was unified into a commemoration of  
the same event in the following centuries. But the Flood was a crucial event also 
for the discovery of  political power’s origins. The physical explanation of  the 
Flood didn’t have aim to defending or contesting the Bible’s content. Boulanger 
was only interested in observing its direct consequences on primitive humanity. 
The feelings of  the primitive men that survived to the Flood got them to try to 
re-create “Heaven on Earth” establishing a theocratic government. Boulanger 
analyzed the topic in the Recherches arguing that it was the “crainte” to prompt 
the survivors, who were believing to be at the end of  the world:
C’est enfin de-là que l’homme idolâtre courut ensuite consulter tous les jours l’aurore 
ou le soleil levant, et que généralement les peuples ont par toute la terre tourné vers ce 
côté les portes de tous les temples, s’imaginant que le soleil et le grand juge viendroient 
du côté de l’Orient20.
The first social aggregation of  the survivors, described by Boulanger, were 
some groups of  families strongly influenced by God’s judgment. These 
families were only governed by domestic laws. But Boulanger emphasized 
19 n. a. Boulanger, L’Antiquité dévoilée par ses usages, in N. A. Boulanger, OEuvres de Boullanger, 
Amsterdam, [s.n.], 1794, tome II, p. 26.  
20 n. a. Boulanger, Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme oriental, in n. a. Boulanger, OEuvres de 
Boullanger, Amsterdam, [s.n.], 1794, tome I.  p. 41.  
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how these early forms of  aggregation did not constitute political governments 
yet. The first political society was established by men when families 
became more complex and therefore it was necessary to create a stronger 
relationship to keep the unity. Thus, men were forced to give themselves 
political structures, to recognize “des supérieurs” and “des magistrates”, and 
to submit  themselves to civil and political laws. Their mistake resided in the 
choice of  their king: the men didn’t choose another man them equal, but 
they chose God:
Les hommes voulurent appliquer les principes du règne d’en haut au règne d’ici-
bas, et la plûpart de ces principes se trouvèrent faux, parce qu’ils étoient déplacés : 
ce gouvernement n’étoit qu’une fiction, qu’il fallut nécessairement soutenir par une 
multitude de suppositions ; et ces suppositions furent avec le tems, prises pour des vérités, 
d’où résultèrent une foule de préjugés religieux et politique, qui précipitèrent dans des 
abimes affreux la religion et la police primitive. 
C’est ainsi que les nations, après avoir puisé dans le bon sens et dans la nature leurs 
loix domestiques, économiques et civiles, les soumirent toutes à une chimère qu’elles 
appellèrent le règne de Dieu, et que nous avons appelé Théocratie 21.
Boulanger distinguished the subordination to God into two binomials. On the 
one hand the engineer described the binomial religious/legitimate associated 
to the early forms of  aggregation into families, the “théocratie sacrée”. On 
the other, he emphasized the binomial political/unfair that was the basis of  
the first political society, the “théocratie civile”. Boulanger considered sacred 
theocracy positively because the bond with God was only religious. 
Instead, the choice to be governed by God into political society was 
founded on illusory basis. The men would try to apply the principles of  the 
kingdom of  Heaven on Earth. The first big mistake of  man was the mixture 
of  the religious and political spheres in a civil theocracy, because religion crept 
into civil and domestic laws:
Quoique Dieu fût l’unique roi de la société, comme il n’y a aucun pacte ni aucune 
convention à faire avec un dieu, la théocratie dès son institution et par sa nature fut un 
gouvernement despotique, dont le grande juge étoit le sultan invisible, et dont les prêtres 
étoient les vizirs et les ministres, c’est-à-dire les despotes réels22. 
21 Ibid., p. 65.
22 Ibid., p. 104.
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This description of  civil theocracy as a political negative model was the central 
topic of  Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme oriental. The aim of  this work was 
to demonstrate that the despotic regimes of  the East were not the affects 
as Montesquieu had explained “de la volonté momentanée & capricieuse d’un 
seul”, but they were the consequence of  the existence of  a primitive theocracy 
at the origins of  humanity. Boulanger described this theocracy as “projet 
magnifique, mais fatal, qui a precipité toutes les nations dans l’idolâtrie et dans 
l’esclavage”23. He presented a monistic theory of  human history, but developed 
in a strictly negative sense. In his historical-political analysis, religion was the 
only responsible of  all evil in human history.
Boulanger’s interpretation of  a theocratic political model is strictly 
connected with the Respublica Hebraeorum literature. 
From the 1570s to the 1670s many political thinkers transformed biblical 
‘exempla sacra’ of  Old Testament into an organic political model, the Respublica 
Hebraeorum. In the political debates of  the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
in northern Europe, many specific treatises employed the biblical texts to 
find legitimation for either monarchy, democracy, or aristocracy, such as 
Bonaventure Bertram’s De Politia Judaica, tam civili quam ecclesiastica (1574), Carlo 
Sigonio’s De Republica Hebraeorum (1582), the Huguenot Vindiciae contra Tyrannos 
(1579), Althusius’s Politica methodice digesta (1603). All of  them discussed and 
referred to the biblical polity as a model24. Christopher Ligota, Lea Campos 
Boralevi, Diego Quaglioni, Vittorio Conti’s studies about this topic showed 
the political nature of  this debate over the biblical polity, though often using 
terms and themes which traditionally belonged to theology25.
In De Republica Emendanda associated to Grotius (1605) and Petrus Cunaeus’s 
De Republica Hebraeorum (1612) this model was identified as a theocracy. Their 
aim wasn’t to legitimize their contemporary regimes but to recognize a new 
and different model into Jewish’s theocracy. Cunaeus described the Jewish 
23 Ibid., p. 18.
24 For a more detailed list, see e. nelSon, The Hebrew Republic, Jewish Sources and the Transformation 
of  European Political Thought, Cambridge-London, Harvard University Press, 2010, pp. 16–22.
25 See Politeia biblica, (edited by) l. caMPoS Boralevi - d. Quaglioni, “Il Pensiero politico”, 
XXXV, 2002, pp. 365-521; l. caMPoS Boralevi, James Harrington’s “Machiavellian” anti-
Machiavellism, “History of  European Ideas”, 2011, pp. 113-119; v. conti, Consociatio Civitatum, le 
repubbliche nei testi elzeviriani (1625-1649), Firenze, Centro Editoriale Toscano, 1997; c. r. ligota, 
L’histoire à fondament theologique: la République des Hebreux, in L’Ecriture Sainte au temps de Spinoza et 
dans le systeme spinoziste, “Travaux et documents du Groupe de recherche spinoziste”, 4, 1992, pp. 
149-167; e. nelSon, op. cit., Cambridge-London, Harvard University Press, 2010; a. Sutcliffe, 
Judaism and Enlightenment, Cambdrige, Cambdrige University Press, 2003; i. richichi, Teocrazia, 
“Il Pensiero politico”, XLIV, 2011, pp. 211-229.
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theocracy as a positive and normative model that would be applicable in the 
political reformation of  the present Dutch republic. 
However, the theocratic model described by Boulanger is very different 
from Cuneaus’s. The consequences of  new chronology theories on the 
reconsideration of  the Holy Scripture caused effects on theocracy description 
too. 
Differently from Cunaeus’s thought, who talked about Jewish theocracy, 
Boulanger described theocracy as the first form of  government adopted 
by all nations. He identified in the establishment of  this “constitution” the 
reason of  a further series of  political and religious prejudices. According to 
Boulanger, theocracy was a universal, primitive and absolutely negative model. 
He described theocracy as a despotic government. 
For Boulanger, God couldn’t govern directly, so the men found ways 
to know his commands: first they explained a lot of  signs on Earth as a 
connection between them and God, than they built a palace, a temple and 
a throne, giving God officers and ministers. The power of  God’s ministers 
was based on superstition. So, because of  it, the men represented God by 
emblems and symbols. Thus, they were finally idolized as incarnations of  
God. According to Boulanger, the origins of  idolatry date back when men 
lost the distinction between Heaven and Earth.
Lastly, by way of  conclusion, for Boulanger theocracy was a political 
regime, as well as others of  antiquity, associated to the primitive human 
history and the men had to move away from it. The fundament of  society 
should no longer be religion and the present political models would need new 
principles to legitimize their power. Boulanger’s intent was to prove the first 
big mistake of  men after the Flood: reason was replaced by religion. So, men 
had founded political society on superstitious and supernatural principles. In 
Boulanger’s historical-political analysis, the religious influence wasn’t limited 
to one political model, but it concerned all political societies. Boulanger’s aim 
was to show that the fusion of  the religious and the political spheres was 
extremely dangerous for civil society.
The moral and political decline of  humanity started with the birth of  
religion and, politically, with the establishment of  a theocratic government. 
There is no more possibility to recognize the thesis of  religion’s social utility. 
Boulanger appears clearly projected towards a radical secularization of  society 
and political power.
Chapter Three
religious pluralism 
and the international Community : 
alber iCo gentil i ’s Contribution
Davide Suin
Alberico Gentili1 (1552-1608)’s juridical and political work develops in a 
context characterized by deep political and institutional changes. Even if  
on the practical side the evanescence of  medieval institutions, geographical 
discoveries and the end of  Christendom’s unity - events which introduce 
political modernity - implicate the upset of  political horizons and undermine 
the traditional order in Respublica christiana, on the theoretical and doctrinal 
sides a redefinition of  interpretative categories and legitimation of  changes is 
necessarily requested. 
1 Gentili, born in San Ginesio in 1552, graduated in law in Perugia (1572). He abandoned 
Italy in 1579 to reach England in 1580 where he became a brilliant academic jurist and lawyer. 
Biographical notes are in g. SPeranZa, Alberico Gentili. Studi, Roma, Tipografia Fratelli Pallotta, 
1876; g.h.J. Molen van der, Alberico Gentili and the Development of  International law. His life, 
Works and Times, Amsterdam, H. J. Paris, 1937, pp. 35-60; d. PaniZZa, Alberico Gentili, giurista 
ideologo nell’Inghilterra elisabettiana, Padova, La Garangola, 1981; id., Alberico Gentili: vicenda umana 
e intellettuale di un giurista italiano nell’Inghilterra elisabettiana, in Alberico Gentili giurista e intellettuale 
globale. Atti del Convegno, Prima Giornata Gentiliana, 25 settembre 1983 (CISG), Milano, Giuffrè, 
1988, pp. 31-58; a. de BenedictiS, Gentili Alberico, in DBI, Roma, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia 
italiana, vol. 53, 1999, pp. 245-251; P. ragoni (ed.), Alberico Gentili: vita e opere, San Ginesio, 
CISG, 2000.  
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The gradual disappearance of  medieval universalism - clear in the 
progressive erosion of  imperial prerogatives and in the widespread diffusion 
of  Reformation doctrines in Europe - and the long process of  Modern 
State development are the frame in which Gentili’s reflection matures. 
In this framework jurists become creators of  a system which is based on 
reinterpretation of  ius commune and on ex novo elaboration of  legal principles to 
guarantee political changes. 
Gentili plays a central role in this process. He arrived in England in 1580 
exiled religionis causa and there he was well introduced into influential court 
circles. He was protected by Robert Dudley, Oxford University’s chancellor, 
thanks to whom he undertook a brilliant career becoming in 1587 Civil Law 
Regius Professor. In England, Gentili was involved in the hottest political and 
institutional debates, he held a central role in the legitimation of  political 
assets2. In that period, the conditions of  the Modern State’s affirmation as 
superiorem non recognoscens grew. Scholars had to solve two problems: 1) the new 
relations between the sovereign States, 2) the relation between a declining 
Imperial authority and Modern States, which were juridically equal. Opinions 
like Miguel d’Elzurum’s were not current any more3. 
Francisco de Vitoria, Diego Covarruvias and Fernando Vasquez de 
Menchaca had opinions which were much more realistic. The above named 
intellectuals, the greatest representatives of  the Spanish Scholastic, had 
criticized European States’ subjection to  Imperial authority. These authors 
had a great influence on Gentili’s internationalist doctrine4.
By that time the Holy Roman Emperor, as Bodin5 argued, did not have 
2 d. PaniZZa, Alberico Gentili, giurista ideologo nell’Inghilterra elisabettiana cit., pp. 15-54; g. Minnucci, 
Jean Hotman, Alberico Gentili, e i circoli umanistici inglesi alla fine del XVI secolo, in Studi di storia del 
diritto medioevale e moderno, edited by F. Liotta, III, Milano, Monduzzi, 2014, pp. 203-262.    
3  Miguel d’Elzurum was an ideologist of  Charles V’s empire. In his Tractatus universi iuris (1525) 
he supported a universal order that was made up of  States, ruled by not sovereign Princes but 
by authorities subdued to Emperor.  
4 M. ferronato - l. Bianchin (edited by), Silete theologi in munere alieno. Alberico Gentili e la Seconda 
Scolastica. Atti del Convegno Internazionale (Padova, 20-22 novembre 2008), Cedam, 2011. 
5 Bodin exercised great influence on Gentili’s political reflection; d. Quaglioni, The Italian 
“readers” of Bodin, 17th-18th centuries: the Italian “readers” out of Italy – Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), 
in The reception of  Bodin, edited by Howell A. Lloyd, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2013, pp. 371-386. 
Bodin was much esteemed in England (by Elizabeth too; M. leatherS KuntZ, Introduction to J. 
Bodin, Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets of the Sublime, Pennsylvania Stare University Press, 2008, 
p. XXIII, n. 29), as we know from Gabriel Harvey:  “you can not step into a scholar’s study 
but (ten to one) you shall likely find open either Bodin de Republica or Le Roye’s Exposition 
upon Aristotle’s Politics or some other like French or Italian Politic Discourses…”; g. harvey, 
Letterbook of  Gabriel Harvey, ed. E.J.L. Scott, London, Camden Society, 1884, XXXIII, p. 79. Six 
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his medieval prerogatives any more. Bodin claimed the Emperor was not a 
sovereign Prince, but the first citizen in an aristocratic form of  state, similar to 
the Venice doge but in contrast to the French king6. 
Sovereign States were replacing the universal empire. As Bartolo da 
Sassoferrato affirmed, developing Marino da Caramanico’s conclusions7, rex 
in regno suo est imperator8. The modern system of  States was developing on the 
ruins of  the Respublica christiana, demolished by Reformation. Consequently 
the need to clarify a new political praxis was rising. Gentili gave his important 
contribution upon this issue, in particular in De legationibus (1585)9 and in De 
iure belli (1598)10.
livres de la République  were printed in England in 1577, one Latin and one English version were 
respectively printed in 1586 and 1606; r.w.K. hinton, Les Six livres vus d’outre-manche, in Jean 
Bodin. Actes du Colloque Interdisciplinaire d’Angers (24-27 Mai 1984), Angers, 1985, vol. II, pp. 469-
478; a. Surany, The Genius of  the English Nation: Travel Writing and National Identity in Early Modern 
England, Cranbury, Associated University Press, 2010, p. 72. Methodus had the same success, 
especially from 1582 when Bodin was introduced to the influent John Dee (The Private Diary of  
Dr. John Dee, ed. J. Orchard Halliwell – Phillipps, London, Camden Society, 1842, p. 10), but at 
that time this writing is already quoted by John Leslie, Mary Stuart’s ambassador in England; 
A defence of  the honour of  the right high, mighty and noble Princess Marie Queen of  Scotland, Rheims, J. 
Foigny, 1569. About Methodus in England (read by Sidney, Harvey, Nashe) see g.l. MoSSe, The 
Influence of  Jean Bodin’s République on English Political Thought, “Medievalia et Humanistica”, 5, 
1948, pp. 73-83. About the English Six livres de la République edition see K.d. Mcrae,  Introduction 
to J. Bodin, The Six Bookes of  a Commonweale (London, 1606), translated by Richard Knolles, 
edited by K.D. McRae, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1962. For the reception of  
Bodin in Elizabethan and Jacobean England see g. BurgeSS, Bodin in the English revolution, in 
The reception of  Bodin cit., pp. 387-408. Gentili met Bodin in London in 1581 (as testified by a 
letter recently discovered; P. MeyJeS, Jean Hotman’s English Connection, in “Mededelingen Afdeling 
Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks”, 53/5, 1990, p. 209) when the French jurist was in England for the 
marriage negotiations between Elizabeth I and Alençon; J. BoSSy, English Catholics and the French 
marriage, 1577-1581, “Recusant History”, 5, 1959, p. 10 n. 40.   
6 On this issue see: J.h. franKlin, Sovereignty and the mixed constitution: Bodin and his critics, in The 
Cambridge History of  Political Thought 1450-1700, edited by J.H. Burns with the assistance of  Mark 
Goldie, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 298-328. See J. Bodin, I sei libri dello 
Stato, edited by M. Isnardi Parente and D. Quaglioni, vol. II, Torino, Utet, 1988, pp. 391-392.  
7 “Sicut dicimus omnia esse imperatoris […] ita possumus et in rege dicere de rebus omnibus 
regni sui”. This quotation is drawn from f. calaSSo, I Glossatori e la teoria della sovranità. Studio di 
diritto comune pubblico, Milano, 1957, pp. 182-183. 
8 Cfr. d. Quaglioni, Politica e diritto nel Trecento italiano. Il De tyranno di Bartolo da Sassoferrato 
(1314-1357), Firenze, Olschki, 1983.  
9 De legationibus libri tres, Londini, Vautrollerius, 1585. The treatise had other three different 
editions during Gentili’s life: two reproductions in 1594 and 1607 and the 1596 edition in one 
composite volume together with Félix La Mothe le Vayer’s Legatus […] and Ottaviano Maggi’s 
De legato. 
10 De jure belli libri tres, Hanoviae, apud Guilielmum Antonium, 1598. The quotations in this 
essay are drawn from the recent critical edition  a. gentili, Il diritto di guerra (De iure belli, 1598). 
Introduction by D. Quaglioni. Translation by P. Nencini. Critical notes by G. Marchetto and C. 
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In 1584 the Privy Council recalled Gentili to express his opinion about 
a bitter question, about which treatment was to be given to the Spanish 
ambassador Bernardino Mendoza, guilty of  conspiracy against Elizabeth’s 
life. Gentili expressed legal advice11, on which he based his three books De 
legationibus. 
The treatise which is an emblematic example of  a new kind of  political 
literature - that is writing about ambassadors12 - is a first significant testimony 
of  Gentili’s political reflection. In De legationibus Gentili aims to clarify 
the confused diplomatic praxis in that period and to define the perfect 
ambassador’s duties and virtues. This issue gives the jurist the possibility to 
reflect about central topics in the late sixteenth century political debate, in the 
treatise Gentili touches sovereign power characters and vexata quaestio of  the 
relations between politics and religion.
The consciousness of  pluralism in the modern international community arises 
in the development of  this reflection. The modern international community was 
uneven on both political and religious sides and it was made up of  sovereign States, 
which had the same right to send and receive embassies. The institutionalization 
of  diplomatic praxis and the elaboration of  ius legationis were urgent. The right 
of  embassies, Gentili argued, was based on ius naturae et gentium13.  Ius legationis is 
a “immutabile ius” and “omnibus constitutum”, to the barbarians too14. Only 
Lestrigons and Cyclopes, Gentili polemically affirms, do not respect the holiness 
of  embassies15. Religious differences among States are not important; embassies 
between States with different creeds or religions had been frequent in the past and 
“nunc a Pontificijs admitti, quae a Protestantibus proficiscuntur: & contrari”16. 
Embassy rights “ne propter religionis disiidia debeant […] conturbari”, because 
“religionis ius hominibus cum hominibus non est, sed cum Deo”17.
In these pages, we can find the main theme of  Gentili’s political 
reflection, which is the clear distinction between politics and religion18. The 
Zendri, Milano, Giuffrè, 2008.   
11 Gentili and Jean Hotman suggested the expulsion of  the ambassador Bernardino Mendoza 
from England; De legationibus libri tres cit., II, 18-19, pp. 77-82.  
12 See r. langhorne, Alberico Gentili sulla Diplomazia, in Alberico Gentili. Atti dei Convegni nel quarto 
centenario della morte, 11-12-13 settembre 2008 (CISG), II, Milano, Giuffrè, 2010, pp. 443-456. 
13 “Ius legationum (dicit Cicero) humano, divinoque vallatum praesidio est”; De legationibus, II, 
1, p. 40. 
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ivi, 11, p. 63. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Gentili’s approach to this issue is greatly influenced by politiques, especially by Bodin (c. 
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last one is neutralized as an intimate relation with God. This phenomenon 
is the condition to reduce religious conflicts, which tore apart Europe in 
the second half  of  XVI century. This distinction is a premise to Gentili’s 
reflections in his unpublished manuscript De papatu Romano Antichristo and 
in De iure belli, about the relation between different religions in international 
arena and in each State. 
Alberico Gentili read reality with sceptical rationalism due to his 
humanistic education and the study of  Giusto Lipsio’s Politicorum libri 
sex (1589) and Michel de Montaigne’s Essays (1580), frequently quoted 
in De iure belli19. Gentili distrusted the possibility of  reaching a complete 
knowledge about Truth and God20, whose nature is unknowable to man. 
This is why the Italian jurist accepts religious differences and wishes a 
peaceful interreligious and inter-confessional coexistence21: this was the 
vivanti, Assolutismo e tolleranza nel pensiero politico francese del Cinque e Seicento, in Storia delle idee 
politiche economiche e sociali. IV-Assolutismo, diritto naturale, costituzioni, directed by L. Firpo, Torino, 
Utet, 1980, pp. 13-93; d. Quaglioni, I limiti della sovranità. Il pensiero di Jean Bodin nella cultura 
politica e giuridica dell’età moderna, Padova, Cedam, 1992, pp. 199-226; id., Sans violence ni peine 
quelconque au port de salut. Il problema della libertà di coscienza nella République di Jean Bodin, in La 
formazione storica della alterità. Studi di storia della tolleranza nell’Età moderna offerti a Antonio Rotondò. 
Promoted by H. Mèchoulan, R.H. Popkin, G. Ricuperati, L. Simonutti, I, Secolo XVI, Firenze, 
Olschki, 2001, pp. 361-373) but also by his humanistic formation; d. PaniZZa, Il pensiero politico 
di Alberico Gentili. Religione, virtù e ragion di Stato, in Alberico Gentili politica e religione nell’età delle guerre 
di religione. Atti del Convegno, Seconda Giornata Gentiliana, 17 maggio 1987 (CISG), Milano, Giuffrè, 
2002, pp. 59-213. 
19 About scepticism, tacitism and their influence on late sixteenth century English thought see: 
J.h.M. SalMon, Stoicism and Roman example: Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England, in “Journal of  
the History of  Ideas”, 1989, pp. 199-225; P. BurKe, Tacitism, scepticism, and reason of  state, in The 
Cambridge History of  Political Thought 1450-1700 cit., pp. 479-498. 
20 This persuasion seems to be shared with Bodin, especially if  we read Colloquium Heptaplomeres. 
It has been argued that this work is centred on “l’idée de l’absence de vérité absolue en matière 
de religion”; K.f. faltenBacher, Examen de conscience à Venise: le “Colloquium Heptaplomeres”, in La 
liberté de conscience (XVIe-XVIIe siècles). Actes du Colloque de Mulhouse et Bâle (1989) réunis par 
H. Guggisberg, F. Lestringant et J.C. Margolin, Genève, Droz, 1991, p. 111.   
21 Gentili shares this ambition with a huge number of  scholars who aim to resolve the tragic 
European religious conflicts and the reconciliation between Protestant and Catholic Churches. 
We can remember - among the several late-sixteenth century irenists who in England searched 
satisfaction to their projects - Jacopo Aconcio, Bernardino Ochino (M. firPo, “Boni christiani 
merito vocantur haeretici” Bernardino Ochino e la tolleranza, in La formazione storica della alterità. Studi di 
storia della tolleranza nell’età moderna offerti a Antonio Rotondò cit., pp. 161-244), Francesco Pucci (d. 
cantiMori, Eretici italiani del Cinquecento. Ricerche storiche, Firenze, Sansoni, 1978, pp. 184-194; M. 
Biagioni, Prospettive di ricerca su Francesco Pucci, “Rivista storica italiana”, CVII, 1995, pp. 133-152; 
id., Universalismo e tolleranza nel pensiero di Francesco Pucci, in La formazione storica della alterità. Studi 
di storia della tolleranza nell’età moderna offerti a Antonio Rotondò cit., pp. 331-360) and Marc’Antonio 
De Dominis (e. Belligni, Marcantonio De Dominis tra l’Inquisizione romana e Giacomo I: nuove 
prospettive storiografiche dopo Cantimori, in S. Villani, S. Tutino, C. Franceschini (edited by), Questioni 
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ambition also of  the Huguenot Philip Duplessis-Mornay, intellectual near 
to the Sidney circle22.  
However, this pluralistic conception varies in Gentili’s works. The author’s 
position in De iure belli is much more conciliatory and open to differences than 
the limited confessional pluralism model in De papatu Romano23, work” that had 
never been published because it was in contrast with Anglicanism and with 
Gentili’s moderate philo-puritan patrons24. 
De papatu Romano Antichristo is part of  a well-established current in 
Reformation writings, which is Anti-Christ literature. Ochino’s Imagine de 
Antechristo (1542)25 and Aconcio’s Stratagemata Satanae (1564)26 are emblematic 
examples of  this literature and well-known to Gentili27. 
De papatu Romano is a strong invective against Catholic Church and its 
institutions. It represents a violent condemnation of  the Pope’s temporal 
di storia inglese tra Cinque e Seicento: cultura, politica e religione. Atti del seminario tenutosi presso la Scuola 
Normale Superiore di Pisa, 11-12 aprile 2002, Pisa, 2006, pp. 103-120).  
22 He pursued the reconstruction of  unity among Christian churches. This aim is clear in 
Exhortation à la paix aux catholiques français (1574), Traité de l’Eglise (1578), De la vérité de la religion 
chrétienne (1581). This last treatise, partially translated in English by Sidney, was printed in 
England in 1587. The English courtier probably introduced in England Vindiciae contra tyrannos; 
S. lee, Sidney Philip, in Dictionary of  National Biography, vol. 52, 1897, pp. 219-234. Cfr. S. teStoni 
Binetti, Introduzione to Stephanus Junius Brutus, Vindiciae contra tyrannos. Il potere legittimo del 
principe sul popolo e del popolo sul principe, Torino, La Rosa editrice, 1994, pp. VII-XVI; ead. Il 
pensiero politico ugonotto. Dallo studio della storia all’idea di contratto (1572-1579), Firenze, Centro 
Editoriale Toscano, 2002, pp. 235-276.
23 This theological-political treatise has an uncertain dating but recent studies seem to establish 
his writing between 1580 and 1591; d. Quaglioni, Il “De Papatu Romano Anticristo” del 
Gentili, in “Ius gentium ius communicationis ius belli” Alberico Gentili e gli orizzonti della modernità. Atti 
del convegno di Macerata in occasione delle celebrazioni del quarto centenario della morte 
di Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), Macerata, 6-7 Dicembre 2007, edited by L. Lacchè, Milano, 
Giuffrè, 2009, pp. 197-207; g. Minnucci-d. Quaglioni, Per l’edizione critica del De papatu Romano 
Antichristo di Alberico Gentili (1580/1585-1591) in Alberico Gentili. Giustizia, guerra, impero. Atti 
del convegno XIV Giornata gentiliana, San Ginesio 24-25 settembre 2010, Milano, Giuffrè, 2014, 
pp. 331-346. At the moment a critical edition by Giovanni Minnucci and Diego Quaglioni is in 
development.  
24 d. PaniZZa, Alberico Gentili giurista ideologo nell’Inghilterra elisabettiana cit., pp. 19-42. 
25 The work is quoted in a. gentili, De papatu Romano Antichristo, Oxford, Bodleian Library, 
Ms. D’Orville  607, f. 1v. 
26 The work is quoted in De papatu Romano Antichristo, f. 3r. Gentili knew Aconcio’s works. He 
was in good relations with Giovanni Battista Castiglione (by whom he was introduced to Robert 
Dudley) who edited the posthumous Pia esortazione al timor di Dio by Aconcio, printed by Wolfe; 
M. firPo, Giovanni Battista Castiglione, in DBI, Roma, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia italiana, vol. 22, 
1979, pp. 81-83. 
27 d. Quaglioni, Alberico Gentili: il papato romano e il “potere totale”, in Machiavelli e la lingua della 
giurisprudenza. Una letteratura della crisi, Bologna, il Mulino, 2011, pp. 204, 206.  
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ambitions and of  the Catholic Church’s misappropriations. To this purpose, 
Gentili surprisingly quotes Agostino Nifo, who sustained, in his De regnandi 
peritia, that the Pope’s ambition was moved “a sacris ad imperia”28. In addition, 
Gentili’s treatise is relevant as the author’s religiosity manifesto and it testifies 
his position about religious toleration.
Due to his adhesion to Reformation, Gentili was forced to leave his 
homeland and to search guarantees to his freedom of  conscience abroad. 
This is why Gentili is so sensitive to religious toleration. Toleration guarantees 
an irrepressible conscience and spontaneity in man’s relations with God. 
However, Gentili’s toleration is mostly considered instrumentum regni. Religion 
is - as Machiavelli said - an instrument to cohesion and to subjection to 
authority29: “nulla autem res efficacior multitudinem regit, quam superstitio”30. 
So “auctores gravissimi” advise rulers to subject people by using religion or 
superstition and in this manner subjects are addressed “ad utilia”31. 
This is why religion has a great political value as a means of  government. 
Religious unity is a mark of  political and institutional stability. 
The Italian jurist wished religious unity in each State, as Lipsio. Lipsio was 
well known to Gentili because he had been his brother Scipione’s master32 
when he studied in Leida and because Lipsio had edited several versions of  
Tacito’s works33. However, Gentili was a realist and he knew religious unity was 
unlikely to happen, especially by means of  force. 
Gentili affirms the irrepressibleness of  conscience and suggests the 
principle of  religious toleration as a solution to conflictual and destabilizing 
inter-confessional divisions. As for Bodin, toleration is the most effective 
means to maintain unity in a State, if  not religious unity. Use of  force in 
28 De papatu Romano Antichristo, f. 6r. 
29  n. Machiavelli,  Discorsi, I, 11, 11: «E veramente mai fu alcuno ordinatore di leggi straordinarie 
in uno popolo che non ricorresse a Dio, perché altrimente non sarebbero accettate». 
30 a. gentili, The Wars of  the Romans, edited by B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann, translated by 
D. Lupher, Oxford, University Press, 2011, II, 2, p. 132. Cfr. n. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I, 11, 3: “Il 
quale [Numa Pompilio] trovando un popolo ferocissimo, e volendolo ridurre nelle obedienze 
civili con le arti della pace, si volse alla religion come cosa al tutto necessaria a volere mantenere 
una civiltà, e la constituì in modo che per più secoli non fu mai tanto timore di Dio quanto in 
quella republica; il che facilitò qualunque impresa che il Senato o quelli grandi uomini romani 
disegnassero fare”. 
31 The Wars of  the Romans cit., II, 2, p. 132. 
32  a. de BenedictiS, Gentili Scipione, in DBI, Roma, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia italiana, vol. 53, 
1999, p. 268. 
33 f. Barcia, Tacito e tacitismi in Italia tra Cinquecento e Seicento, in S. Suppa (edited by), Tacito e 
tacitismi in Italia da Machiavelli a Vico. Atti del Convegno (Napoli, 18-19 dicembre 2001), Napoli, 
Archivio della Ragion di Stato, 2003, p. 43, n. 2.  
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religious subjects is counterproductive and brings political instability because 
it undermines sovereign authority34.
In De papatu Romano, Gentili promotes an essential religiosity, simple on the 
dogmatic and sacramental side. He also promotes an anti-dogmatic Church, 
open to   interreligious confrontation. Though at the beginning of  the treatise 
Gentili labels the Pope as the Antichrist, minimizing the typical association 
Antichrist-Islam35, Papacy is not the only polemical target in this treatise 
because dogmatism and intolerance in Reformed Churces are also implicitly 
criticized. 
The manuscript was written during the intensifying crisis between 
England and Spain, when a Catholic conspiracy was threatening Elizabeth’s 
throne. In the manuscript, Gentili, close to militant Protestant circles, 
wishes a universal and pluralist Christian Church. In this Church, theological 
and dogmatic conflicts should be solved and doctrine reduced to a very 
few dogmas – among which Trinity is clearly affirmed36. In this Church, 
Reformed Churches (Lutherans, Anglicans, Zwinglians and moderate 
Calvinists) should merge and coexist with the Catholic one, only if  the latter 
were tolerant and would redeem from its moral degeneration37. The Papacy 
is the Antichrist because it is intolerant: «Antichristus magna meretrix ebria 
sanguine Sanctorum, et sanguine Martyrum Jesu»38.
34 “[…] il diritto di religione non riguarda gli uomini nei loro rapporti reciproci […]. La religione 
riguarda Dio, il cui diritto è divino e non umano, cioè tra Dio e l’uomo e non tra uomo e uomo”; 
a. gentili, Il diritto di guerra cit., I, 9, p. 59. Those who have a different religion or “posseduti 
dall’umano errore […] non seguono una buona religione, non vanno per questo contro il diritto 
naturale” and hence they should be tolerated; ivi, p. 60. “[…] non si deve usare violenza contro i 
sudditi che abbracciano un’altra religione”; ivi, p. 64. Cfr. Bodin: “[…] il principe che, perfettamente 
convinto di essere nelle vera religione, voglia conquistare ad essa i sudditi divisi in sette e fazioni, 
a mio parere non deve usare la forza, giacché la volontà umana tanto più è ribelle quanto più 
si cerca di farle forza; invece, seguendo la vera religione e aderendo ad essa, senza finzione né 
dissimulazione alcuna, riuscirà, senza violenza e senza infliggere pena di sorta, un po’ per volta, 
ad adeguare gli animi e la volontà dei sudditi alla sua […]”;  I sei libri dello Stato, II cit., pp. 581-582. 
35 This is why Noel Malcolm has seen in De papatu Romano a germination of  Calvin-Turchism; 
n. MalcolM,  Alberico Gentili and the Ottomans, in B. Kingsbury, B. Straumann (edited by), The 
Roman Foundations of  the Law of  Nations. Alberico Gentili and the Justice of  Empire, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, pp. 127-145. 
36 This is clear in one passage of  the treatise in which Gentili defends Protestants: “Deum Trinum 
fatemur cum tua Ecclesia, fatemur Christum Deum, filium Dei coeternum, consubstantialem 
Patri: symbolum Apostolicum, Nicaenum, retinemus et Athanasium, novum Testamentum 
recipimus”; De papatu Romano Antichristo, f. 70v. 
37 De papatu Romano Antichristo, f. 28r, f. 32r. Cfr. d. PaniZZa, Alberico Gentili, giurista ideologo 
nell’Inghilterra elisabettiana cit., pp. 27-32; v. lavenia, Alberico Gentili: i processi, le fedi, la guerra, in «Ius 
gentium ius communicationis ius belli» Alberico Gentili e gli orizzonti della modernità cit., pp. 185-186. 
38 De papatu Romano Antichristo, f. 68v. 
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The aim is not only simply to overcome inter-confessional divisions, but 
also the political purpose to counterbalance the advance of  international 
Catholicism. Gentili theorizes an anti-dogmatic and tolerant Church, in which 
a confessional pluralism could exist. This pluralism is carefully modelled 
as an effective answer to the threat coming from militant Catholicism and 
Spanish interference. This is a pluralism directed to defend Protestantism and 
England from Spanish expansionism, disguised behind religiosity39. To this 
purpose, taking Habsburg and Ottoman Empires on the same level, in De iure 
belli Gentili asserts: “Non dovrebbero giustamente opporsi tutti in oriente ai 
Turchi e in occidente agli Spagnoli, che, gli uni di qua e gli altri di là, ordiscono 
e si adoperano per espandere il loro dominio? […] Già in precedenza abbiamo 
parlato dei Turchi, e tutti li conosciamo. Se qualcuno non sa degli Spagnoli, 
ascolti da Paolo Giovio come anche la loro indole sia sfrenata e avida di 
comandare. Una volta insinuatisi, tendono sempre a raggiungere in tutti i 
modi il massimo potere” and “se nessuno sarà in grado di opporsi alla Spagna, 
l’Europa cadrà inevitabilmente”40.
Gentili expediently excludes sectarian radicalism from this universal Church. 
This radicalism is typical of  those who do not recognize the essential Trinity 
dogma and those who menace State stability and Protestant cohesion because 
they reject subjection to political and religious authorities. Gentili chooses a 
middle way between an extreme freedom of  conscience and a safe State and 
Protestantism. The involvement of  irenic and anti-Trinitarian Reformed 
currents in this universal Church would threaten Protestant unity and would help 
Catholicism advance. These sectae are considered Pope’s emissaries, advocates 
of  discord: “Sui sunt emissarii Anabaptistae, Libertini, Schwenckfeldiani, 
Servetistae, Antitrinitarii. Dixit in corde suo: Divide et impera”41.
Gentili preferred established Churches and he mistrusted religious 
unrest typical of  contemporary spiritualists42. His position was far from 
Italian heretics, well studied by Delio Cantimori43. Gentili did not agree 
with Bernardino Ochino’s universalistic tension nor Francesco Pucci’s 
universalism44. Gentili aimed at the ideal of  a Christianism simplified in 
39 Il diritto di guerra cit., I, 8, p. 53. 
40 Il diritto di guerra cit., I, 14, pp. 93-94. 
41 De papatu Romano Antichristo, f. 84r.  
42 One general reconstruction of  spiritualist movements in Italy is in M. firPo, Tra alumbrados 
e “spirituali”. Studi su Juan de Valdés e il valdesianesimo nella crisi religiosa del ‘500 italiano, Firenze, 
Olschki, 1990. 
43 d. cantiMori, Eretici italiani nel Cinquecento, Firenze, Sansoni, 1939.
44 Probably Gentili met Pucci at the Italian Church in London (1579-1582) and he perhaps 
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its dogmas and rites, mediated by ecclesiastical hierarchies but outside of  
every form of  authoritarianism. These premises explain Gentili’s choice for 
Anglican Church, after he had frequented the Italian Church in London45. This 
choice is the natural result of  his search for an anti-dogmatic religiosity aimed 
to politics. The Anglican Church did not emphasize theological distinctions, 
born during the Reformation. As for Richard Hooker, a State Church theorist, 
the Anglican Church was almost a civil religion in a country that conflicted 
with Rome and Habsburg. Paolo Sarpi, who knew Gentili’s works through his 
pupil Edwyn Sandis46, was led to get in touch with English scholars for similar 
reasons, wishing an Anglican solution for Venice during the Interdict years47.
We cannot compare Gentili’s realism to Erasmus’s involvement in the 
promotion of  a mild, original, charitable and anti-Augustinian Christianism. 
Gentili simply wished religious peace and State safety. A tolerant and anti-
dogmatic Church should protect these values.
From the beginning of  De papatu Romano, we can observe Gentili’s aversion 
to Spanish religious policy and Habsburg imperial ambitions. In the first folio, 
close to the anti-Jesuit propaganda spread especially in France by Etienne 
Pasquier48, Gentili mentions the sequence of  Society of  Jesus generals until 
Claudio Acquaviva (elected in 1581) and underlines that they were all Spanish 
or Habsburg subjects, except Acquaviva49. This consideration shows Gentili’s 
interest for Spanish legenda negra50 and testifies his will to disclose Habsburg 
mysteries of  State and arcana imperii.51 
knew his work Informazione della Religione Christiana (1580), printed by John Wolfe, with whom 
the Italian jurist would start an intense editorial collaboration. 
45 Subjection to the Anglican Church is clearly testified in an apologetic letter annexed to 
Disputationum de nuptiis libri VII, Hanoviae, apud Guilielmum Antonium, 1601: “Ego sileo […]. 
Sto ego ecclesiae Anglicanae in politia sua» and «imo ius puto, et fas esse, principibus obbedire”
46 Edwin Sandys was author of  Relation of  the State of  religion, work translated in Italian by Paolo 
Sarpi and printed in 1625; t.K. raBB, The editions of  Sir Edwin Sandys “Relation of  the State of  
Religion”, in “Huntington Library Quarterly”, 26/4, 1963, pp. 323-326. 
47 See c. Petrolini, Religione e potestà dei principi: Gentili e Sarpi, in V. Lavenia (edited by), Alberico 
Gentili. “Responsability to Protect”: nuovi orientamenti su intervento umanitario e ordine internazionale. Atti 
del convegno della XV Giornata Gentiliana, San Ginesio, 14-15 settembre 2012, Macerata, Eum, pp. 
215-242.   
48 See S. Pavone, Le astuzie dei gesuiti. Le false istruzioni segrete della Compagnia di Gesù e la polemica 
antigesuitica nei secoli XVII e XVIII, Roma, Salerno Editrice, 2000.  
49 De papatu Romano Antichristo, f. 1v. Gentili’s aversion to Jesuits is clear in a passage where they 
are described as “fex et ultimum Satanae excrementum”; ivi, f. 76r. 
50 It was spread in England by alumbrados and was appreciated by the most progressive circles 
in London court; g. ungerer, Anglo-Spanish Literary Relations in Tudor Literature, Madrid, Artes 
Graficas Clavileño, 1956. 
51 A certain interest in Tacito’s political thought is evident in Gentili’s first writings. Cfr. 
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The rising crisis between England and Spain, which threatened to restore 
its control over the Netherlands and to expand its influence on France, urged 
Gentili to write a treatise about war. In De iure belli, a masterpiece of  modern 
war and international law, the author suggests a war law systematic doctrine, 
whose aim is the legitimation of  English foreign policy and the objection of  
Spanish imperialism. The treatise belongs to that anti-Spanish literature which 
flourished in the Earl of  Essex’s entourage (Gentili’s illustrious patron and 
dedicatee of  De iure belli) in the eighties and nineties of  XVI century52.
In De iure belli, Gentili refers to the most modern developments in political 
and international praxis and he makes use of  a large apparatus of  fontes (a 
heterogeneous whole of  quotations drawn from Scriptural writings, from 
civil and canonical law, from classical and modern historians53). In the treatise, 
the jurist formulates the criteria of  just war. Justness and legitimacy of  war, 
differently from the medieval tradition of  just war, are not based on the 
canonical criterion of  iusta causa, but in a merely formal criterion taking root 
in Roman law. This criterion, neutralizing the concept of  iusta causa and enemy 
criminalization, reduces war to a duel54. War is the last verdict for subjects 
that resort to arms, because they do not recognize higher authorities to settle 
controversies55.
Developing reflections outlined by Raffaele Fulgosio (1367-1427)56, Andrea 
Alciato (1492-1550) and Balthasar d’Ayala (1548-1584)57, Gentili defines war as 
Lectionum et epistolarum quae ad ius civile pertinent libri IV, Londini, excudebat Iohannes Wolfius, 
1583-1584, II, 11, pp. 116-117.  
52 P. e. J. haMMer, The Polarisation of  Elizabethan politics: The Political Career of  Robert Devereux, 2nd 
Earl of  Essex, 1585-1597, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
53 Cfr. c. Zendri, Metodo e sistema delle fonti in Alberico Gentili, in Silete theologi in munere alieno. 
Alberico Gentili e la Seconda Scolastica cit., pp. 45-64 and, in the same book, g. Marchetto, Le fonti 
del De iure belli libri tres (1598) di Alberico Gentili: osservazioni sull’uso dei consilia, pp. 65-82. 
54 Il diritto di guerra, I, 2, p. 16. 
55 Ivi, 3, pp. 21-30. 
56 raPhael fulgoSiuS, Super prima digesti veteris parte, rubr. in D. 1, 1, 5 ex hoc iure, Lugduni, 1654, 
p. 8: “…cum ex utraque parte bellantium contingant acquisitiones dominiorum et servitutes 
[…] quomodo ex ea parte que iniuste bellum agit contingit quod acquirat dominia eodem que 
capit iniustum agens. Respondeo quod quia incertum erat utra pars iuste bellum moveret, nec 
erat iudex communis utrisque superior per quem possit cetum civiliter effici, optima ratione 
constituerunt gentes, ut eius rei iudex bellum foret: hoc est, ut quod in bello vel per bellum 
caperetur, partis capientis fieret: quasi sibi adiudicatum a iudice fuisset”. 
57 Author of  De iure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari (1582). «Quae hactenus de iustis belli 
causis dicta sunt, magis ad aequum et bonum, et viri boni officium, quam ad iuris effectus referri 
debent. Cum enim summis tantum Principibus, qui superiorem non habent, belli gerendi ius 
sit, de aequitate causae disceptare non convenit. Hinc certo modo iustum poterit dici bellum, 
etsi non ex iusta causa feratur […]. Similitaer iustum bellum dicitur, quod publice legitimeque 
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the last judgement for public and sovereign powers, monarchies or republics. 
Just enemies are not those who hold a just cause - unknowable to man58 - but 
those who hold a public and sovereign power. Liberi principes and liberae res 
publicae - in De legationibus Gentili defines sovereign entities in this way59 - are the 
modern international community’s subjects which exercise a power juridically 
independent from superior authorities. This international community is plural, 
both on religious and political sides, with regard to the systems of  government 
chosen by States. Gentili must take into consideration a complex reality in 
which States with different creeds and those torn by religious conflicts coexist. 
Gentili, educated by the reading of  Bodin, Machiavelli and Guicciardini60, 
admits that the intrinsic reasons of  conflicts - which tear Europe apart - should 
be searched for in human passions, thirst for power and people’s nature.
Religion, Gentili asserts quoting Lattanzio61, cannot be forced62. Likewise 
Bodin, Gentili observes, using Cassiodoro’s words, that “religionem imperare non 
possumus”63. Refusing the Holy War theorists’ traditional reasons, the author 
formulates a system of  inter-state relations that, relegating religion to man’s 
inner life, solve political-religious divisions making Catholics, Lutherans, 
Calvinists and Mohammedans juridically and formally equal64. Gentili bases 
rules for relations between States on natural and rational law, common to all 
men and nations65. This is a subject reserved to jurists and not to theologians, 
geritur ab ijs, qui belligerandi ius habent”; BalthaZariS ayalae i. c. Exercitus regii apud Belgas 
supremi iuridici, et apud Mechlin. Consiliarii, De iure et officis bellicis, ac disciplina militari Libri III. Accedit 
Martini laudenSiS, Tract. de Bello, cum notis, Lovanii, Typis Ioannis Vryenborch, sub Bibliis, 
1648, I, 2, p. 41, nn. 33-34. 
58 “È nella natura delle guerre che entrambe le parti pretendano di avere la ragione dalla loro 
parte» because «tutto è avvolto nelle tenebre e si ignora quella verissima e purissima giustizia che 
non porterebbe due persone a litigare giustamente”; Il diritto di guerra, I, 6, pp. 44-45. 
59 De legationibus, I, 4. 
60 Gentili’s considerations on religious wars are strongly drawn from Guicciardini. In this 
manner Gentili expressed his opinion about Ferdinand the Catholic: «che ha fama di cattolico, 
mascherò quasi tutte le sue cupidigie sotto l’onesto velame della religione»; Il diritto di guerra, I, 
9, p. 58. Similar observations are in Guicciardini: “coprì [Ferdinando] quasi tutte le sue cupidità 
sotto colore di onesto zelo della religione e di santa intenzione al bene comune”; Storia d’Italia, 
edited by S. Seidel Menchi, Torino, 1971, XII, 19, p. 1267. 
61 Il diritto di guerra, I, 9, p. 56. 
62 Ivi, pp. 55-60. 
63 Ivi, p. 55. Cfr. J. Bodin, I sei libri dello Stato, vol. II cit., pp. 583-584: «Teodorico re dei Goti, 
per quanto favorisse gli Ariani, non volle mai forzare la coscienza dei suoi sudditi, e ne spiega 
le ragioni con queste parole: “religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur ut credat invitus, così 
come leggiamo in Cassiodoro”» 
64 Equality between Christians and Muslims is not substantial; see. infra. 
65 De legationibus, II, 1, p. 40. Cfr. Il diritto di guerra, I, 1. 
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traditional actors in political legitimation66. “Silete theologi in munere alieno” 
Gentili affirms at the end of  the twelfth chapter in the first book of  De iure 
belli, blaming theologians’ interference in politics and their unsuitability for 
dealing with political affairs – in particular the relations between Europeans 
and Ottomans67. 
The author affirms that just reasons of  war against Ottomans always 
exist, however these just reasons are not based on religion but on a different 
question. Gentili develops a point of  view similar to Covarruvias, affirming 
that Ottomans should be fought not because they are infidels, but because their 
imperialistic policy threatens Christianity’s safety68. A preventive war, called 
“utile”69 by Gentili, should be fought against Ottomans70. For Gentili this form 
of  war is an accomplishment of  the natural principle of  self-defence71. 
A certain mistrust towards infidels persists, in spite of  a formal collocation 
of  the Ottoman Empire on the same level as Western powers. Likewise his 
brother Scipione, author of  Annotationi sopra la Gierusalemme liberata (1586)72, 
Alberico does not give up traditional anti-Islamic reasoning. 
As mentioned in De legationibus, establishing diplomatic relations with 
Muslims is allowed (in 1581 Elisabeth established a permanent embassy in 
66 d. PaniZZa, Alberico Gentili, giurista e  ideologo nell’Inghilterra elisabettiana cit., pp. 55-88. 
67 Il diritto di guerra, I, 12, p. 83.  
68 Ottomans, Gentili argues, “ci insidiano, ci minacciano e, con grande perfidia, sono sempre 
pronti a depredare i nostri beni”; ibid. “Non si deve muovere guerra a chi se ne sta quieto, a chi 
coltiva la pace, a chi non fa nulla di male contro di noi. Ma quando mai si comportarono così 
i Turchi?”; ibid. 
69 See Il diritto di guerra, I, 14. 
70 This kind of  war should be undertaken also against Spain. De Mas has seen  Gentili as one of  
the first theorists of  preventive war; f. Bacone, Saggi, introduzione di E. Garin, a cura di E. De 
Mas, traduzione di C. Guzzo, Milano, Tea, 1995, p. 73: “esso - il concetto di guerra preventiva - 
deriva dalla formulazione del diritto bellico secondo la scuola protestante capeggiata da Alberico 
Gentili”. Cfr. r. tucK, The Rights of  War and Peace. Political Thought and the International Order from 
Grotius to Kant, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 16-19.     
71  The historical context strongly influences these reflections, indeed in 1593 a war between 
Ottomans and Habsburg burst, it finished in 1606. Relatively to defence war Gentili asserted 
that: “È una legge unica e perpetua: difendere la propria salvezza con ogni mezzo. Ogni modo 
è onesto per porsi in salvo: ai dotti lo prescrisse la ragione giuridica, ai barbari la necessità, alle 
nazioni il costume, agli animali la natura stessa. E questa non è una legge scritta ma innata”; Il 
diritto di guerra, pp., 85-86. These considerations are drawn from Ammiano Marcellino (Res gestae, 
XXIII, 1, 7) and Cicerone (Pro Milone 4 and 11). 
72 First commentary to Gerusalemme liberata by Torquato Tasso, in which Scipione did not give 
up the typical Christian prejudice against Ottomans, though he observed that Turkish arms 
were considerable as “pietose” and “giuste” as Christian ones; Annotationi sopra la Gierusalemme 
liberata, in Opera omnia in plures tomos distributa, t. VIII, Neapoli, sumtibus Joannis Gravier, 1769, 
p. 325. 
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Istanbul), as well as stipulating commercial treaties. Muslims have the same 
juridical status as Christians, but establishing military agreements or alliance 
treaties with them is not allowed73 – this is the vulnus of  religious pluralism in 
Gentili: “Io rimango dell’opinione di un dottissimo teologo del nostro secolo 
[Vermigli74], il quale sostiene che si può stare in pace con gli infedeli, ma non è 
mai possibile unire conformemente a giustizia le nostre armi alle loro”, infidels 
– Gentili affirms – are “genti di religione contraria e per lo più spregiatori di 
ogni costume e di tutto il diritto bellico”75. 
In dealing with relations between Europeans and Ottomans Gentili seems to 
be much less modern than the contemporaneous Bodin. The French jurist was 
fascinated by Islamic culture and he had studied the Ottoman Empire’s political 
institutions by reading Paolo Giovio’s Commentario de le cose de’ Turchi 76- work 
frequently quoted in Gentili’s De iure belli  - and Guillaume Postel’s République des 
Turcs77. In his République Bodin had affirmed that treaties stipulated with pagans 
and idolaters were no less binding than those signed between Christians78. 
In Gentili the distinction between politics and religion aims to maintain 
peace among States and – an essential value in his view - to guarantee the safety 
of  the State. For him, as for Bodin, the neutralization of  the religious sphere has 
73 “Non è proibito avere relazioni con gli infedeli: la legge divina non ci ordina di isolarci 
dal mondo e la legge umana comanda a tutti di mettersi in relazione con gli altri. Qui però 
ci si interroga sulla liceità degli accordi, un genere particolare delle relazioni umane, che le 
cose sopra dette dimostrano non essere lecito con uomini di religione diversa dalla nostra”; Il 
diritto di guerra, III, 19, pp. 580-581. Also military alliance “in cui un fedele unisce le sue armi a 
quelle di un infedele” is illicit and “se non è lecito fare queste alleanze contro altri infedeli, sarà 
ancora più illecito farle contro chi professa la nostra stessa religione”; p. 581. Likewise Vermigli 
Gentili affirms that is possibile to maintain peace with Infidels but not “unire conformemente 
a giustizia” Christian weapons to Muslim ones; p. 582. 
74 Gentili quotes Vermigli’s Commentarius in librum Iudicum. It has been affirmed that Gentili 
had “particolare affezione per le opere di Pietro Martire Vermigli e di Theodore de Bèze”; g. 
Minnucci-d. Quaglioni, Il De papatu Romano Antichristo di Alberico Gentili (1580/1585-1591): 
primi appunti per l’edizione critica, in “Il Pensiero politico”, XLVII, 2, 2014, p. 147. 
75 Il diritto di guerra, III, 19, p. 582.
76 Commentario delle cose de’ Turchi had extraordinary fortune. On this see l. Michelacci, 
Introduzione. La nostalgia dell’altro, in P. Giovio, Commentario delle cose de’ Turchi, Bologna, Clueb, 
2005, pp. 8-67. 
77 This work exercised great influence on Jean Bodin, especially on the writing of  Colloquium 
Heptaplomeres (1593). About the relation Bodin-Postel see M.l. KuntZ, Jean Bodin’s Colloquium 
Heptaplomeres and Guillaume Postel: A Consideration of  Influence, in Jean Bodin. Actes du Colloque 
Interdisciplinaire d’Angers (24-27 Mai 1984), Angers, Presses Universitaires d’Angers, 1985, II, pp. 
435-444.   
78 J. Bodin, I sei libri dello Stato, edited by di M. Isnardi Parente and D. Quaglioni, Torino, Utet, 
vol. III, 1997, pp. 252-254.
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the political purpose of  preserving State stability and unity79. It pragmatically 
allows removal of  one of  the reasons to polity disintegration and to prevent 
State division into factions which do not recognize the authority principle 
on whom it is based. These factions contest State existence as a unitary and 
monist entity and hence they cause crisis. On the side of  foreign relations 
the value of  peace and inter-State harmony can be efficiently guaranteed by 
refusing religious wars and the diffusion of  faith by use of  force80. On the 
other side (that is the relation between different religions and confessions in 
each State) the author affirms the value of  toleration. However in De iure belli, 
differently from De papatu Romano Antichristo and three commentationes on war 
(1588-1589)81, toleration is valid erga omnes: also Anabaptists and Antitrinitarians 
should be tolerated. 
Jews too, Gentili argues, should be tolerated as we can infer from the blame 
moved to Seiano, accused to have solicited Tiberio to eradicate the Jewish 
community in Rome: «Vorrei che non ci fossero più Seiani!»82 
Gentili considers toleration as an ethically compulsory behaviour but also, 
pragmatically, as a useful instrument to rule differences and to legitimize 
public and common State institutions. The State is an actor moved to solve 
and neutralize differences, for the purpose of  safeguarding the effective 
implementation of  sovereignty and its monism.
Gentili’s religious pluralism does not hinder State monism, on the contrary 
pluralism is a means to perseverance of  the community’s political and juridical 
organization. State safety is a central principle in Gentili’s hierarchy of  political 
79 Gentili and Bodin’s positions are radically opposed to Estienne de la Boétie’s.  In his Memoires 
de la pacification des troubles la Boétie had affirmed that “Tout le mal est la diversité de religion 
qui a passé si avant, qu’ung mesme peuple, vivant soubz mesme prince, s’est clerement divisé 
en deux pars […]. Non seulement les opinions sont differantes, mais déjà ont diverses esglizes, 
[…] aucunement deux diverses republicques oposées de front l’une à l’autre.”; Memoire sur la 
pacification des troubles. Edité avec introduction et notes par M. Smith, Genève, Librairie Droz, 
1983, pp. 35-36. To safeguard unity and stability, the sovereign is needed to use force against 
his subjects; see d. Quaglioni, Bodin: sovranità e libertà di coscienza in Machiavelli e la lingua della 
giurisprudenza cit., pp. 169-170 and, in the same book, La Boétie: servitù volontaria e guerra civile, pp. 
129-142. 
80 Only towards those that do not have religion force can be used. In Gentili atheists are seen 
as enemies of  humankind; Il diritto di guerra, I, 9, pp. 58-60. Similar observations are in Bodin; I 
sei libri dello Stato, II cit., pp. 581-585.   
81 See i. Maclean, Appendice. Alberico Gentili: bibliografia annotata delle sue opere, 1582-1614, in 
Alberico Gentili. Atti dei convegni nel quarto centenario della morte, vol. II cit., pp. 161-162.   
82 A certain openness towards Jews appears in De papatu Romano Antichristo. Gentili affirms that 
“iudei peiores aliis inflidelibus” but that “iudeorum fides habet primordium veritatis” and “iudei 
possunt habere synagogas in terris christianorum”; f. 2r. 
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values and pro salute reipublicae it is allowed to use force - so denying toleration 
- if  State safety is compromised83. 
The author explains that the use of  force to impose the sovereign’s faith 
is illegitimate except when toleration could cause State destabilization and 
crisis: “A buona ragione gli epicurei furono espulsi da Roma; quella setta 
infatti dissolveva del tutto l’amministrazione dell’Impero, essendo questa 
amministrazione per gran parte fondata sulla religione e sul timore degli 
dei”84. “Non si deve usare violenza contro i sudditi che abbracciano un’altra 
religione”85 unless “da ciò la cosa pubblica non ne riceva detrimento”86.  
This position is antithetical to Giusto Lipsio’s. The Flemish humanist 
had sustained the need for a policy aimed to religious uniformity87. Gentili 
referring, as Bodin, to examples drawn from Ottoman history, rejects Lipsio’s 
position and asks: “Oggi nell’Impero Turco, non sono forse pubblicamente 
tollerati i Giudei e i Cristiani?”88
Polemically associating the Ottoman Empire and the Pontifical State, 
Gentili clarifies that in Ancona Turcs, Jews and Greeks are tolerated89. But in 
Ancona Gentili underlines, toleration has economical and commercial reasons: 
the Papacy had developed Ancona as a commercial base to rival Venice, the 
majority of  its exportations were directed to Ottoman regions in the Balkans. 
Michel Foucault affirmed that in the period in which Gentili lived, European 
thought was still limited to the research of  similarity and  did not formulate 
the conceptual instruments to face difference90. Foucault’s observations are 
certainly sharable however Gentili’s reflection is an important step in the long 
history of  inter-cultural and inter-religious relations. Gentili gives a significant 
theoretical contribution to the human progress towards a more peaceful 
83 Force can be used against those religious creeds and cultural manifestations which damage 
cohesion and stability in the State; Il diritto di guerra, I, 10, p. 62. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ivi, p. 64.  
86 Ibid. 
87 g. liPSio, Politicorum sive civilis doctrina libri sex, in Opera Omnia, Anversa, Officina Plantiniana, 
1637, IV, 2, pp. 63-64.  Politicorum libri are costantly recalled by Gentili who approached neo-
stoicism by reading Lipsio; cfr M. Senellart, Le stoïcisme dans la constitution de la pensée politique. Les 
Politiques de Juste Lipse (1589), in Lagrée J. (edited by), Le Stoïcisme aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles. Actes 
du Colloque CERPHI (4-5 juin 1993), Cahiers de philosophie politique et juridique, Caen, 1994, 
pp. 117-130 and a. Mccrea, Constant Minds: Political Virtue and the Lipsian Paradigm in England, 
1584-1650, Toronto, University press, 1997, pp. 3-37. 
88 Il diritto di guerra, I, 10, p. 65. Cfr. J. Bodin, I sei libri dello Stato, vol. II cit., pp. 583-584. 
89 Il diritto di guerra, I, 10, p. 65.
90 M. foucault, The Order of  Things : An Archaeology of  the Human Sciences, New York, Vintage, 
1973.  
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inter-cultural exchange. This was Jean Bodin’s purpose too, common to both 
the intellectuals was also the desire to see a new era of  peace established in 
Europe by means of  the annihilation of  inter-religious and inter-confessional 
conflicts. The French jurist in the conclusion of  his Colloquium Heptaplomeres 
(1593) exclaims rather significantly: “Ecce quam bonum et quam jucundum, 
cohabitare fratres in unum”91. 
91 J. Bodin, Colloquium Heptaplomeres de rerum sublimium arcanis abditis, curavit L. Noack, Parisiis-
Londini, 1857, p. 358. 

Chapter Four
benjamin Constant the “fox” 
and the ideal of freedom 
betWeen politiCs, history and religion 
Giuseppe Sciara
I’ve been defending the same principle for forty years, freedom in everything, in religion, 
philosophy, literature, industry and politics: and for freedom I intend the triumph of  
individuality as much over authority which wants to govern through despotism, as over 
the masses who claim the right to render the minority subservient to the majority1. 
With these words included in the preface of  Mélanges de littérature et de politique 
of  1829, Benjamin Constant proclaimed two features of  his political and 
philosophical thought: continuity and consistency. They certainly were not 
superfluous clarifications, because out of  the numerous preconceptions to 
which he had been subject to for some time, the label “changeable Constant”, 
given to him following his collaboration with Bonaparte during the Hundred 
Days after having been his sworn enemy for 12 years, is the one that has 
resisted through time more than any other.
Benjamin Constant is now considered one of  major minds from the 
1 B. conStant, Mélanges de littérature et de politique, in Œuvres complètes de Benjamin Constant, Série 
Œuvres, vol. XXXIII, dirigé par f. rouSSet, Berlin/New York, De Gruyter, 2012, p. 145. My 
Translation. From now on, to indicate the volumes of  Œuvres complètes de Benjamin Constant I’ll 
use the letters OCBC. 
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history of  political thought and some commentators consider him the first 
true theorist of  liberalism, not only because he was the first to clearly theorise 
liberalism as a theory of  limitation of  political power, but also because his 
reflections come in a particularly emblematic time frame in the formation 
process of  our political and cultural identity: the period running from the 
French Revolution of  1789 up to the July Revolution of  18302. 
Some biographical notes allow us to understand the importance of  his 
thought and his political experience3. Constant was born in 1767 in Lausanne 
from a Protestant family, which had fled from France and taken refuge in 
Switzerland at the time of  the revocation of  the Edict of  Nantes in 1683. 
This is certainly no insignificant detail, because as I will explain soon, the 
concept of  freedom theorised by Constant contains a religious weight which 
is rich in meaning as regards considerations on monism and pluralism. After 
having studied in various Universities around Germany and Scotland, the 
Swiss liberal arrived in Paris at 28 years old, in 1795, when the Revolution 
had just entered into its Thermidorian stage. Here his intellectual and political 
career started and its path was completely dissimilar to that of  other figures at 
that time, such as Hegel, an intellectual who was dedicated to studying within 
the four walls of  his study. Constant instead was an engagé intellectual, strongly 
motivated to play a political role in revolutionary France and this aspiration 
was never to abandon him. This is a characteristic always to bear in mind to 
understand some of  his attitudes towards historical and political events which 
he experienced first hand. 
During the Thermidor Constant sided with the government of  the Directory, 
a political regime based on the principles of  the representative republic, the 
2 There is an extensive bibliography on Constant’s political thought. I will limit myself  to 
indicating some international texts which have become “classics”: e. hofMann, Les “Principes de 
politique” de Benjamin Constant, Droz, Genève, 1980; S. holMeS, Benjamin Constant and the making 
of  modern Liberalism, Yale U.P., New Haven & London, 1984; M. BarBeriS, Benjamin Constant. 
Rivoluzione, costituzione, progresso, il Mulino, Bologna, 1988; M. gauchet, Constant, in f. furet - M. 
oZouf, Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution francaise, Paris, Flammarion, 1988; B. fontana, Benjamin 
Constant and the post-revolutionary mind, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1991; g. 
a. Kelly, The humane comedy: Constant, Tocqueville and French Liberalism, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1992; t. todorov, Benjamin Constant. La passion démocratique, Hachette, Paris, 
1997; S. de luca, Alle origini del liberalismo contemporaneo. Il pensiero di Benjamin Constant tra il 
Termidoro e l’Impero, Marco Editore, Lungro di Cosenza, 2003. Among the more recent works 
cf. K. S. vincent, Benjamin Constant and the birth of  French liberalism, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York-Basingstoke, 2011.
3 For Constant’s biography the fundamental references are: K. KloocKe, Benjamin Constant. Une 
biographie intellectuelle, Genève-Paris, Droz, 1984; d. wood, Benjamin Constant: A Biography, New 
York, Routledge, 1993.
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regime which followed the Reign of  Terror during which the Jacobins had 
tried to put into practice the model of  the ancient city, or direct democracy, 
giving life to the first assembly-based dictatorship in history. Constant, writing 
a series of  perfunctory pamphlets, is thus a Republican at this stage who keeps 
his distance from the Jacobins and their radical democracy. He was a tireless 
advocate of  freedom and was convinced this could only be guaranteed by the 
directorial Republic’s government. Later on, after the Coup of  18 Brumaire, 
which paved the way for Bonaparte, Constant started to reflect systematically 
on political principles and realised that freedom is independent from the form 
of  government adopted. No matter what the political regime is, republic or 
monarchy, and no matter who power legitimately belongs to, what matters is 
how far this power can get, and what its limits are. Criticising Rousseau and his 
Social Contract, which the Jacobins had taken as a justification for establishing 
the Reign of  Terror, Constant in the Principes de politique, a work composed 
around 1806, but which remained unedited until the 1960’s4, theorises the 
existence of  a sphere of  the Individual’s own rights, a private area where 
authority, be it of  the monarch or the people, has no right to enter. 
This concept, developed in the years of  Bonapartist authoritarianism 
(Constant was sworn enemy of  Napoleon for all the Imperial Age) would 
no longer change. During the years of  the Restoration, from 1814 onwards, 
the Swiss liberal first sided with the Bourbons, convinced that the monarchic 
regime restored by Louis XVIII might guarantee the rights of  freedom to the 
French again. During the Hundred Days, as outlined, Napoleon was called 
to issue the new constitution and the decision to accept this offer greatly 
influenced the rest of  his life and the idea future generations would have of  
him. But even after the definitive failure of  Napoleon and the second return of  
the Bourbons, despite the accusations of  opportunism and being a turncoat, 
Constant had the chance to show his own consistency and his own faith in the 
principle of  Freedom, struggling in the political agon against the ultraroyalistes, 
pronouncing a great many political speeches being a member of  parliament 
and publishing works fundamental for the history of  liberal thought, among 
which De la liberté des Anciens comparée à celle des Modernes stands out for its 
importance and clarity of  explanation.
4 On the origin and the historiographical value of  this fundamental work cf. e. hofMann, Les 
“Principes de politique” de Benjamin Constant, cit. On Constant’s publication method and use of  the 
Principes de politique dated 1806 as réservoir of  Restoration works cf. id., ‘Les Principes de politique’ 
de 1806 comme ‘réservoir’ de textes pour les publications de Constant sous la Restauration. Une description 
schématique du problème, «Annales Benjamin Constant», XXXIII, 2008, pp. 25-61.
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Constant’s liberalism is thus established on a strictly political definition of  
freedom as an individual’s independence from power, from state authority. 
Nevertheless this definition, which we found in the quotation which I started 
this paper with, is the guiding principle of  all Constant’s considerations as 
regards politics, literature, history and religion. Constant thus as a first 
impression may seem a monist thinker, guided, to quote Isaiah Berlin, by a 
single inspiring principle, in his case that of  freedom. And moreover a great 
deal of  commentators, above all ones with a Marxist background, interpreted 
Constantian thought in a monistic sense, as a superfluity of  bourgeois interests5. 
On the basis of  Berlin’s classification between monist thinkers (hedgehogs) 
and pluralist thinkers (foxes)6, my intent is hence to demonstrate that Constant 
is by no means a hedgehog, safe in his spiky shell, who thinks he has found an 
absolute truth, that is one single principle which can explain the complexity of  
living in society; Constant is a fox who pursues many ends, often disconnected 
and contradictory, a thinker who is not at all convinced of  being the guardian 
of  truth and well knows that no-one can boast such a title. 
However, for this purpose, it is not enough just to analyse his political 
writing. We need to look at the many-sided nature of  his work, consider the 
various fields where his considerations were reached (politics, history, religion, 
literature) and the different forms where they were expressed (political 
booklets, articles, theoretical treaties, diaries, novels): from the pamphlets of  
his younger days, to the articles published almost daily on the Restoration 
periodicals, from political essays which remained unedited for a long time, to 
writings about religion (above all De la religion), from novels such as Adolphe 
to autobiographical writing such as Journal intime. Only by bearing in mind his 
complete work – and I believe that for the history of  political thought it is 
necessary to deal also with sources which are not essentially political, not great 
essays – is it possible to highlight how his idea of  freedom transcends the 
typically political dimension which one thinks of  usually when approaching 
his thought and does not appear at all like a monistic philosophical principle7.
5 A typical example is the reading of  u. cerroni, Introduzione, in B. Constant, Principi di poli-
tica, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 19702, pp. 7-44. For an analysis of  the different interpretations of  
Constant’s political thought cf. S. de luca, La riscoperta di Benjamin Constant (1980-1993): tra 
liberalismo e democrazia, “La Cultura”, XXXV, nn. 1-2, 1997, pp. 145-174 e 295-324.
6 i. Berlin, The hedgehog and the fox: an essay on Tolstoy’s view of  history, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
London, 1953.
7 For an overall view of  Constant’s political, philosophical, historical, literary and religious 
thought cf. The Cambridge Companion to Constant, edited by h. roSenBlatt, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.
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Here I cannot proceed to a systematic analysis of  the whole corpus of  
Constant’s work. So as to outline the originality of  Constant’s individualistic 
liberalism and his conception of  liberalism not as a monistic ideal but as an 
opening towards political, religious and moral pluralism and more generally, to 
pluralism of  values, thus I will pause a while on two aspects which in my opinion 
make up the basis of  all his considerations: firstly his philosophy of  history and 
his concept of  the perfectible nature of  the human race; secondly the concept 
of  ethics focused on the concept of  religious sentiment. This analysis will allow 
me to emphasise a contrast, or rather, a continuous intrinsic tension in his 
ethical and political thought: between requests for Enlightenment and requests 
typical of  that type of  Romanticism which was about to get established8. 
One of  the greatest debts that Constant holds towards the Scottish 
Enlightenment, with which he had entered into contact with at an early 
age during his time in Edinburgh, is the abandonment of  the paradigm of  
natural law in favour of  “reasoning through history”, an element which foretells 
an attitude which was to be typical of  the nineteenth century. In fact at the 
base of  all Constant’s thought exists a philosophy of  history based on the 
perfectibility of  the human race, the only theory which is able to explain the 
enigma of  individual and social existence9. According to Constant, only the 
progressive perfection of  the human species creates relationships between 
different generations: each one leaves the following a real heritage of  moral 
and spiritual knowledge, discoveries, and conquests. In this process every 
individual plays a fundamental role, bringing his own special contribution. 
Even just a small intellectual contribution makes man an essential part of  this 
process:
He who with meditation discovers even just one principle, he who with his hand traces 
out just one truth, can allow that the peoples and tyrants use his life; it will not be lived 
in vain, and if  time cancels even the name that labels his fleeting existence, his thought 
will however remain impressed and totally indestructible, and nothing can prevent the 
fact that he has contributed to its formation10.
8 This tension clearly emerges from B. Fontana’s volume, Benjamin Constant and the post-
revolutionary mind, cit.
9 On this aspect of  Constant’s thought cf. in particular e. Behler, La doctrine de Coppet d’une 
perfectibilité infinie et la Révolution française, in Le groupe de Coppet et la Révolution française, Actes du 
Quatrième Colloque de Coppet, 20-23 juillet 1988, sous la direction de E. Hofmann et A.-L. 
Delacrétaz, “Annales Benjamin Constant”, VIII-IX, 1988, pp. 255-274; e. hofMann, The Theory 
of  Perfectibility of  the Human Race, in The Cambridge Companion to Constant, cit., pp. 248-271. For a 
wide ranging examination of  Constant’s philosophy of  history cf. e. traverS, Benjamin Constant: 
les principes et l’histoire, avec une préface de P. Raynaud, Paris, H. Champion, 2005.
10 B. conStant, De la perfectibilité de l’espèce humaine, in OCBC, vol. XXXIII, p. 435.
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The foundation of  the theory of  perfectibility lies in the distinction between 
feelings and ideas. All the notions man receives are transmitted by the senses. 
On one side are feelings, said to be “fleeting, isolated, and leave no trace of  
their existence”11; on the other there are impressions which take shape through 
remembrance of  a feeling or several feelings together and these are called 
“ideas”. The former, feelings, cannot be conserved, are fleeting, the latter 
on the other hand make up a real asset for the individual, because they are 
conserved in the thinking part of  man, are subject to different modifications, 
they weave together, multiply or are simply conserved over time forming a 
kind of  “interior world”. 
While starting from an empirical and sensualistic basis, Constant immediately 
distances himself, imagining a human being with strong spirituality and intense 
creative skills who possesses his own interior world produced by the formation 
of  ideas and the encountering or clashing between them. The ability for man 
to be perfected lies in the supremacy of  ideas over feelings. If  an individual 
was dominated by feelings he would have no chance to improve himself; but 
for man, who “behaves through ideas, improvement is assured”12. In fact, even 
if  the ideas at a given moment are wrong, they carry with them “a seed with 
ever new combinations, more or less instant but unfailing corrections, and 
uninterrupted progress”13.
With this faith in the puissance des idées Constant did not mean to reason in 
a normative way, in fact he wanted to distance himself  from the imperative of  
illuminist origin for which “man must free himself  from slavery of  the senses 
and act according to the light of  reason”14. Constant proposed simply to study 
what man does without worrying what he should be doing; he restricts himself  
to highlighting that what makes man different from the other creatures, is 
his continual inclination to sacrifice a feeling for an idea and consequently 
“relinquish the present for the future”15. Man thus becomes morally and 
spiritually independent; and it certainly is no coincidence that freedom of  
thought acquires fundamental importance in Constant’s thinking. Reason, that 
is the human inclination to combine, modify and perfect ideas, must enjoy the 
utmost independence from authority: “independent thought is indispensable 
for light literature, science and the arts as much as air is necessary for physical 
11 Ivi, p. 436.
12 Ivi, p. 437.
13 Ibidem.
14 Ivi, p. 438.
15 Ibidem.
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life”. Hence, freedom of  thought and perfectibility end up coinciding: 
obstructing the free exercising of  reason, for example by limiting freedom of  
the press means attacking the human being in his very essence, striking him 
in his “most noble parts” and depriving him of  the most powerful means of  
improvement.
Constant thus from some points of  view could be considered to belong to 
the Enlightenment tradition – the concept of  perfectibility, after all, is typical 
of  the Enlightenment – while from others he strictly keeps his distance. One 
instance where this detachment materializes is where he refuses to attribute 
everything, both regarding morals and regarding politics, to the idea of  interest: 
the liberal from Lausanne here introduces the concept of  religious sentiment, 
which he needs, to criticize the utilitarian morals of  Benthamian origin16. 
Religious sentiment appears as “the most natural of  our emotions”17, 
thanks to which the individual finds his own consolation from everyday 
evils. Constant thus starts from the statement that the human condition is 
unhappy, due to the pains and difficulties which continuously arise. Man is 
not only a creature whose hallmark is the inclination to use his own intellect, 
to gradually approach perfection through his ideas, but he is also a weak and 
fearful being who can find himself  in difficulty when faced with the obstacles 
life has in store. An individual’s religious sentiment originates directly from 
this weakness, from this daily sacrifice to suffer the pain and equally from this 
self-deception that above it all there is a superior being ready to reward him 
for such an act of  devotion. Religious sentiment represents the other side 
of  human existence, quite the opposite compared to its constant tendency 
towards perfection.
There is however a common focal point, an element where perfectibility 
and religious sentiment find their own origin and together their own 
fulfilment: it is the individual’s natural inclination toward sacrifice which 
in the first case comes about by rejecting a feeling in favour of  an idea and 
in the second bearing up to pain and difficulty, with a view to some higher 
16 Constant dedicates several works to religion. It is sufficient to recall book VIII of  Principes 
de politique and De la religion considérée dans sa source, ses formes et ses développements. On the religious 
theme in Constant cf. K. KloocKe, Le concept de la liberté religieuse chez Benjamin Constant, “Annales 
Benjamin Constant”, X, 1989, pp. 25-39; P. deguiSe, La religion de Benjamin Constant et l’Unita-
risme américain, in B. Constant: philosophe, historien, romancier, homme d’Etat, Actes du Colloque de 
l’Université du Maryland, October 1989, “Annales Benjamin Constant”, XII, 1991, pp. 19-27. A 
systematic study of  Constant’s religious thinking and its political implications in the context of  
French debates was performed by h. roSenBlatt, Liberal Values. Benjamin Constant and the Politics 
of  Religion, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
17 B. conStant, Principes de politique applicables à tous les gouvernements, in OCBC, vol. V, p. 268.
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objective, but in both cases it is nothing but the attitude of  “sacrificing the 
present for the future”18. 
Constant hangs the same concept of  moral on the idea of  religious 
sentiment, because on it are based man’s most noble sentiments such as 
love, melancholy, need for glory, that is “all the delicate, noble and profound 
passions” that reason cannot explain. Thus, the notion of  religious sentiment 
also absorbs the concept of  doubt, which becomes almost a principle of  
method for an individual’s moral conduct. In the Mélanges as in De la religion, 
but also in many pages of  his Journal Constant maintains that “religious 
sentiment is surely compatible with doubt” and that in fact, “it is much more 
compatible with doubt than with any religion”19. The doubt that Constant 
mentions is not man’s doubt while suffering, far away from God, but it is a 
positive doubt, an instrument of  reason, a doubt which is almost “Popperian”, 
belonging to whoever does not have blind faith in dogmatic beliefs, because 
they know that dogma is an obstacle to man’s progress, whereas doubt gives 
rise to life and continuous renewal20. Therefore, the religion which Constant 
refers to is not dogmatic, but personal, inner and free. Considering the above 
we can understand why in De la religion – which has always represented, for 
Constant, his greatest work, which he had worked on, even if  it was not 
continuously, for almost 40 years – among other things Greek and Roman 
polytheism comes to be glorified: because the Swiss liberal considers it a set 
of  religious beliefs which is much better disposed towards tolerance compared 
to the monotheistic religions. In fact, through this reasoning on Greek and 
Roman polytheism, Constant in De la religion reached the point of  theorising 
religious, moral and political pluralism21. 
When Constant bases his human moral on religious sentiment he clearly 
distances himself  from the Enlightenment, from the English Utilitarians 
and from the French idéologues, who assert that man’s morals are based on 
the notion of  interest. This reasoning can be found and not by chance in 
the Préface to the treatise De la religion, in which Constant argues that interest 
makes us “know only what is useful or what is harmful”22 and hence ends 
up “destroying everything which is against it”23. The man who shapes his 
18 B. conStant, De la perfectibilité de l’espèce humaine, cit., p. 438.
19 B. conStant, Journaux intimes (1804-1807), in OCBC, vol. VI, p. 259.
20 Ibidem.
21 Cf. regarding B. fontana, Benjamin Constant and the post-revolutionary mind, cit., pp. 131-174.
22 B. Constant, De la Religion considére dans sa source, ses formes et ses développements, tome I, in OCBC, 
vol. XVII, p. 78.
23 Ivi, p. 77.
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own behaviour on interest establishes a moral based on one single rule: to 
refrain “from everything which is able to harm us”24 and this brings him to be 
continually influenced by feelings which are either selfish or overly prudent, 
hence repudiating that instinctiveness, that element of  passion and emotion 
which belong to the human being. Rational calculation of  interest cannot be, 
in Constant’s view, the source of  morality because it does not allow man to 
abandon and liberate himself  from his own selfish ambitions. Only religious 
sentiment can produce elevation of  the individual due to disinterest and 
continual sacrifice of  material interests in favour of  something more sublime 
and nobler. However, as has been pointed out, disinterest for Constant, “is 
not the fruit, as in Kant, of  unconditioned obedience to the imperatives of  
reason, an obedience made difficult by the irredeemable contrast with our 
sensitive impulses”25, but flows directly from religious sentiment and thus is 
not in contrast with man’s sensitive side. To summarise, the Enlightenment’s 
understanding of  morality, and Utilitarianism, and Kantian morals, have all 
omitted the importance and complexity of  the individual’s inner life.
This mentality, this idea of  an individual who is surely rational, but 
distinguished by turbulent passions and emotions emerges clearly in 
Constant’s literary works, in particular in Adolphe: the psychological study 
and characterisation of  the young protagonist, the description of  his inner 
turbulence, of  his change in beliefs, his choices which often went against his 
interests, his doubting even as regards the value of  freedom, make this work 
a forerunner as regards themes which were to belong to Romanticism. Both 
from a philosophical point of  view, and in the development of  the characters 
in his own literary works, Constant bluntly refuses behaviour inspired by a mere 
rational calculation based on interest and juxtaposes the principle of  perfectibilité 
and religious sentiment, which make up the two complementary aspects of  
human existence, both, as we have seen, based on the concept of  sacrifice. 
Hence, Constant represents a fundamental milestone on the long path 
of  ethical and political thought. His considerations, on one hand, make up 
a part of  the furrow dug by the Kantian revolution which puts man at the 
centre of  the universe, on the other in the tradition of  the French Lumières, but 
which it is substantially different from, as we have seen. In Constant’s work, 
freedom is made individual, it is no longer the characteristic of  a common 
body, but instead becomes a typical feature of  a human being, able to make 
24 Ibidem.
25 S. de luca, Alle origini del liberalismo contemporaneo, cit., p. 208.
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choices, express judgements, to be morally independent26. This consideration 
of  freedom in man’s intimate domain brings Constantian liberalism to assume 
“a spiritualistic inflection, because historical values are overcome by meta-
historic values”27: Man’s actions and experience assume a deeper meaning, not 
only because of  their efficiency with regard to the political and social world 
surrounding them, but also, above all with regard to his own inner ego and its 
relationship with the Transcendent.
Freedom thus assumes a sacred quality because it is included in the ethical 
edifice founded on the concept of  sacrifice, the original cause of  human 
perfectibility, and on religious sentiment. The latter is founded on a collective 
and individual moral based on the refusal of  self-interest well understood 
to be of  Benthamian origin, a moral handed down through the generations 
through the process of  perfection. In this way, freedom ends up coinciding 
with the “same moral conditions of  civil life”28.
This greater intricacy in understanding individuality, this element of  inner 
being and spirituality when perceiving freedom thus bring Constant closer to 
Romantic inspiration. But in his view, conversely to Romanticism, freedom is 
not represented as a myth and “faith in freedom is not born from an abstract 
conviction or a revelation, but from a historical experience”29 and thus is a 
faith which is constantly being renewed. Freedom is not presented just as a 
romantic ideal which individuals must aspire to, but is inevitably linked to a 
conception of  man which is part of  a historical process, one which he himself  
is leading, through the power of  ideas and by means of  his own inclination to 
sacrifice current passions for the fulfilment of  a future project.
To sum up, in Constant’s thinking, freedom, religious sentiment and 
historical philosophy  are bound indissolubly to create a morality, a life direction 
which is realised outside the standards of  utilitarian selfishness and, as can 
be inferred, Constant is certainly not advocate of  one single ethic, of  values 
which are valid for all in space and time. Utilitarianism, with its pretension of  
quantifying pleasure and pain and basing what is right and wrong on these 
measurements, claiming even to define what happiness is, making it coincide 
with the pursuit of  what is useful, fundamentally had theorized a single system 
26 Cf. a. Zanfarino, Introduzione, in id., Constant. Antologia di scritti politici, il Mulino, Bologna, 
1982.
27 f. valentini, Liberalismo e gradualismo. Humboldt, Constant, Staël, in id., Il pensiero politico 
contemporaneo, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1985, p. 116.
28 a. oModeo, Benjamin Constant e la libertà come ideale e come metodo, in La cultura francese nell’età della 
Restaurazione, Einaudi, Torino, 1974², p. 203.
29 P. Biondi, La politica di Constant, in “Studi politici”, II, nn. 3-4, 1953-54, p. 299.
BenJaMin conStant the “fox” and the ideal of freedoM 67
of  values, bringing the life of  man down to something decided in advance.
For Constant it is not so. An ethic valid for all does not exist, neither does 
one single system of  values, nor does one single lifestyle that everyone has to 
follow, and happiness cannot have the same meaning for all. Precisely because 
he distinguishes religious sentiment from dogmatic beliefs, he highlights the 
value of  doubt, he imagines individual freedom with a strong ethical and 
spiritual charge, freedom which dwells in the inner world of  each of  us, he 
demonstrates acknowledgement not only of  the concept of  tolerance, but also 
of  pluralism of  values, which are in fact individual values hence different for 
each of  us. 

Chapter Five
franCes Wright: 
l iberty as a founding pr inCiple 
of republiCan ameriCa  
Federica Falchi
It was between 1760 and 18301 that the term democracy first came to be used 
with a positive connotation in British political discourse (e.g. T. Paine in Rights 
of  Man and Letter Addressed to Addressers), albeit with a quite different meaning 
from that associated with the Greek city states 2. 
This semantic shift was a direct result of  the American experience that led 
to the growing resentment against the monarchy. It was spawned by the ideals 
of  individualism and egalitarianism and inspired by English history and Law 
as well by Lockean Contractarianism.   
It should be remembered that the word democracy was at the time practically 
synonymous with the term Republic, which thanks to the ideas spread by 18th 
century writers was associated with the splendour and power of  the Roman 
Republic that “had achieved, in its glory and fame, all that any people on earth 
could have wished for […] «It was impossible» said Montesquieu, «to weary of  
1 M. PhiliP, Reaching for democracy in Britain 1760-1830, in Carmelo Calabrò, Viaggio nella 
democrazia. Il cammino dell’idea democratica nella storia del pensiero politico, edited by Mauro Lenci, 
presented by C. Palazzolo, Pisa, Edizioni ETETS 2010, p. 106.
2 “The reference of  the term ‘democracy’ changes from ancient small city-states in which the 
people rule directly, to the idea of  representative institutions serving states of  often considerable 
territory and scale” in ivi, p. 105.
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something as great as ancient Rome»”3. In the Federalist, the Founding Fathers 
had equated  «pure democracy» with the republic4.
In the years following the establishment of  the American Constitution, 
the United States attracted the curiosity of  numerous scholars due to the 
novelty of  it being a Republic located within in a vast territory; it was a federal 
state with extensive male suffrage. In short, as Tocqueville noted, it was the 
first example of  a modern democracy. «I admit that in America I saw more 
than America; I sought there an image of  democracy itself, its tendencies, its 
character, its prejudices, its passions; I wanted to know democracy, if  only to 
know at least what we must hope or fear from it»5.
Before the French philosopher arrived in America to write his celebrated 
analysis of  the events underway there, another thinker had already made the voyage 
across the Atlantic with the intention of  studying this new and revolutionary 
political model; the person in question was the Scotswoman Frances Wright6 who 
3 g. S. wood, L’eredità di Roma nella rivoluzione americana, in La virtù e la libertà: Ideali e civiltà italiana 
nella formazione degli Stati Uniti, Torino, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1995, p. 22.
4 See also J. MadiSon, Federalist No. 10, November 23, 1787, in http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
histdox/fed_10.html.
5 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition of  De la démocratie en Amérique, 
ed. Eduardo Nolla, translated from the French by James T. Schleifer. A Bilingual French-Engli-
sh editions, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010). Vol. 1. 21/2/2016. http://oll.libertyfund.org/
titles/2285. 
6 Born in Scotland in 1795, she was the daughter of  the well-to-do radical James Wright. Both her 
parents died when she was still a child, so she was brought up mainly by relatives on her mother’s 
side, who were part of  the prestigious Campbell clan. One person who played a particularly 
important role in her education was her uncle Mylne, professor of  moral philosophy at the 
University of  Glasgow and a well-known figure in the Scottish Enlightenment movement. A 
lively, enquiring mind, she lived her years between the United States (eventually taking citizenship), 
Great Britain and France. Her first publications were an essay on Epicurean philosophy and a play, 
Altorf, about the independence of  Switzerland. After a visit to Owen’s New Harmony, she set up 
a community for the emancipation of  blacks in Nashoba. When it was clear her emancipationist 
project had failed, she went to New York, where she held the first of  a series of  lectures on 
politics, religion and female emancipation. As a result of  some unfortunate personal events, 
she gradually withdrew from public life and sadly died in solitude in 1852, in Cincinnati. On 
Frances Wright see my f. falchi, Frances Wright, una scozzese alla ricerca delle origini e della valenza 
politico-sociale dell’idea di eguaglianza nel nuovo mondo, in G. Scichilone - M. Ferronato (edited by), Lo 
scrittoio dell’intellettuale. La sfida del conflitto nella storia politica occidentale, Roma, Aracne, 2016 and among 
others: f. wright, Biography, Notes, and Political Letters of  Frances Wright D’Arusmont. Dundee, J. 
Myles, 1844; w. waterMan, Frances Wright, New York, Columbia University 1924; Margaret 
lane, Francis Wright and the Great Experiment, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1972; r. 
Stiller, Commune on the Frontier: The Story of  Frances Wright, New York, Crowell, 1972; c. MorriS, 
Fanny Wright: Rebel in America, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1984; S. KiSSel, In 
Common Cause: The “Conservative” Frances Trollope and the “Radical” Frances Wright, Bowling Green, 
OH, Bowling Green State UP, 1993; J. rendall, Prospects of  the American Republic, 1795-1821: The 
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disembarked in New York with her sister Camilla, convinced that she would find 
her imagined utopia. 
It was after reading La Storia della guerra dell’indipendenza degli Stati Uniti 
d’America (1809) written by the Piedmontese historian Carlo Botta7, that she 
took a passionate interest in American affairs and read all the books on the 
United States8 that she could find in her family library as well as at the Glasgow 
university library. As a child she had read widely because «Surrounded at all 
times by rare and extensive libraries, and commanding whatever masters she 
desired»9. Her thirst for knowledge was such that «she applied herself  by 
turns to various branches of  science, and to the study of  ancient and modern 
letters»10. Her curiosity still unquenched, she decided she had to go and see for 
herself  the truth that lay behind what she had read.  
Wright spent almost two years travelling around North America, recording 
her thoughts and impressions in letters she exchanged with Robina Craig 
Millar11 who also had a keen interest in American affairs having lived there 
herself. On her return to England, her friend Robina encouraged her to select 
and edit her letters for publication; the English edition of  the volume went 
to print in 1821 with the title Views of  society and manners in America; in a series 
of  letters from that country to a friend in England, during the years 1818, 1819, and 
1820. The French version, Voyage aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique, ou Observations sur 
la société, les mœurs, les usages et le gouvernement de ce pays, recueillies en 1818, 1819 et 
1820 Par Miss Wright, came out in 1822. 
Radical and Utopian Politics of  Robina Millar and Frances Wright, in Manning Susan and France Peter 
(edited by), Enlightenment and Emancipation, Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, 2006, pp. 145-
159; M. t. Pichetto, “A friendship of  no ordinary character”. Frances Wright e il generale Lafayette, in G. 
Angelini - M. Tesoro (edited by), De amicitia. Scritti dedicati a Arturo Colombo, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 
2007, pp. 284-294; a. J. g.PerKinS - t. wolfSon, Frances Wright, Free Enquirer: The Study of  a 
Temperament, Philadelphia, Porcupine,1972; c. a. KolMerten, Women in Utopia. The ideology of  gender 
in the American owenite communities, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1998.
7 On Carlo Botta, see for example: r. graSSo, Carlo Botta e la Storia della guerra dell’indipendenza 
degli Stati Uniti d’America, Chiaravalle C.le, Industria tipolitografica Frama, 1972; l. canfora - 
u. cardinale (edited by), Il giacobino pentito: Carlo Botta fra Napoleone e Washington, Roma-Bari, 
Laterza, 2010.
8 She quotes among others: lieutenant hall, Travels in Canada and in the United States 
in 1816 and 1817, London, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown 1818; h. BradShaw 
fearon, Sketches of  America: A Narrative of  a Journey of  Five Thousand Miles Through the Eastern and 
Western States of  America, London, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1818.
9 f. wright, Biography, Notes, and Political Letters of  Frances Wright D’Arusmont, cit., p. 6.
10 Ibidem.
11 Robina, of  radical persuasion, was the daughter of  the doctor and academic William Cullen 
(1710-1790). She married John Craig Millar (1762-1796) and went with him to the United States, 
where she remained until his death. See c. MorriS, op. cit.; J. rendall op. cit.
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Working on the text gave her the opportunity to come into contact with 
«the prominent Reformers of  Europe»12.
Notwithstanding a few inaccuracies and a level of  enthusiasm that 
sometimes seems to compromise objectiveness, her writing is filled with rich 
descriptions and reflections on American institutions and society. Her prose 
also reveals an admiration for some of  the features of  the modern conception 
of  republic adopted by the New world; she emphasizes how the principle of  
liberty brings harmony and a pluralist vision of  social and political life.  
It is difficult not to agree with Duran when she states that Views «May 
also be read as a product of  the late – very late – years of  the Scottish 
Enlightenment»13 in which Wright systematically refers to «classical republican 
imagery to represent the heroic face and political goals of  the American 
republic»14.
The structure of  her prose, her methods of  research and analysis, as well 
as the numerous learned references all revealed the education that Wright 
had received. In addition to being well versed in the classics and in Italian 
writers, she was also familiar with the works of  writers during the Scottish 
Enlightenment, thanks to the influence of  her uncle Mylne and his friends 
and colleagues at the university of  Glasgow, one of  the main centres of  this 
school of  thought. On top of  this wealth of  cultural knowledge, she had 
also studied the works of  Paine15, a republican and a central character in the 
American revolution, and the works of  the leading proponents of  Natural law 
and Contractarianist theory in England16. 
12 f. wright, Biography, Notes, and Political Letters of  Frances Wright D’Arusmont, cit., p. 12. During 
her lifetime, as a result of  her success as an author as well her political and social initiatives, 
Wright had the opportunity to meet and mix with a number of  the most illustrious thinkers and 
politicians of  the day. Among them were J. Bentham, Lafayette, J. Monroe, T. Jefferson, James 
e John S. Mill, J. Madison, G.J. Holyoake, R. Owen. V. w. waterMan, op. cit.; c. MorriS, op. cit.
13 J. rendall, op. cit., p. 145.
14 Ivi, p. 146.
15 She would certainly have had access to the works of  Paine in the family libraries because her 
father James was an admirer of  the American and French revolutions, and of  Paine. In 1794, he 
published a low-priced version of  The Rights of  man, drawing the suspicion of  the government, 
who thereafter kept him under surveillance. V. f. wright, Biography, Notes, and Political Letters of  
Frances Wright D’Arusmont cit., p. 4. 
16 As Marco Geuna says «The Scottish enlightenment can perhaps be considered as another 
cultural context in which the languages of  Natural Law and Republicanism  are intertwined 
and superimposed in the writings of  various authors. Further, it is a context in which thinkers 
whose roots lie in either one or the other tradition are often confounded; a context in which 
the two traditions are, as it were, placed in opposition, albeit in renewed terms» in M. geuna, 
La tradizione repubblicana e l’illuminismo scozzese, in edited by L. Turco, Filosofia, Scienza e Politica nel 
Settecento Britannico, Padova, Il Poligrafo, 2003, p. 56.
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5.1 the republiCan spir it
In spite of  the conviction held by many Englishmen that America was «in 
a sort of  middle state between barbarism and refinement»17 Wright’s first 
impression of  America when she arrived was a country whose political, social 
and economic foundations were clearly in the making and that liberty, in the 
broadest sense of  the word, was the driving force of  a progress: «recalling the 
rapid strides which these States have made, in less than half  a century, from 
unknown colonies to a vast and powerful empire, you cannot help invoking 
the name of  Liberty, under whose auspices all has been effected»18.
Frances Wright sensed the presence of  liberty, the essence of  pluralism, 
not just in a theoretical dimension, as was the case in Great Britain, but on a 
practical level as well. It was perceptible in all sectors of  society, in political and 
social institutions, to the extent that there was no distinct barriers separating the 
governed from the governors, nor conditions of  oppression and domination, 
but rather a balance borne of  a common consensus. All this was thanks to 
the «universal spread of  useful and practical knowledge, the exercise of  great 
political rights, the ease, and, comparatively, the equality of  condition»19.
Wright’s selection of  her letters broadly followed the outline of  Botta’s 
book, since a number of  them dealt with an analysis of  the birth of  the United 
States. Evidently, she thought this would be crucial, according to the precepts 
and principles of  the Scottish Enlightenment, to better understand the chief  
origins of  the social and political genesis of  19th century America. Under the 
strong influence of  this school of  thought, she believed it necessary to look 
closely at both the social and political environment that had formed and compare 
it to the one that people had come from, in order to gain a better understanding 
of  man and the development of  ideas20. As Trevor-Ropper writes, «the study of  
17 f. wright, Views of  society and manners in America; in a series of  letters from that country to a friend 
in England, during the years 1818, 1819, and 1820, London, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and 
Brown 1821, p. 311.
18 Ivi, p. 21.
19 Ivi, p. 118.
20 The most noteworthy figures of  the Scottish Enlightenment included such names as Francis 
Hutchenson, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, William Robertson, John Millar 
and David Hume. V. h. trevor-roPer, “The Scottish Enlightenment”, in Studies on Voltaire 
and the Eighteenth Century, 68, 1967, pp. 1635-1658; n. t. PhilliPSon, The Scottish Enlightenment, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981; P. JoneS (edited by), The ‘Science of  man’ in the 
Scottish Enlightenment. Hume, Reid and their Contemporaries, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
1989; t. M. devine (edited by), Improvement and Enlightenment, Edinburg, John Donald Publishers 
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man merges in the study of  his social context, and the pupils of  Hutchenson, 
from being moral philosophers, concerned with the problem of  virtue, became 
social historians, concerned with the problem of  progress»21.
One important point that the Scotswoman highlights is the homogeneity 
of  the settlers’ economic and social conditions, which contributed to the 
making of  a society without hierarchical divisions. Indeed, the fact that many 
settlers were either dissenters, drawn by the desire to practice their own faith 
freely, or had little interest in religion, meant there was widespread acceptance 
and tolerance of  religious diversity. Faith was a personal matter that would not 
intrude on political and institutional affairs.
Wright saw that a thorough description of  the life and character of  the 
first settlers would be necessary to highlight the correlation she had observed 
between liberty and the practice of  religious tolerance22. 
In America as in other countries, the transition from freedom of  conscience 
to freedom of  expression was a brief  one, albeit longer in some cases. The case 
of  Pennsylvania is emblematic and is examined closely by Wright. The state’s 
founder, William Penn, had made a name for himself  in his homeland for his 
campaigning in favour of  the freedom of  conscience. For example, in the Great 
Case of  Liberty of  Conscience Once More Debated & Defended23 he declared that the 
freedom of  expression was his right, and the right of  every human being: Wright 
writes «intrepid Penn, not only asserted his own right to freedom of  opinion, 
LTD, 1989; M. geuna, La tradizione repubblicana e l’illuminismo scozzese, cit., pp. 49-86; M. ruBBoli, 
Illuminismo, filosofia scozzese del Common sense e protestantesimo americano, in G. Cantarutti - S. Ferrari 
(edited by), Illuminismo e protestantesimo, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2010, pp. 229-242.
21 h. trevor-roPer, op. cit., pp. 1640.
22 With regard to this, see among others: g. JellineK, La Dichiarazione dei diritti dell’uomo e del 
cittadino, Bongiovanni Giorgio (edited by), Roma-Bari, Laterza, (1895) 2002; n. BoBBio, L’età 
dei diritti, Torino, Einaudi, 1997; g. oeStreich, Storia dei diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali, 
Gustavo Gozzi (edited by), Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2001; a. facchi, Breve storia dei diritti umani, 
Bologna, il Mulino, 2006; t. caSadei, Tra ponti e rivoluzioni. Diritti, costituzioni, cittadinanza in 
Thomas Paine, Torino, G. Giappichelli Editore, 2012; e. Pariotti, I diritti umani: concetto, teoria, 
evoluzione, Lavis (TN), Cedam, 2013; M. lenci, Dalla libertà religiosa alla libertà politica: il radicalismo 
anglo-americano, 1689-1776, in (edited by) M. Lenci - C. Calabrò, Viaggio nella democrazia. Il cammino 
dell’idea democratica nella storia del pensiero politico, cit., pp. 43-68.
23 His battle for the freedom of  conscience cost him dearly; he was imprisoned in the infamous 
Tower of  London. The treatment he received convinced him in Pennsylvania to adopt a penal 
code that took into consideration the humanity of  a convict, substituting just punishment for 
cruelty and giving convicts an opportunity to redeem themselves. See for example: c. MaBel 
MaSon, William Penn: founder of  Pennsylvania, Boston, John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 1924; 
e. J. gray, Penn, New York, Viking Press, 1950; M. K. geiter, Wiliam Penn, London, Longman 
Pub Group 2000.
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but claimed it also for mankind»24 and that his ‘colony’was an example of  virtue, 
a state where the people were all free citizens with the same rights and duties and 
all in control if  their own destiny and patrons of  their own sovereignty.
The conviction held by Wright that «It is difficult to make observations 
upon the inhabitants of  a particular district that shall not more or less apply to 
the nation at large. This is the case in all countries, but more particularly in these 
democracies»25 was shared by many, particularly since there was an openness 
towards the themes of  tolerance, humanity and self-government that was 
generally uniform throughout the colonies, even though to varying degrees. 
On this, Wright cites Burke, who had also identified the correlation between 
freedom of  conscience and the consequent expansion of  liberty in America:
In this Character of  the Americans, a love of  Freedom is the predominating feature which 
marks and distinguishes the whole […] This fierce spirit of  Liberty is stronger in the 
English Colonies probably than in any other people of  the earth; and this from a great 
variety of  powerful causes; which, to understand the true temper of  their minds, and the 
direction which this spirit takes, it will not be amiss to lay open somewhat more largely26.
Burke again: 
Religion, always a principle of  energy, in this new people is no way worn out or 
impaired; and their mode of  professing it is also one main cause of  this free spirit. 
The people are protestants; and of  that kind which is the most adverse to all implicit 
submission of  mind and opinion. This is a persuasion not only favourable to liberty, 
but built upon it27.
24 f. wright, Views of  society and manners in America; in a series of  letters from that country to a friend 
in England, during the years 1818, 1819, and 1820, cit., p. 54.
25 Ivi, p. 118.
26 e. BurKe, Speech of  Edmund Burke, Esq., on Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies 
22 March 1775, in Edmund Burke, Select Works of  Edmund Burke. A New Imprint of  the Payne 
Edition. Foreword and Biographical Note by Francis Canavan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1999). Vol. 1. 25/2/2016. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/796>.
27 Ibidem.
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5.2 the deClaration of independenCe and the Constitution
The Declaration of  Independence and the creation of  a constitution were able 
to come about thanks to the combination of  the socio-historical conditions of  
the American colonies and the judicial and philosophical tradition of  England, 
the latter being a vital sine qua non for political legitimacy in the United States.  
Wright reminds us of  the key events and moments in history associated 
with the Declaration of  Independence, recalling the emotion she felt during a 
visit to the building where it was signed: 
«I know not, in the whole page of  human history, anything more truly 
grand and morally sublime than the conduct of  the American Congress 
throughout that unequal contest, upon which hung not the liberties of  one 
people but those of  mankind»28. Memories of  the war invoke the heroic 
actions of  a people who had become beacons of  the principle of  liberty, of  
self-determination and who, notwithstanding the difference in military might 
continued the struggle unwaveringly because they had «confidence in their just 
cause, and, with their eyes upon the pole-star of  liberty, did they steady the 
helm of  the reeling vessel of  the infant state, ride out triumphantly the storm 
of  war and revolution, and gain the glorious haven, from which their thoughts 
had never swerved»29.
As she takes us through the stages of  the American revolution, Wright 
recalls that the members of  the Assembly enjoyed the complete trust of  the 
populace and draws attention to how they claimed their natural right to choose 
their own representatives and could participate in establishing laws according to 
the precepts and precedents of  the British tradition. The apparent indifference 
of  the motherland combined with the vast distance separating them brought 
people together and made them more receptive to the «numerous energetic 
pamphlets which began to advocate the national disunion of  the colonies 
from the British empire»30. 
Faced with an evident disregard of  their natural rights, and on the strength 
of  the contractarianist tradition from which they had come, these settlers had 
staged all manner of  protests possible, thus exerting their right to popular 
resistance to the point where the continuing injustices perpetrated by the 
28 f. wright, Views of  society and manners in America; in a series of  letters from that country to a friend 
in England, during the years 1818, 1819, and 1820, cit., p. 87.
29 Ivi, p. 88.
30 Ivi, p. 95.
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motherland led to the breakdown of  the pact and the foundation of  a state 
based on liberty and popular consent. These events in American history 
represent a milestone in the history of  civilization and progress because, to 
quote Wright «It was not the cause of  Americans only, it was the cause of  the 
very people whose injustice they opposed»31. 
Further, «the people were now their own lawgivers, whatever they decreed 
amiss could be forthwith amended, and from that time we find no political 
disputes in this or the other republics, but those of  a day»32.
A further defining characteristic, according to Wright, is one that emerged 
tangibly during the revolutionary period: moderation. It enabled Americans to 
reach decisions in a spirit of  harmony and consensus, providing a beacon of  
light for a people forced to deal with huge human and economic loss. Referring 
to them as «modern Romans», she draws a parallel with the political and civic 
virtues that helped the Roman Republic become a model of  civilization and 
political maturity. The use of  moderation was perhaps motivated by a will 
to distinguish the values underlying the American revolutionary experience 
from the French revolution, frequently cited for the brutality of  its summary 
executions.
An oft-quoted feature noted by Wright is «the integrity of  the Congress, or 
the confidence of  the people in their integrity»33. Integrity is the civic virtue 
traditionally held to be an indispensable ingredient for the good functioning 
of  a Republic; a virtue that guarantees the people’s representatives will focus 
on the common good rather than on personal gain. 
we find not one member of  that magnanimous assembly even suspected of  peculation, 
or of  a desire of  personal aggrandizement; and the latter [confidence of  the people in 
their integrity], that, during the worst days of  that storm period, the public suffering was 
never charged to any willful mismanagement on the part of  the government34.
Republican virtues are something that every citizen must exercise through 
active participation in the life of  the community and state, something made 
possible by the right to vote given to most American males35. The fact that the 
31 Ivi, p. 96.
32 Ivi, pp. 106-107.
33 Ivi, pp. 89-90.
34 Ivi, p. 90.
35 Despite her great admiration for the American republic, Wright didn’t hesitate to draw 
attention to what she considered two detestable evils: the inferior legal and political position 
of  women and slavery. The Scottish author had a positive, rosy outlook on the progress of  
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settlers had a generally higher level of  education compared to most European 
countries, that they had been granted suffrage and were encouraged to play 
an active part in the resistance against the motherland, instilled in Americans 
a sense of  belonging, while also maintaining a spirit of  individualism. The 
Scottish writer first discerned this during her voyage to the United States; 
engaging in conversation with the crew she observed that «every man of  the 
crew, from the old veteran to the young sailorboy, could read and write, and, I 
believe, I might almost say every man could converse with you upon the history 
of  his country, its laws, its present condition, and its future prospects»36.
Within any state, notes Wright, peace is obtained through a balance between 
power and liberty, which had been achieved in America. Commenting on the 
debate between supporters and enemies of  the Republic, she affirms that it 
was futile for the latter to point to the example of  Rome with its feuding 
factions and internecine war, because America had created institutions with 
popular representation and «this is which gives to modern liberty a character 
foreign to that which she bore in ancient times; this is which has made freedom 
and peace shake hands, and which renders the reign of  one coeval with that 
of  the other»37.
A system of  representation which was:
invented, or rather by a train of  fortuitous circumstances brought into practice in En-
gland, has been carried to perfect in America; by it the body of  the people rule in 
everything; by it they establish their constitutions; by it they legislate according to the 
Constitutions established; and by it again they amend their constitutions, according to 
the gradual advance of  the public mind in political wisdom. Thus, though the form of  
government should in some cases be found deficient, yet as the door is ever left open to 
improvement, in system it may always be pronounced perfect38.
mankind, but was convinced there were evident signs that both these evils could be corrected 
«The prejudices still to be found in Europe, though now indeed somewhat antiquated, which 
would confine the female library to romances, poetry, and belles-lettres, and female conversation 
to the last new publication, new bonnet, and parasol are entirely unknown here. The women are 
assuming their place as thinking beings, not in despite of  the men, but chiefly in consequence 
of  their enlarged views and exertions as fathers and legislators» franceS wright, Views of  society 
and manners in America; in a series of  letters from that country to a friend in England, during the years 1818, 
1819, and 1820, cit., p. 422; «The counsel, and perhaps ultimately the assistance, of  the great 
and numerous northern and western states, may in time be useful in relieving their sister states 
from this crime and calamity; if  the former be given with temper, and the latter yielded with 
unpretending generosity», ivi, p. 72.
36 Ivi, p. 5.
37 Ivi, p. 116.
38 Ibidem.
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The scholar from Dundee was convinced that even imperfect Republics, 
where liberty and power are in the hands of  the people, can strive to reach 
excellence. In support of  her argument she cites another passage taken from 
I discorsi sopra la prima deca Tito Livio «“Quelle republiche che, se le non 
hanno l’ordine perfetto hanno preso il principio buono e atto a diventare 
migliore, possono, per la occorrenza delli accidenti diventare perfette”»39.
5.3 the b irth of the Constitution
These republics based on common principles were able to privilege the «common 
good» and overcome their differences because «there is no strength without 
union»40. Wright cites the words of  Ramsey that she thought best described the 
sense and the driving force behind the adoption of  a Federal government. 
The adoption of  this constitution was a triumph of  virtue and good sense over the vices 
and follies of  human nature; in some respects, the merit of  it is greater than that of  
the declaration of  independence. The worst of  men can be urged on to make a spirited 
resistance to invasion of  their rights; but higher grades of  virtue are requisite to induce 
freemen, in the possession of  a limited sovereignty, voluntarily to surrender a portion of  
their natural liberties; to impose on themselves those restraints of  good government whi-
ch bridle the ferocity of  man, compel him to respect the claims of  others, and to submit 
his rights and his wrongs to be decided by the voices of  his fellow citizens. The instances 
of  nations which have vindicated their liberty by the sword, are many; of  those which 
have made a good use of  their liberty when acquired, are comparatively few41. 
Americans had the merit of  not abusing their liberty, and realized that a respect 
for rights could not be attained without an acceptance of  shared rules; this co-
existence of  liberty and restriction is, as Kant explains, the only path to peace 
and the rule of  reason.
The adoption of  a Federal constitution was an absolute novelty in history, a 
constitution which the liberty of  a nation and the world in general was entrusted.
39 Ibidem.
40 Ivi, p. 329.
41 Ivi, p. 328.
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The spectre of  ‘dictatorship of  the people’ and the loss of  individualism 
was still present in the memory and knowledge of  the traditional diffidence 
towards democracy voiced by the fathers of  ancient Greece and in 
Rousseau’s experimental democratic ideas. Frances displayed an awareness 
of  the democratic debate and was keen to draw attention to the innovation 
in the American system: «the voice of  the sovereign people is not altogether 
absolute, and by no means undisputed. If  the people be proud, also are their 
agents in congress; and few are found who will passively surrender their 
right of  judgement to their employers»42. On occasions when the people 
are at odds with their representative, the latter may exert the right to a ‘call 
to reason’. Taking such a liberty is not a betrayal of  the electorate because 
it occurs only on rare occasions and in any case, any ambitious politician 
would see the danger of  doing so. As Wright specifies, if  a man is ambitious, 
he will only be successful if  he acts on the interests of  others: «the moment 
that he ostensibly opposes his own to those of  his fellow citizens, he must 
throw up the game»43.
America’s republican model, observes Wright, is at variance with the 
Machiavellian model that lauds conflict between opposing factions with 
conflicting interests, because it rests on the principle of  parity in political and 
civil conditions. Revolts and struggles do not occur, nor are they necessary 
because the systems seems fair and just to all: «Liberty is here secure, because 
it is equally the portion of  all. The state is liable to no convulsions, because 
there is nowhere any usurpations to mantain, while every individual has an 
equal sovereignty to lose»44. 
5.4 broad Consensus
The Union’s political system, writes the Scottish scholar, comprises two 
chambers having legislative functions. The first represents all the people 
of  the Union while the second those states in which the union is split «the 
hall of  representatives may be said to speak the feelings of  the nation, and 
42 Ivi, p. 508.
43 Ivi, p. 360.
44 Ivi, pp. 361-362.
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the senate to balance the local interests of  the different sections of  its vast 
territory»45.  
This particular arrangement ensures that a law must gain the assent of  
both the majority of  the people and the majority of  states, i.e. a high level 
of  consent. Furthermore, the system also has the advantage of  factoring in 
the needs of  different states according to the number of  inhabitants and 
each state’s economic features. While in America the boundaries between 
the three powers are clear and well respected, this is not the case in England; 
although the theory of  the division of  power may be well understood in 
principle, it is not put effectively into practice. Legislative and executive 
power often confusingly overlap, due both to the influence of  the monarchy 
and ministers on the legislative process. In America, on the other hand, 
neither the president nor any member of  his government may play a part in 
the workings of  either chambers.
This separation of  tasks and responsibilities seemed unclear in both 
practice and theory to many Englishmen. In support of  her argument Wright 
cites «the mistake of  a wellknown political economist in London, who (as I 
was told in Washington,) once addressed a letter, apparently intended for Mr. 
Madison, To the President of  Congress. I understand that a similar error is to 
be found in a published work of  Mr. Jeremy Bentham»46.
The guarantee of  a well balanced political and institutional framework 
assuring that the rights of  every person be respected, is the Constitution, 
affirms Wright. Created by common will, the document represents a shared 
heritage that anyone may appeal to in cases of  injustice. The English had no 
prior experience of  a document of  this kind, as it afforded stability even if  
majorities were altered. Indeed, it set an example to European states that from 
the mid 1700s began to recognize its effectiveness not only in safeguarding 
rights and defining duties of  citizens, but also in ensuring that governing 
majorities conducted themselves with fairness and ensured stability. 
45 Ivi, p. 365.
46 Ivi, p. 367.
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5.5 ConClusion
Wright’s analysis brings to light the distinguishing features and conditions 
identified by scholars of  the Republican tradition, while also acknowledging 
the existence of  numerous republican families47.
The first of  these distinguishing features is undoubtedly liberty, in both its 
positive and negative senses: the positive liberty that arises from the opportunity 
for self  government and the negative liberty that generates discussion and 
debate in the search for the common good that serves to foster an awareness 
and inclusiveness in legislative processes. In brief, Wright considered liberty 
to be an indispensable ingredient because «the human mind is ennobled by 
liberty»48 which cultivates knowledge, reason and the understanding of  reality, 
leading to the adoption of  ‘good laws’.
The second feature to note is civic virtue. Wright refers to the citizens as 
«modern Romans» who all felt part of  a community, who behaved decorously 
according to the guidelines of  a constitution recognized by all; determined to 
attain the common good, they became naturally virtuous.  
Finally, the real novelty that made America a modern republic and as Paine 
said, what distinguished it from the «simple democracy» of  the Greeks, is the 
establishment of  representation that allowed for the right balance between 
involving people in the political process and the criteria of  competence, 
between the principle of  liberty and equality. Such an achievement was the 
culmination, asserts Wright, of  a long journey through history from the Roman 
republic, through to those of  Florence in the Middle Ages, with a theoretical 
base originating in the English system. The republic could not have come into 
being overnight, but was rather the fruit of  the gradual improvement of  man 
47 Geuna’s analysis is wide-ranging and thorough in this regard: «Suspended between political 
theory and historiographical research, the concept of  republicanism seems to elude an all en-
compassing definition. A look at the historiography reveals that during the 80s and early 90s, 
Geuna’s analysis led to continuing debate and questioning of  certain strongly continuationist 
ideas in Pocock’s “tunnel history”. Focusing closely on single events concerning the republican 
tradition as yet unexplored […]  it became apparent that one could no longer speak of  Repu-
blicanism in general, but of  different kinds of  republicanism. What also clearly emerged is that 
from the middle of  the 1600s, many Republican theorists mix and merge republican discourse 
with other traditional political discourses, namely the language and discourse of  natural law» in 
M. Geuna, La tradizione repubblicana e i suoi interpreti: famiglie teoriche e discontinuità concettuali, Filoso-
fia Politica / a. XII, n. 1, aprile 1998, Bologna, il Mulino, pp. 111-112.
48 f. wright, Views of  society and manners in America; in a series of  letters from that country to a friend 
in England, during the years 1818, 1819, and 1820, cit., p. 116.
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through learning from practical experience and from theories that helped to 
iron out defects. While in Britain the discussion of  philosophical principles 
remained within philosophers’ circles, in America the institutions and citizens 
put them into daily, collective practice. As Petit says, «a republic demands 
that an institutional system be based on a network of  check and balances to 
power, which in turn allows for the rule of  law»49; in America such a network 
was embodied by and represented in the effective division of  powers, in the 
Constitution and in the watchfulness of  its citizens. 
After such a thorough analysis, the question was whether such enlightened 
republicanism could be transposed to Europe. Wright’s answer was that despite 
the experiment failing in France and the possibility that the same fate would 
befall America, «surely it is proposed to force the same attempt elsewhere»50.
49 M. geuna, La tradizione repubblicana e i suoi interpreti: famiglie teoriche e discontinuità concettuali, cit., 
p. 112.
50 f. wright, Views of  society and manners in America; in a series of  letters from that country to a friend 
in England, during the years 1818, 1819, and 1820, cit., pp. 362-363.

Chapter Six
plurality and deCision. 
state and soCiety in romano guardini
Carlo Morganti
Romano Guardini (Verona, February 17th 1885 – Munich, October 1st 
1968)1 is a German philosopher and catholic theologian, one of  the most 
important thinkers of  the Republic of  Weimar.2 He is sometimes referred  to 
as a «Philosopher of  the Christian world […] whose longlife task was that 
of  proclaiming the sacred in a modern world».3 Probably, he is not a political 
thinker,4 but his works lead the reader to hold a different opinion.5
1 About Romano Guardini’s biography see h. B. gerl falKovitZ, Romano Guardini 1885-1968 
– Leben und Werk, Mainz, 1985, tr. it. Romano Guardini – La vita e l’opera, Morcelliana, Brescia, 
1988; h. Kuhn, Romano Guardini. Der Mensch und das Werk, tr. it. Romano Guardini. L’uomo e l’opera, 
Morcelliana, Brescia, 1963. See also h. engelMann - f. ferrier, Introduzione a Romano Guardini, 
Queriniana, Brescia, 1968.
2 Among his most important works see Vom Geist der Liturgie, Herder, Freiburg, 1918; Vom 
Sinn der Kirche, Grünewald, Mainz, 1922; Liturgische Bildung. Versuche, Deutsches Quickbornhaus, 
Burg Rothenfels am Main, 1923, then published under the title Liturgie und liturgische Bildung, 
Grünewald, Mainz, 1992.
3 See g. a. PanichaS, The essential Guardini, “Modern Age”, 2005, pp. 171-175.
4 See r. guardini, Verantwortung und Urteilsmöglichkeit in politischen Fragen. Ein Brief  in der Zeit von 
der Wahlen (1953), in “Geschichte in Wissenschaft und unterricht”, 21 (1970), p. 719; and  r. guardini, 
Letter to Joseph Müller-Marein, “Die Zeit” (23/9/57), cit. in H. B. gerl, Romano Guardini 1885-1968 
– Leben und Werk, cit., p. 314.
5 Romano Guardini is studied as a political thinker particularly in Italy. See for example a. 
BaBolin, Religione e politica in Romano Guardini, “Archivio di filosofia”, 1978, pp. 329-354; r. 
eSPoSito, Teologia politica. Modernità e decisione in Schmitt e Guardini, “Il Centauro”, 6, 1986, 16, 
86 MoniSMS and PluraliSMS in the hiStory of Political thought
Romano Guardini was born in Italy, in Verona; his father and his mother 
were supporters of  the idea of  Italian unity led by Camillo di Cavour against 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Hapsburg monarchy. In 1886, when 
Romano Guardini was only one year old, his family moved to Germany, 
to Mainz. There, his father ran the local branch of  his own company, the 
Grigolon-Guardini and Bernardinelli GmBH, and was the Italian Counsel.
Romano Guardini studied in Mainz, then attended university courses 
in Freiburg, Tubingen, Munich and Berlin. He tried to study chemistry and 
political sciences, however, his religious vocation led him to study theology in 
Freiburg, with an abiding interest in liturgy. In 1910, he was ordained a priest.
After becoming German subject in 1911, during the First World War he 
was a nurse in the ranks of  the German Imperial Army.
He is German and Italian, entwined by bonds of  responsibility to both 
Germany and Italy. So, he starts to think about a supranational entity, in order 
to go beyond differences and irreducible nationalistic disagreements: he starts 
to think to Europe. But, first of  all, he thinks towards the idea of  community, 
a strange idea in an era of  individualistic edonism.6
In 1913 he publishes Die Grundlagen des Sicherheitsbewußtseins in den Sozialen 
Beziehungen7 and in 1916 Die Bedeutung des Dogmas von dreieinigen Gott für das 
sittliche Leben der Gemeinschaft.8 He wants to describe the characters of   the idea 
pp. 103-139, then also in Idem, Categorie dell’impolitico, il Mulino, Bologna, 1988, pp. 27-72; M. 
nicoletti, La politica tra autorità e coscienza in Romano Guardini, in La Weltanschauung cristiana di 
Romano Guardini (edited by S. Zucal), EDB, Bologna, 1988, pp. 209-227; M. BorgheSi, Romano 
Guardini. Dialettica e antropologia, Studium, Roma, 1990; g. caMPanini, Romano Guardini e il 
nazionalsocialismo: l’atteggiamento pratico, la riflessione teoretica, “Humanitas”, 47, 1992, pp. 666-689; 
M. nicoletti, La democrazia e i suoi presupposti in Romano Guardini, “Communio”, 22, 1993, 
132, pp. 109-122; l. BeZZini, Tecnica e potere nella riflessione di Romano Guardini sulla fine dell’epoca 
moderna, “Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia. Università di Siena”, 12, 1991, pp. 173-198; 
M. tronti, Guardini e il potere, in M. Nicoletti – S. Zucal, Tra coscienza e storia, p.187-194; M. 
nicoletti, Guardini e il problema dell’etica tra autorità e coscienza, in Ibidem, pp. 195-209; S. Zucal, 
Romano Guardini pensatore europeo e pensatore dell’Europa, in R. Guardini, Europa. Compito e destino, 
Morcelliana, Brescia, 2004, pp. 77-112; M. nicoletti, Introduzione, in R. Guardini, Opera Omnia, 
VI, Scritti politici, edited by M. Nicoletti, Morcelliana, Brescia, 2005; S. Zucal, Romano Guardini, 
una cristologia politica?, “Theologica & Historica. Annali della Pontificia Facoltà Teologica della 
Sardegna”, 2006, 15, pp. 191-207.
6 Guardini is in this sense a “thinker of  Europe”, see r. guardini,“Europa” und “Christliche 
Weltanschaaung”. Aus der Dankrede bei der Feier meines siebzigsten Geburtstags in der Philosophischen 
Fakultät der Universität München am 17. Febr. 1955, then also published in Stationen und Rückblicke, 
Werkbund, Würzburg, 1965; Europa. Compito e destino, Morcelliana, Brescia, 2003, edited in the 
Italian translation by S. Zucal.
7 Die Grundlagen des Sicherheitsbewußtseins in den sozialen Beziehungen, “Historisch-politische Blätter für 
das katholische Deutschland”, 152, 1913, pp. 687-702.
8 Die Bedeutung des Dogmas von dreieinigen Gott für das sittliche Leben der Gemeinschaft, “Theologie und 
Plurality and deciSion. State and Society in roMano guardini 87
of  community, by emphasizing both the individual and the community as 
original and irreducible parts of  the same entity;9 Trinity speaking, the idea of  
community thought by Guardini derives from the perfect community of  the 
Holy Trinity: the former mirrors in the Holy Trinity, and the latter is the very 
“Magna Charta” of  any human community.
After the war, Guardini publishes Vom Geist der Liturgie (1918)10 and then 
Vom Sinn der Kirche (1922),11 in which he continues, in an ecclesiological study, to 
speak about the community, affirming that a religious process of  incalculable 
importance has begun : «the Church is coming to life in the souls of  men»; 
a community coming to life in the souls, religiously speaking; a community 
coming to life by creating its own State, politically speaking.
The State is in fact the second important concept in Guardini’s political 
thought. A community acts through the State and the State is the means by 
which a community develops itself  politically and historically.
In the early 1920s he dedicates to the State two articles: Rettung des Politischen12 
and Der Staat in uns,13 both published in 1924. In the former, Guardini develops 
his idea of  politics by referring it to the State – so an indissoluble bond is created 
between Politics and State, i.e. they are not conceptually unrelated worlds; in the 
latter, Guardini describes his idea of  State as God’s representative in worldly 
things – while the spiritual field falls under the competence of  the Church.
All that lets us think towards a theocratic model, but a more general study 
of  Guardini’s thought leads us to different conclusions. Guardini’s political 
considerations take place against the powerful conception of  the German 
Reich, a conception that is strongly monistic in its fundamental structures; 
the language Guardini uses is a typical theological language. So, it can appear 
a theocracy, but it could be intended, more simply, as a particular German 
political form, in which there’s no place for the philosophic-political concept 
of  popular sovereignty – the real Sovereign is God – but where people matters 
in creating its own State. Creating the State is an ethic task given to a people by 
God, however a State is not an ethic necessity and a people can create its own 
Glaube”, 8, 1916, pp. 400-406.
9 “When I affirm the church,” he writes, “I am at the same time affirming individual personality, 
and when I speak of  the interior life of  the Christian, I imply the life of  the Christian 
community”.
10 Vom Geist der Liturgie, Herder, Freiburg, 1918.
11 Vom Sinn der Kirche, Grünewald, Mainz, 1922.
12 r. guardini, Rettung des Politischen, “Die Schildgenossen” 4, 1924, pp. 112-121.
13 r. guardini, Der Staat in uns, in Gottes Werkleute. Briefe über Selbstbildung. In Einzelheften, Verlag 
Deutsches Quickbornhaus, Burg Rothenfels a.M., 1924.
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State, in order to develop himself  historically, or not.14 
However, speaking à la Guardini, God is a “politikum”, i.e. He must have 
a public role in Politics.15 The presence of  God in public life assures single 
persons that their own personalities are guaranteed by the State and thus 
assures people from any totalitarian degeneration of  the State. So, we can 
argue that a State is entwined by mutual bonds of  responsibility with God and 
with the people: it is God’s representative and not the real God and it has to 
respect the nature of  people as God’s child.
Thus, the monism of  Guardini’s personal interpretation of  the State – 
that is often considered a theocratic model, in a hurried reading – is perfectly 
counterbalanced by the pluralism of  the God’s childhood. In other words, 
we can not consider here a pluralism of  the institutions, as though Guardini 
preferred an institutional decentralization or those medieval intermediate 
corps that were considered bulwarks of  liberty against the hypothetical 
excessive power of  a Leviathan.
The pluralism to which Guardini refers in his political writings is the 
«personal» pluralism  of  the human being, which is a «person» and a God’s 
child, he is a unique and irripetible being, and not an unrelated atom or a gear 
of  a bigger mechanism.16 According to Guardini, «the totalitarian State denies 
the personhood of  the human being. In this State – which actually should 
no longer be described as such – the human has no unconditional dignity 
stemming from his human being as such, he is merely a biophysical individual, 
and the standards determining how he must be treated are those of  political, 
social, economic achievement»17.
Consequently, it is possible to argue that Guardini’s political conception is 
fundamentally antitotalitarian18, because the personality of  the human being is 
14 See r. guardini, Der Staat in uns, in Gottes Werkleute. Briefe über Selbstbildung in Einzelheften. 
Zehnter Brief, Verlag Deutsches Quickbornhaus, Rothenfels am Main, 1924.
15 See r. guardini, Ethik. Vorlesungen an der Universität München (1950-1962), Grünewald, Mainz 
– Schöning, Paderborn, 1993; see also the Italian article M. nicoletti, Gott ist ein Politikum: Dio, 
il potere e la coscienza in Romano Guardini, “Rivista della Scuola superiore dell’economia e delle 
finanze”, 2005, 6-7, pp. 346-357.
16 About the anthropological thought of  Romano Guardini see, e.g., M. acQuaviva, Il concreto 
vivente. L’antropologia filosofica e religiosa di Romano Guardini, Città Nuova, Roma, 2007, pp. 27-29.
17 See Totalitarianism and political religions, edited by h. Maier, Schöning, Paderborn 1996, 
Routledge, 2004.
18 See particularly M. BorgheSi, Crisi del moderno. Nichilismo e totalitarismo in Guardini, “Il nuovo 
Aeropago”, IV, 1985, 2, pp. 65-88. See also g. caMPanini, Romano Guardini e il nazionalsocialismo. 
L’atteggiamento pratico, la riflessione teoretica, “Humanitas”, 47, 1992, pp. 666-689; M. nicoletti, 
La democrazia e i suoi presupposti in Romano Guardini, “Communio”, 22, 1993, 132, pp. 109-122; 
u. BröcKling, Katholische Intellektuelle in der Weimarer Republik. Zeitkritik und Gesellschaftstheorie bei 
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independent of  such standards. «It is the human being as such, and with that 
it possesses something categorical, something that withdraws from it any right 
to be an instance of  power»19.
The 1930s is a traumatic decade. The German economic system is still not 
completely restored when in 1933 the Nazi party gets the majority of  votes. 
The middle and later years of  the decade are dominated also by the militrarism 
of  Fascism and Nazism and by the Stalinist show trials in the USSR, which are 
a profound shock to the many who have regarded it by contrast as a beacon 
of  light. The Spanish Civil war points to a coming international war, while the 
entire Europe, deeply divided socially and politically, is inept in avoiding the 
even more real danger of  a new war. During this decade, Romano Guardini 
does not stand plainly against the Nazi regime, against that regime that 
removes him from his chair at Berlin University – he is being Professor of  
“Philosophy of  religion and catholic vision of  the world (Religionsphilosophie 
und Katholische Weltanschaaung)” since 1923. He does not side against the Nazi 
regime. During this decade, Guardini is dedicated to what is well known in 
literature as immunization of  the consciences20 – he devotes himself  entirely to the 
anthropological research, to the study of  person and personality, and writes 
Welt und Person, published in 1939, and Der Mensch, only recently published and 
translated also in Italian (2009), in which the philosopher assembles the fruits 
of  his lectures at the University of   Berlin, held between 1930 and 193921.
When the community seems to prevail over the individual, Guardini works 
in a complementary manner, in comparison with what he has done in the first 
decades of  the century: then, he emphasizes the communitarian aspects of  
human life, as though he wants to free people from a wrong individualism 
caused by the positivistic atmosphere of  the end of  the XIX century and by 
a process of  modernization, yet begun in the XV century –  he offered to his 
readers, as a solution to the problem of  individualism, the Faith, neither in man 
nor in history, but in God alone and in His Providence. Wilhelmsen’s words 
cogently summarize Guardini’s significance as an extraordinary commentator 
on the crisis of  modernity in the context of  the «search for orientation» and 
Walter Dirks, Romano Guardini, Carl Schmitt, Ernst Michel und Heinrich Mertens, München, 1993.
19 See r. guardini, Ethik. Vorlesungen an der Universität München (1950-1962), Grünewald, Mainz 
– Schöning, Paderborn, 1993.
20 See M. nicoletti, La democrazia e i suoi presupposti in Romano Guardini, “Communio”, 22, 
1993, 132, pp. 109-122; h. engelMann - f- ferrier, Introduzione a Romano Guardini, Queriniana, 
Brescia, 1968.
21 See r. guardini, Welt und Person. Versuche zur Christlichen Lehre vom Menschen, Werkbund, 
Würzburg, 1939 and  Der Mensch. Grundzüge einer christlichen Anthropologie.
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«a course of  action for the New Age».22 Now, Guardini pays attention to the 
individual, that he considers lost in the sea of  indifference of  the modernity. 
According to Guardini’s idea, the human being of  the modernity looks for 
new reference points and solid values to which he can ground his opinions 
and his life. 
The atheistic idea of  modernity conceived by positivism and determinism 
makes human beings not more free than in the past, but alone.23 
So he is ready to abandon himself  to new forms of  religion: the Blood, the 
Soil, and to be seduced by new salvation bringers, namely, in this specific case, 
by Adolf  Hitler. In the German language, there is a play on words – Führer 
and Verführer, leader and seducer – that cannot be translated into English, but 
that is really explanatory to understand what occurred in the Nazi Germany.
Romano Guardini takes his rightful place in that school considering the 
origin of  any form of  totalitarianism in the atheism of  politics – namely 
a school rejecting a public role for any religion; Guardini doesn’t ask for a 
political system based on a mixture of  politics and religion, as there was during 
the Middle Ages, but a political system in which politics and religion meet in 
armonic cohabitation.
Recognizing a public role to religion constitutes the basis of  a social 
form of  pluralism. In other words, it allows us to recognize to the individual 
that autonomy which is peculiar to any human being, for he is a «person», a 
God’s child. It means also that it is important to recognize to any person a 
significant role in realizing his own State, that is not necessarily a determined 
human construction, but a harmonic whole of  human beings; without them, 
it couldn’t exist. 
In the essay Der Heilbringer in Mythos, Offenbarung und Politik. Eine theologisch-
22 See g. a. PanichaS, The essential Guardini, “Modern Age”, 2005, pp. 171-175.
23 See e.g. r. guardini, Briefe von Comer See, Matthias Grünewald Verlag, Mainz, 1927; Das 
Ende der Neuzeit. Eine Versuch zur Orientierung, Hess Verlag, Basel, 1950, then Werkbund Verlag, 
Würzburg, 1951 and Die Macht. Versuch einer Wegweisung, Werkbund, Würzburg, 1951; see also 
Das Phänomen der Macht. Vortrag bei der philosophischen Zusammenhang in Gallarate bei Mailand 1962, 
in “Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht” 13, 1962, pp. 617-625 and Fragen zum Problem 
der Macht in Gott in Welt. Festgabe für Karl Rahner, hrsg. Von J.B. Metz, W. Kern, A. Darlap, H. 
Vorgrimler, II. Bd., Herder, Freiburg i.B., 1964. See also M. nicoletti, Romano Guardini: la 
fatica della libertà, “Il margine”, 1995, 1. See also g. a. PanichaS, The essential Guardini, “Modern 
Age”, 2005, pp. 171-175:“A de-divinized and desanctified language of  life and faith, as it has 
emerged and solidified in the modern and now the postmodern world, has become a kind 
of  superstructure in which a verb like venerate and a noun like reverence are debased words. 
Guardini’s thoughts on Christian faith and revelation show him at his best in his contention with 
the empirical process and habits of  mind; steadfastly he testifies to the sacredness of  humankind 
regardless of  the demons “who rule people once they have abdicated their responsibilities”.
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politische Besinnung,24  published in 1946 in a larger form, if  compared with that 
of  which appeared in 1935, Romano Guardini considers the twelve years of  
totalitarian dictatorship of  the Nazi Party in Germany as a form of   «civil» 
or «political» religion25. In Zum Problem der Demokratie,26 appeared in the same 
year, he declares himself  as a supporter of  the democratic system, even if  with 
some specifications. «Personally, I think I am a democrat»,27 he writes, but he 
thinks also that the idea of  democracy needs some more specifications. He 
says that a catholic democrat has to recognize «absolute values and objective 
authorities»,28 i.e. to respect individual personalities and freedoms, the desire 
for a more communitarian life; Guardini is firmly convinced in respecting 
all these values and he has testified to them during all his long life and in his 
writings: the real authority is that of  God, which is the real Sovereign – and the 
popular sovereignty does not exist but as a fictitious political idea.
According to Guardini’s political idea, this concept of  political sovereignty 
of  God does not contrast with that of  democracy: equality, comparison, 
respect do not sap the doctrine of  authority and the idea of  law in the res 
publica – the State as an organized totality – can not indulge in the relativism 
expressed by a majority, which is bound by fundamental values – and at last 
the authority of  God, so really intended, a la Guardini, as a «Politikum».
And we can also read in the pages of  his Ethics that it is not correct to 
identify the reference to God with a given form of  government, for every 
authentic form of  government refers to God, whether it be monarchy or 
aristocracy or democracy. Guardini’s perspective recognizes the relativity of  
the problem, because there is a truth transcending them. And even democracy 
has to refer to God, if  we want to consider it a right form of  government 
and an authentic State and not simply a form of  organization assuring its 
members safety and welfare. And also democracy has to be responsible both 
to its people – or, better, to the Parliament – and to God.
Another typical aspect of   a democratic system is obviously the concept of  
freedom. A man in a democracy is naturally free – and this freedom derives 
24 r. guardini, Der Heilbringer in Mythos, Offenbarung und Politik. Eine theologisch-politische Besinnung, 
Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart, 1946. A first version of  the essay appeared in 1935, under 
the title Der Heiland, in “Die Schildgenossen”, 14, 1934/1935, pp. 97-116.
25 See e. gentile, Le religioni della politica. Fra democrazie e totalitarismi, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2001, 
p. 206-207. See also, by the same author, Il mito dello Stato nuovo, 1999, Il culto del littorio, 20018, La 
via italiana al totalitarismo, 2001; see also r. aron, La mentalità totalitaria, Roma, 1955.
26 r. guardini, Zum Problem der Demokratie, manuscript going back to 1946, then published in 
“Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht” 21, 1970, edited by  F. Messerschmid, pp. 711-716.
27 Ibidem.
28 Ibidem.
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from the fact that man has been created in God’s own image and likeness. Man 
is in a direct reference with God. With the divine Revelation, man is redeemed 
from sin’s slavery and made free. Guardini does not consider this idea of  
freedom as a moral freedom, i.e. the possibility for the mankind to do good 
and evil without distinction. 
The crisis of  the modern State resides, for Guardini, in the basic mistake 
of  a freedom from God, intended as the maximum of  freedom and self-
realization for the mankind and for a political organization. Romano Guardini 
paints a lucid and merciless portrait of  such a State. From the pages of  his 
Ethics, he accuses clearly those people  who have tried to propagandize this 
idea as it was the best or the unique idea of  State and society. The rejection 
of  an objective truth – and particularly of  the divine truth, given to mankind 
through the Revelation – replaced by more truths valid everywhere and every 
time, does not constitute a  form of  freedom for the mankind, but just an 
intolerable load man wants to free himself  from.
The mankind of  the modern era thinks to be free and in his action there 
is no place for faith, that has neither a real significance nor a specific role in 
public life. Faith, and specifically the catholic faith, is derided and considered 
in the same way of  a superstition; the man no longer  trust in God, because 
God is dead.
According to Guardini’s theory, this leads to two results: the crisis of  the 
modern State, that has no more reason for existing; and the neutralization of  
the distinctive personal feature of  all men, who are reduced as if  they were a 
mere object in the hands of  those people detaining power within society and 
the State.
The concept of  authority is thus undermined and every reference to 
transcendence is cancelled by referring politics just  to the worldly sphere. The 
State is convincing till it is successful in remaining faithful to its own tasks: to 
guarantee welfare, prosperity and economic development to its citizens, public 
order, etc. 
If  the State is unable to conclude its own tasks, if  the State is no more capable 
of  morally binding its citizens, they realize that they have no real obligation in 
obeying to it and to its laws, for it has no real authority or sovereignty. Hence, 
the irreversible crisis of  the State, that, according to Guardini’s theory, is man’s 
and society’s crisis.29
29 See particularly r. guardini, Das Ende der Neuzeit. Eine Versuch zur Orientierung, Hess Verlag, 
Basel, 1950, then Werkbund Verlag, Würzburg, 1951 and Ethik. Vorlesungen an der Universität 
München (1950-1962), Grünewald, Mainz – Schöning, Paderborn, 1993.
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Man tries to find an answer to his request of  interior order by referring his 
life to transcendence: however, in this case, the transcendence is demoniac. It 
could lead to a new totalitarianism, a danger that Guardini tries to avoid.
A democracy based on an excessively individualistic freedom is a false 
democracy; Guardini argues that the democracy could be helped by an 
authentic sense of  pluralism, in which the interior spiritual attitude of  the 
individual is not the unique criterion to interpretate world and ethics.
This idea of  pluralism is not thought against society: i.e. there is not a 
prevalence of  the plural-individual element over the social one. Guardini asks 
for a democratic principle informing forms and interpretations of  the reality.
I am obliged now to affirm that Guardini does not want to reduce this 
pluralism of  ideas and concepts  within a monistic order, as if  a monistic 
world interpretation has to prevail over a pluralistic one: this would be against 
the dinamic order of  the existence described by Guardini himself  in his work 
The opposition, published in 1925;30 in this sense the individual element can 
not prevail over the social one and viceversa, and even the idea of  order can 
not include within itself   the opposite parts of  the political existence – the 
individual and the society – by neutralizing their individual values. The style of  
Guardini’s thinking is prophetic, for the solution he offers tends to occupy the 
political place left empty in post-war Europe by Totalitarianisms. Undoubtedly 
the suffering which the war brought, mixed with the gleams of  hope, fostered 
a community spirit in the German nation and when peace finally arrived 
energy welled up. Chances now could be taken and the right political chance 
is that for democracy.
A real democracy is based, in Guardini’s opinion, on a plural variety of  
persons, on the variety of  their social and cultural impulses. The unity can be 
carried out by an inter-personal collaboration that must be necessarily free. 
Everyone must recognize the other, accept him and his opinions, even if  he 
doesn’t agree with them; and everyone must be willing to cooperate with the 
other.
On such a basis, it is possible to create a true political unity, and all that 
is really democratic. This unity is always threatened, it is true, but it is also 
always renewed. As if  it is led by an ethos based on an in common conquered 
experience.
All that derives not directly from human nature, that is not naturally 
inclined to meet other people; in Guardini’s opinion all that asks for a strong 
personal decision for an ethically correct choice, for good and not for evil, for 
30  See Der Gegensatz. Versuche zu einer Philosophie des Lebendig-Konkreten, Grünewald, Mainz, 1925. 
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an intra-personal cooperation, decision that must be free and autonomous. 
And the choice is difficult because contemporary individuals are lost in his 
research for new reference points.
To conclude, I try to summarize the results of  this essay about the political 
idea of  Romano Guardini within the more general background of  the end of  
the German Empire and the growing totalitarian Third Reich.
My personal judgement is that the Guardini’s idea of  the State as God’s 
representative in worldly things could lead to a strongly monistic interpretation 
of  the political thought of  the philosopher. It could be even possible to 
consider this idea as the cultural basis for the creation of  an authoritarian or 
a totalitarian State. However, this monistic perspective proves just apparent, 
for it is strongly counterbalanced by the pluralism that is naturally within any 
society, that provides for persons and not for atoms, persons able to know, 
decide and act.
Politically speaking, it emerges that in Guardini’s works there is a strong 
stand against every totalitarian hypotesis and a position favourable to a 
democratic system in which the individuals meet and cooperate without 
cancelling each other out in a confused social amalgam. They maintain their 
own dignity and, first of  all,  their own freedom.
Just in a free decision the individual reveals his own nature as «person». 
And just in a background not excluding a religious dimension, the political 
system and, at last, the democracy find their authentic sense.
Chapter Seven
monism and pluralism: 
er iC voegelin’s Contribution
Nicoletta Stradaioli
Among the contemporary political philosophers who pay attention to monistic 
and pluralistic conceptions of  society and the State, Eric Voegelin plays a 
significant role, developing an original contribution revolving around a dominant 
theoretical project: the critical analysis of  totalitarianism and of  the crisis in 
Western civilization. Such a speculative path is carried out through a complex and 
multilayered investigation. At the basis of  his study there is the problem of  the 
political order and its foundation, which results in the questioning of  modern 
political (positivist) science. Voegelin’s aim is to build a “new political science”, 
referring to the politiké epistemé of  the classics. This methodological approach is also 
linked to Voegelin’s intention to reject Hans Kelsen’s legal positivism, because the 
scientific, legal perspective of  the Austrian jurist reduces the State to Normlogik. 
Voegelin maintains that for Kelsen anything which does not fit into the categories 
of  Normlogik could no longer be considered science. Thus, in Kelsen’s view the 
State and the legal order coincide and the human being, as the nucleus of  political 
life, is eliminated from the reality of  the State itself. According to Voegelin, a 
theory of  the State (Staatslehre) as such is insufficient, because it does not accept any 
question about the nature, substance, historical and ontological origin of  society. 
Moreover, it eliminates the symbolic quality of  social order which, for Voegelin, 
is the primary element for reading the various and different political phenomena1
1 Since the beginning of  his scientific career Voegelin wanted to overcome the neutral approach 
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In this context, Voegelin’s The New Science of  Politics (1952) offers a vantage 
point for examining the most significant moments of  his interpretation of  the 
concepts of  monism and pluralism. More specifically, the idea of  representa-
tion constitutes the thematic nucleus dealing with the substance of  monism 
and pluralism.2 In this perspective, Voegelin highlights a) the most important 
features of  the Western crisis, the inadequacy of  modern political science and 
thus the urgency of  its restoration, b) the problematic core of  the relationship 
between liberal democracy, pluralism and political order. 
7.1 a neW sCienCe of politiCs and a neW philosophy of history
Voegelin condemns the method of  modern political science which claims 
to extend the procedures, techniques and categories of  the so-called exact 
sciences to the study of  politics, society and history. That methodological 
layout, very similar to that of  natural sciences and mathematics, reduces reality 
to a plurality of  objects and transforms political science into a fixed and dry 
discipline. Hence, according to Voegelin, it adopts a dogmatic paradigm for 
reading reality which consists of  a mere anticipatory, descriptive scheme, a 
to politics of  Hans Kelsen’s Normlogik. That meant to drop out the Reine Rechtslehre of  the 
Austrian jurist, focusing on the symbolic dynamics of  the political community. The analysis 
of  the symbolic quality of  the State is of  particular interest to Voegelin who devoted his first 
systematic research to studying the symbols that define social mechanisms. This perspective 
clashes with Kelsen’s. However, Voegelin recognizes the validity and the logic of  Kelsen’s 
theory, even if  he challenges the theoretical premise that allowed Kelsen to remove from the 
legal system any “residue of  anthropomorphism” and reduce the theory of  the State (Staatslehre) 
to a mere appendix of  the theory of  law (Rechtslehre). Kelsen considered the State the only 
object of  legal science, and this allowed him to put aside the question of  whether the State is 
also something different from positive law. He was not interested in the relationship between 
human beings and the State: positive law and the logical interactions between a hierarchy of  
norms are the main phenomena which constitute the State. For Voegelin, this meant «to purge 
Staatslehre of  everything that does not pertain to positive law»: reducing the State to a legal 
system and excluding from the State political and social elements that are the core of  the 
experience of  communal life.
2 For Kelsen review of  The New Science of  Politics see, H. KelSen, A New Science of  Politics, 
Hans Kelsen’s Reply to Eric Voegelin’s “New Science of  Politics”. Contribution to the Critique of  Ideology, 
Frankfurt-Lancaster, Ontos Verlag, 2004; trad. it. id., Una Nuova Scienza Politica, a cura di F. Lijoi, 
Torino, Giappichelli, 2009.
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rhetorical exercise. In this way, political science can become an instrument for 
legitimizing brutal totalitarian regimes. 
Therefore, it is necessary to end the neutral and value-free approach 
of  this kind of  positivistic political science which is inadequate for 
understanding and questioning the issues underpinning man’s history. In 
order to examine the crisis of  modern science, Voegelin pursues a style of  
thinking which explores political order, political unity and political pluralism. 
The German philosopher examines the dichotomy monism-pluralism 
from an epistemological-gnoseological perspective that is a criticism of  
every rationalistic monistic model. In fact, monism demands a) knowing 
the socio-historical and political elements of  communal life through the 
exclusive use of  a single principle, of  a single interpretative model and b) 
developing formulations always and universally valid, simplifying the set of  
factors which constitute human existence. 
For Voegelin, science in general terms can only grasp a purely external (and 
superficial) knowledge of  phenomena; whereas the cognitive relationship we 
have with phenomena, especially historical ones, is completely different. Here 
we face a sort of  “inner/inward” knowledge, an intimate understanding of  the 
actions that organize socio-political reality. Therefore, according to Voegelin, 
political science is not a reasoning or an understanding of  the external 
world, but rather a critical analysis of  a field already structured by previous 
knowledge. Every society possesses an inner dimension of  meaning, through 
which human beings interpret their very existence. The community carries out 
a process of  self-understanding, a self-interpretation of  society in history, an 
autonomous cognitive scheme that political science must investigate.
Human society is not merely a fact, or an event, in the external world to be studied 
by an observer like a natural phenomenon. Although it has externality as one of  
its important components, it is as a whole a little world, a cosmion, illuminated with 
meaning from within by the human beings who continuously create and bear it as the 
mode and condition of  their self-realization. It is illuminated through an elaborate 
symbolism, in various degrees of  compactness and differentiation – from rite, through 
myth, to theory – and this symbolism illuminates it with meaning in so far as the 
symbols make the internal structure of  such a cosmion, the relations between its 
members and groups of  members, as well its existence as a whole, transparent for the 
mystery of  human existence3.
3 e. voegelin, The New Science of  Politics, in id., Modernity without Restraint. The Political Religions, 
The New Science of  Politics, and Science Politics, and Gnosticism, CW 5, Columbia and London, 
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Hence, political science occurs in a society that is already structured and so 
it does not create social order by its own means. 
The voegelinian theoretical analysis also criticizes severely the 
philosophies of  history because they want to demonstrate that the historical 
process conforms with laws that are explanatory and predictive toward 
the past, the present and the future. Then, history itself  follows a certain 
uniform path. Voegelin believes that we must resist these philosophical 
perspectives that transcend the boundaries of  historical interpretation and 
historical methodology. He condemns the philosophers of  history who 
investigate the past stressing the stages of  the historical process that lead 
to a predictable conclusion. They have the illusion of  owning the laws of  
history that secure the creation of  a perfect society, in which all the evils of  
the world will be wiped out. Finally, philosophers of  history profess an a 
priori history that embodies a unique interpretation of  the multiple elements 
that constitute it. Here lies, for Voegelin, the hallucination of  the twentieth-
century totalitarianism which stems from the irrational assumption of  
possessing a privileged point of  view, thanks to which it is possible to solve 
the uncertainties of  the political order. 
According to Voegelin, political science is undermined and weakened by 
these kinds of  ideological representations of  reality which reduce reason 
to a purely instrumental function: a spell is cast on rational arguments 
about reality of  phenomena. In fact, it is not possible to think through the 
achievements of  an era by applying an absolute and anti-historical principle, 
and even less to solve once and for all the riddle of  history. History is never 
at rest and it always poses new problems and new solutions. Political science 
(and the political scientist) must be suspicious of  rigid theoretical schemes 
that oversimplify the multifaceted richness of  human life, pretending to 
understand and generalize it by means of  similarities and uniformities. 
The task of  political science is to pay attention to what is unique and 
special in historical events and to highlight the peculiar characteristics that 
ground human experiences. For Voegelin, the search of  political order is 
a never-ending exploration, because it takes into account variables which 
are perpetually in motion. Hence, political science is a demanding journey: 
an inquiry which will never reach final solutions, fully conscious that any 
attempt to impose a political design from above leads to totalitarian regimes.
University of  Missouri Press, 2000, p. 109; trad. it., id., La nuova scienza politica, Roma, Borla, 
1999. 
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7.2 the theory of representation
In The New Science of  Politics the concept of  political representation is 
the interpretative paradigm to analyze totalitarianism and examine the 
relationship between pluralism and liberalism. Voegelin describes four types 
of  representation (elemental representation, existential representation, 
representation of  Truth and transcendental representation) and develops 
a “theory of  representation” that highlights the complex nature of  socio-
political reality.4 
The simplest type of  representation is the elemental one. He refers to 
its formal, constitutional and institutional aspects, founded on the principle 
of  elected officials who “stand in the place of  others”. The elemental 
representation depicts the external existence of  society, the delegation of  
opinions and interests to representatives. 
Another type of  representation is existential, through which a society 
literally exists. By means of  it a politico-legal system puts into effect an aim, 
a plan that keeps the political organization alive. In this context, Voegelin 
mentions Maurice Hauriou and his concept of  the idée directrice. According to 
the French jurist,
the power of  a government is legitimate […] by virtue of  its functioning as the 
representative of  an institution, specifically of  the state. The state is a national 
community in which the ruling power conducts the business of  the res publica. The 
first task of  a ruling power is the creation of  a politically unified nation by transforming 
the pre-existent, unorganized manifold into a body organized for action. The nucleus of  
such an institution will be the idea, the idée directrice, of  realizing and expanding it 
and of  increasing its power; and the specific function of  a ruler is the conception of  this 
idea and its realization in history5.
The political-institutional system reaches its full realization when, on the one 
hand, the ruler of  the State (the representative) makes every effort to give 
effect to the idea in history and, on the other hand, the consentement coutumier 
4 For an analysis of  Voegelin’s theory of  representation see, C. Galli, Eric Voegelin: la rappresen-
tanza, la trascendenza, la storia, in Aspetti e problemi della rappresentanza politica dopo il 1945, edited by 
C. Carini, Firenze, CET, 1998, pp. 73–107; id., Contingenza e necessità nella ragione politica moderna, 
Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2009, pp. 209-236.
5  e. voegelin, The new Science of  Politics cit., p. 126.
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(customary consent) of  the members of  the political community is achieved. 
For Voegelin, Hauriou’s theory is significant because it indicates that 
in order to be representative (and to be a representative) the delegation of  
interests or the constitutional dimension of  popular legitimacy through public 
free elections is not enough. It is essential to establish (democratically) not 
only those who govern, but “what” directs the State, which is the idea of  the 
institution, the substance of  political institutions realized in history through 
the actions of  rulers of  a country.
In order to be representative, is it not enough for a government to be representative in the 
constitutional sense (our elemental type of  representative institutions); it must also be 
representative in the existential sense of  realizing the idea of  the institution. […] If  
a government is nothing but representative in the constitutional sense, a representative 
ruler in the existential sense will sooner or later make an end of  it; and quite possibly 
the new existential ruler will not be too representative in the constitutional sense6.
Representation in the elemental sense is not a guarantee of  avoiding the 
disintegration of  society: when representatives fail to fulfill their assignment 
(the idea), the constitutional legitimacy of  the institutions cannot contain the 
collapse of  the political and social order.
Then Voegelin makes a distinction between representation of  Truth and 
transcendental representation. The first consists of  bringing fully into effect 
the idea that grounds the political unity of  society. This kind of  represen-
tation may also be seen as a close and undifferentiated form of  existential 
representation that can easily take totalitarian directions. By way of  examples 
Voegelin refers to the ancient cosmological empires which were considered 
representative of  the cosmic order. More recently, another case is embodied in 
the Marxist dialectics. In Marx the truth of  the cosmic order is converted into 
the truth of  an immanent historical order that asserts unquestionable truth: 
the order of  society must be in harmony with the truth of  history; the aim of  
history is to achieve a realm of  freedom and peace; opponents of  the truth of  
history will be routed, or set free from their oppressors.
Transcendental representation is characterized by subjects open to 
transcendence. Hence, society is representative of  something beyond itself, 
«of  a transcendent truth».7 When Voegelin speculates about representation 
it is precisely this type of  representation that he has in mind; and the aim 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ivi, p. 147.
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of  his study is to identify the symbols by which political societies interpret 
themselves as representative of  a truth that goes beyond worldly existence. 
From this perspective, central to the voegelinian theoretical speculation 
is the relationship between truth and representation, which is analyzed by 
digging out the historical symbols of  this relationship.8 For Voegelin, clas-
sical philosophy (Plato in particular) discovered that at the foundation of  a 
well-ordered society there is the relation of  the human soul to the Divine. Pla-
to introduced the anthropological principle that stated: «polis is man written 
large.  […] [T]his is the dynamic core of  a new theory […] A political society 
in existence will have to be an ordered cosmion, but not at the price of  man; 
it should be not only a microcosmos but also a macroanthropos».9 «By this 
interpretation, the true order of  society depends upon the true order of  man; 
the true order of  man, in turn, depends upon the constitution of  the soul; and 
the constitution of  the soul, its order and disorder, comes to view through the 
experiences symbolized in the course of  a sensitive man’s loving search of  re-
ality for the divine Wisdom […]».10 The importance of  the intimate individual 
descent to the depths of  the soul emerges here. It is a descent that reveals the 
structure of  the soul, but does not grasp definitively an absolute truth. This 
journey shows the significance of  a constant tension towards the Ground 
of  Being, and highlights the impossibility of  establishing the perfect polis, a 
political form “true” in an absolute sense. The truth of  the soul is a structure 
open to transcendent reality, which can be experienced, but not represented 
in all its facets. 
From Plato onwards, therefore, the problem of  the political order is 
expressed in the tension between the truth of  the soul and political truth, or 
between the order of  the soul and the actual order of  society. The next step, 
according to Voegelin, which follows the Platonic anthropological principle (or 
the anthropological truth) is the Christian soteriological truth. Soteriological 
truth emerges with the broadening of  the Platonic-Aristotelian11 knowledge; 
8 In Voegelin’s view there are three types of  truth: cosmological truth (the truth of  the early 
empires), anthropological truth (the truth that appears in the political culture of  Athens), 
soteriological truth (the truth that appears with Christianity). See e. voegelin, The New Science 
of  Politics cit., pp. 149-150.
9 Ivi, p. 136.
10 e. SandoZ, The Voegelinian Revolution. A Biographical Introduction, New Brunswick and London, 
Transaction Publishers, 2000, p. 103.
11 Voegelin explains the transition from the anthropological truth to the soteriological truth 
and he refers to the contrast between the Aristotelian philia and the Thomistic amicitia. The 
former is possible only between equals, and this excludes a friendship between man and God. 
The love of  the Greek philosopher for the divine is a tension toward something in the non-
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it is the expression of  the human soul that opens to a God who becomes 
man, who is present in the world and in history and, then, again absent but 
symbolically present in the world thanks to the Church. This new relationship 
between man and God should not be read as an exaltation of  the possibilities 
of  the human being; on the contrary, de-divinization of  the world and a larger 
articulation of  the soul of  man is proper to Christianity. If  God embodies 
salvation, he must be loved, but cannot be represented politically. 
From this description emerges the specific Western tension between the 
truth of  the soul and the truth of  political order, between transcendence 
and immanence that should not end up in the elimination of  either of  the 
two extremes. History tells us that this tension has been often betrayed in 
trying to build a perfect and final political order on earth. These experiments 
immanentized the transcendent truth, lost sight of  the unresolved tension 
between immanence and transcendence (that, according to Voegelin, is at the 
basis of  true political order), paving the way to totalitarianism and to the crisis 
of  Western civilization. Thus the representation that Voegelin has in mind 
consists of  a peculiar mediation between heaven and earth.
Moreover, the German philosopher highlights how pluralism is the main 
characteristic of  representation. In voegelinian terminology pluralism is 
expressed as articulation or differentiation. He says «articulation [...] is the 
condition of  representation».12 The historical process of  the articulation-
differentiation of  society is at the basis of  social and political development. 
The evolution of  society is founded on diversification, on the rise of  different 
centers of  interest and power which produce the need for representation: to 
produce a representative who can act on the behalf  of  the community and 
organized groups. The articulation of  the community leads to a plurality of  
social and political subjects which need to be represented; representation is, 
therefore, essential for the proper functioning of  society, because it orders 
the social and political dimension of  the community. Thus representation is 
reciprocity. The lack of  mutuality characterizes the anthropological truth. (See e. SandoZ, 
The Voegelinian Revolution. A Biographical Introduction cit., p. 104). The Thomas’s amicitia, on the 
contrary, emphasizes the mutual relationship between man and God. «The Christian bending 
of  God in grace toward the soul does not come within the range of  these experiences [Classical 
philosophy] – though, to be sure, in reading Plato one has the feeling of  moving continuously 
on the verge of  a breakthrough into this new dimension. The experience of  mutuality in 
the relation with God, of  the amicitia in the Thomistic sense, of  the grace that imposes a 
supernatural form on the nature of  man, is the specific difference of  Christian truth». (e. 
voegelin, The New Science of  Politics cit., p. 150).
12 e. voegelin, The New Science of  Politics cit., p. 120. 
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centered on diversity and breaks the original uniformity of  society itself. In 
other words, the articulation and differentiation of  society create a complex 
and multilayered order that substitutes the previous homogeneous unity; at 
the same time, thanks to representation order and unity are restored, without 
denying plurality (the unity or integration of  the socio-political sphere cannot 
be at the expense of  diversity and pluralism). In Voegelin’s perspective, this 
depends on the type of  representation: then, the significance of  a correct 
choice of  representation that is the criterion that orders society itself  is 
evident. Political order must be based on a type of  representation that does 
not ignore the articulation-differentiation achieved by the community; a form 
of  representation must be chosen that safeguards plurality and, at the same 
time, builds a political order that is not a single all-inclusive unity. In fact, 
the final outcome of  this all-inclusive order is the reduction of  all social and 
political processes to an absolute and static organization.
Voegelin’s theory of  representation is a criticism of  all monistic political 
constructions that, on the one hand, understand and organize society on the 
basis of  one single principle and, on the other, eliminate the tension between 
immanence and transcendence. Above all monism is dangerous because it falls 
into the temptation a) to match God, church and politics, with the emergence 
of  a kind of  fundamentalist political theology; b) to divinize the political 
world (as in Gnosticism). But Voegelin also denounces the weakness of  
liberal-democratic representative institutions, far removed from the Christian 
tradition of  the differentiated soul. The liberal democracy has preserved an 
extremely weak form of  transcendental representation, being at the mercy of  
the totalitarian ideologies of  the twentieth century. In particular, modern liberal 
democracy has been seduced by Gnosticism. Modern Gnosticism pretends to 
possess a form of  perfect knowledge by means of  which it is possible to purge 
the world of  all injustices and inequalities. It offers man the opportunity to 
build an earthly paradise through his own actions and deeds. Transcendence is 
denied, the tension between immanence and transcendence is denied as well, 
and with them the articulation-differentiation of  the political order. 
The drift towards Gnosticism of  the liberal democracy occurs in similar 
forms: on the one hand, claiming that elemental representation is the only 
effective form to give voice to different interests and opinions, dividing 
immanence and transcendence and proclaiming the scientific and political 
irrelevance of  transcendence (considered an intimate and private sphere); on the 
other hand, asserting the exclusive significance of  the representation of  Truth, 
in which immanence and transcendence coincide with the total elimination 
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of  the latter. Modern civilization is therefore characterized, for Voegelin, by 
a regressive dynamic that reverses the movement towards differentiation-
articulation of  reality. For Voegelin, the chance that the Western world can 
preserve its pluralistic organizations is seriously threatened. 
This pessimism depends on the historical and political context during which 
The New Science of  Politics was written: after the Second World War, in the anxiety 
of  the Cold War. This context troubled Voegelin, who well remembered the 
victory of  Nazism over the Weimar Republic. The West seems to Voegelin 
to be facing a difficult situation: it is not able to defend an idea of  articulated 
and differentiated order, and thus to defend itself  from external and internal 
enemies. Liberal democracy needs to reaffirm the centrality of  transcendental 
representation: a society is really articulated and differentiated, and therefore 
truly representative, only if  it is founded on two forms of  representation: the 
elemental one (the representation of  interests and popular legitimacy) and the 
transcendental representation that is the infinite tension towards transcendence. 
Voegelin’s theory of  representation identifies a philosophical field of  action 
capable of  founding a just political order. The paradigm of  representation 
reveals the logic of  politics and helps to comprehend the logic of  modernity. 
In this perspective, the dichotomy of  monism-pluralism is connected to the 
questioning of  modern political science, to the diagnosis of  the crisis of  
modernity and to the critique of  totalitarianism. Monism is intended as a 
model of  science desirous of  building with mathematical certainty the right 
political order. A unique and definitive reality that distorts reality itself  ends 
up producing ideological deformations, which find their maximum expression 
in the tragic events of  totalitarianism. Ideological and totalitarian monism, 
in particular, eliminates the tension between immanence and transcendence, 
claiming to achieve in this world a realm of  perfection. Politics must resist 
political experiments that try to solve permanently the uncertainties and 
difficulties of  the present. We must remember that the values and goals which 
men can aspire are many and different. In Voegelin’s perspective pluralism in 
its broader sense is based on the mutual relationship between immanence and 
transcendence: both of  them determine our existence and the structure of  the 
political reality in which we live.
Chapter Eight
beyond politiCs: organizational pluralism 
and teChnoCratiC monism 
in the funCtionalist proposal 
of david mitrany
Stefano Parodi
In 1943, David Mitrany (1888-1975)1, Rumanian economist at the London 
School of  Economics, presents in his most famous work, A Working Peace 
System2, a proposal to renew the international system. In that he is influenced by 
a widespread concept about the international system in the English academic 
world at that time3. Such a concept is based on the possibility of  creating 
tools which are suitable to ensure a reciprocate comprehension and thus to 
1 For biographical information see Dorothy Anderson, David Mitrany (1888-1975): an Appreciation 
of  his Life and Work, paper available on the Internet site http: journals.cambridge.org; see also 
d. Mitrany, The Making of  the Functional Theory: A Memoir, in The Functional Theory of  Politics, 
London School of  Economics & Political Science, London, Martin Robertson, 1975, pp. 3-46. 
2 d. Mitrany, A Working Peace System. An Argument for the Functional Development of  International 
Organization, London, 1943; Italian translation Le basi pratiche della pace. Per una organizzazione 
internazionale su linee funzionali, “Orientamenti”, Cambridge University Press, 1945; see also S. 
Parodi, La teoria funzionalista di David Mitrany. Con riproduzione anastatica della traduzione italiana 
del volume di David Mitrany Le basi pratiche della pace. Per una organizzazione internazionale su linee 
funzionali, Firenze, Centro Editoriale Toscano, 2013, pp. 67-160; and A Working Peace System 
(1943), in id., The Functional Theory of  Politics cit., pp. 123-132.
3 In particular at the London School of  Economics and at Oxford University.
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automatically activate forms of  cooperation and integration among States4.
It should not be forgotten that Mitrany lived through the horrors of  the 
Second World War, so  he strongly feels the urgency of  such a renewal in the 
international relations and works out a model of  integration among States 
which is finalized to eliminate the war causes and strives  to reach a permanent 
(«perpetual») peace condition. This model represents an answer to nationalism 
and to the state-centric structure of  the international system and it is founded 
on the belief  that taking away the international cooperation from the political 
province, that is to say from the conflicting field, is the only road to peace. 
Moreover, according to Mitrany, social and economic problems are not merely 
of  a political nature, so their solution can be easily assigned to a staff  of  
technical experts, thus making up a supranational level set free from politics.
In that we can see the great attention Mitrany pays in his analysis to the 
deep changes in international politics, to the globalization of  economic and 
political issues, as well as of  the wars effects: 
In the light of  the great effort which the nations are making to outlaw war, neutrality is 
rapidly changing its meaning. Most wars have been limited in scope and in extent; they 
were fought out by two or three countries for some limited national interest. To keep out 
of  war, to remain neutral, was even from an international viewpoint sound policy for a 
country which was not directly involved. Neutrality helped to narrow the field of  battle 
and the play of  national policies. But already the last War has wrought great changes 
in this. It has shown that the effects of  a modern war cannot be localised; in other 
words, material neutrality had disappeared. Secondly, the consequence of  this is that 
general interests, and rules which had been created to protect them, like the ‘freedom of  
the seas’, inevitably get involved; hence political neutrality becomes growingly impossible 
4 See g. Sola, Storia della scienza politica, Roma, La Nuova Italia Scientifica, 1996, p. 408. About 
the functionalist perspective of  international relations, Alfred Zimmern’s studies are very 
important. See a. ZiMMern, The Greek Commonwealth, London, Oxford University Press, 1911; 
id., Nationality and Government, London, Chatto and Windus, 1918; id., The Study of  International 
Relations, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1931.
We can also find some interesting parallelism between Mitrany’s functionalist theory and 
«planning theory» in the Thirties.  About that see o. neurath, Pianificazione internazionale per 
la libertà (with introduction and edited by T. Carena and F. Ingravalle; Italian translation by 
L. Coppo), Torino, Scholè, 2010. About «planning theory» see a. SalSano, Ingegneri e politici 
Dalla razionalizzazione alla “rivoluzione manageriale”, Torino, Einaudi, 1987. About  «managers 
revolution» see J. BurnhaM, The Manager Revolution, New York, Day, 1941 (first Italian translation: 
La rivoluzione dei tecnici, Milano, Mondadori, 1946); see also B. riZZi, The Bureaucratization of  the 
World, edited by a. weSto, New York, The Free Press, 1985.
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and incompatible with the development of  international law. If  nations are unwilling 
to exert themselves for the maintenance of  existing international rules, there is not much 
sense in creating new ones. Neutrality is not a virtue in itself, its merit is relative to the 
cause with which it is connected. Not to join national wars probably was a contribution 
to peace; not to join in organising international peace may probably mean a contribution 
to war5.
In this framework does the «functionalist road»6 to peace rise and it is marked 
by the detection of  «the practical foundations» of  the solid elements and of  
the «relation of  things» and this is a hallmark of  Mitrany’s work: 
Without doubt the first light towards a ‘functional’ outlook on things social and 
political came from my two teachers at the London School of  Economics, in its early 
days, when it was small but intensely alive, and truly free intellectually. L. T. Hobhouse 
was a Liberal, with a close personal connection with C. P. Scott and The Manchester 
Guardian; Graham Wallas had been one of  the founders of  the Fabian Society. Both 
of  them were Oxford men, and both had recoiled from the traditional way of  studying 
and teaching political theory; both were true searchers, allergic to the slightest whiff  of  
5 d. Mitrany, The New Meaning of  Neutrality, in  id., The Functional Theory of  Politics  cit., pp. 146, 
147; from The Problem of  International Sanctions, OUP, 1925; see also id., The End of  “Morality” in 
War («International Relations», London, November 1973), in id.,  The Functional Theory of  Politics 
cit., pp. 231-236.
6 About functionalist perspective, for a general idea see J. r. arthur grooM - Paul taylor 
(edited by), Functionalism. Theory and Practice in International Relations, London, University of  
London Press, 1975; see also Paul Taylor’s introduction in d. Mitrany, The Functional Theory 
of  Politics cit., pp. ix-xxv; see also Paul taylor, Functionalism: the approach of  David Mitrany, in 
Groom and Taylor editors, Frameworks for International Co-operation, London, Pinter Publishers, 
1990; c. navari, David Mitrany and International Functionalism, in David Long and Peter Wilson 
(edited by), Thinkers of  the Twenty Years’ Crisis. Inter-War Idealism Reassessed”, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1995; l. aShworth, Creating international studies: Angell, Mitrany and the liberal tradition, 
Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999; g. M. aMBroSi, Some Literature relating to David Mitrany, Functionalism, 
and European Integration (available on the Internet site of  the University of  Trier, www.uni-
trier.de); id., Keynes and Mitrany as instigators of  European Governance, in Millennium III, N. 12/13, 
Summer 2005 (a version of  the paper (2004) is available on the Internet site of  the University 
of  Trier, www.uni-trier.de). About neo functionalist perspective and regional integration, for a 
first approach, see e. B. haaS, The Uniting of  Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957, 
Stanford, University Press, 1958; id., International Integration: The European and the Universal Process, 
«International Organization», 15, 1961; id., Beyond the Nation State. Functionalism and International 
Organizations, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964; id., The Study of  regional Integration: 
reflections on the Joys and Agonies of  Pre-theorising, «International Organization» 24 (4), 1970.
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dogmatism. Hobhouse, essentially a philosopher, had given a definition of  politics as a 
‘science’ which to me remains fundamental: that the part of  the political scientist was 
not to predict events but to uncover and make clear ‘relation of  things’7.
Another aspect of  Mitrany’s scholar personality comes out of  his words: 
his ideological anti-dogmatism8. It is not possible, therefore, to understand 
Mitrany’s functionalist theory unless we grasp the fundamental element 
represented  by his absolute mistrust in ideologies, and, in general, in politics. 
From this point of  view, the fact that Mitrany’s name is often linked to the 
events of  the European integration process is undoubtedly correct, if  we take 
into account the influence wielded, even indirectly, on Jean Monnet and the 
functionalist solution used instead of  the one proposed by the federalists: 
«The last months of  1945 also marked the crisis and the paralysis of  the 
Italian MFE9 and Spinelli10’s abandon, who had got to the conclusion that 
the possibilities of  a concrete action towards European federation were 
invalid[…]. Exactly in those months, inspired by the Rumanian economist 
David Mitrany, a new functionalist school of  thought rose and it was meant 
for opening the way of  a new strategy towards Europe […]»11.Yet, considering 
7 d. Mitrany,  The Making of  the Functional Theory: A Memoir, in The Functional Theory of  Politics 
cit., pp. 16, 17.
8 An example of  his ideological anti-dogmatism can be found in d. Mitrany, Marx Against 
The Peasant, Chapel Hill, The University of  North Carolina Press, London, Georg Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1951. Italian translation Il marxismo e i contadini, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1954. 
Mitrany already deals with this topic in the Twenties see d. Mitrany, “Marx v. The Peasant”, 
in T. E. Gregory and H. Dalton (eds.), London Essays in Economics in Honour of  Edwin Cannan, 
London, Routledge, 1927; republished with the title Marx si Taranimea; teoria agrariana a lui Marx, 
Reactia Poporanista, Biblioteca economica, Bucuresti, Institut de arte grafice, No. 7, 1930.
9 About MFE see l. levi, S. Pistone, Trent’anni di vite del movimento federalista europeo, Milano, 
Franco Angeli, 1973.
10 About Altiero Spinelli see e. Paolini, Altiero Spinelli. Appunti per una biografia, Bologna, il 
Mulino, 1988; P. graglia, Unità europea e federalismo, Da “Giustizia e libertà ad Altiero Spinelli, 
Bologna, 1996. See also a. SPinelli, Come ho tentato di diventare saggio. Io Ulisse, Bologna, il 
Mulino, 1984 and a. SPinelli, La rivoluzione Federalista. Scritti 1944-1947, edited by Piero Graglia, 
Bologna, il Mulino, 1996.
11 See g. MaMMarella - P. cacace, Storia e politica dell’Unione europea, Roma-Bari, Editori Laterza, 
2° ed., 2002, pp. 22, 23. In this paper I personally translated all the quotations in Italian. About the 
historical framework of  European integration see l. v. MaJocchi, La difficile costruzione dell’unità 
europea, Milano, Jaca Book, 1995; B. olivi, L’Europa difficile. Storia politica della Comunità europea, 
Bologna, il Mulino, 1998; B. olivi - r. Santaniello, Storia dell’integrazione europea, Bologna, 
il Mulino, 2005; see also M. alBertini - a. chiti Batelli - g. Petrilli, Storia del federalismo 
europeo, Roma, ERI, 1973;  S. PiStone, L’Italia e l’unità europea. Dalle premesse storiche all’elezione 
del Parlamento Europeo, Torino, Loescher, 1982 and S. PiStone (edited by), L’idea dell’unificazione 
europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale, Torino, Loescher, 1975; c. curcio, Europa. Storia di 
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Mitrany only as the theoretician of  the functionalist road – chosen by Europe 
in the years after the Second World War – doesn’t allow us to assess the most 
relevant aspects of  his theoretical elaboration.
First, it shouldn’t be forgotten that Mitrany builds his functional model 
making up a new kind of  international organization, that is to say, global 
and not regional: the European integration process, from this viewpoint, can 
represent a step in the right direction, but not the final result. Secondly, the 
net of  independent authorities he proposes goes beyond a simple economic 
integration; it reduces the weight of  political power as much as possible in 
its various international activities as they are established by the functionalist 
approach and it creates, at international level, a growing de politicization 
of  decisions and thus the overcoming of  the political dimension. On this 
point what Antonio La Spina and Giandomenico Majone write about the 
authorities is enlightening. These authorities (now inside each individual State) 
represent «[…]the abandon of  a State model seen as a direct manager, a goods 
distributor, a social engineer in favour of  the idea of  a Regulator State. Its 
strategic tools are the regulative authorities: institutions that are independent 
from the political class and the electoral cycle and are provided with a specific 
mandate and with incisive powers, which are provided for by law, only about 
distinctly limited issues. These authorities are composed by people who were 
chosen because of  their high technical knowledge and their impartiality»12.
un’idea, Torino, ERI/Edizioni Rai, 1978; l. levi - u. Morelli, L’unificazione europea. Cinquant’anni 
di storia, Torino, Celid, 1994; h. MiKKeli, Europa. Storia di un’idea e di un’identità, Bologna, il 
Mulino, 2002; S. fagiolo, L’idea dell’Europa nelle relazioni internazionali, Milano, Franco Angeli, 
2009.
12 See a. la SPina - g. MaJone, Lo Stato regolatore, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000, p. 7. See also 
Alessandro Arienzo’s essay Oltre la democrazia, la governance economica della politica, in a. arienZo 
- d. laZZarich (edited by), Vuoti e scarti di democrazia. Teorie e politiche democratiche nell’era della 
mondializzazione, Napoli, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2012. In his essay Arienzo writes: «The 
governance must foster the continuous transformation of  the boundaries and of  the nature 
of  the public space and of  its movers through a wider opening and flexibility of  the state 
administration, of  the broadening of  decisional spaces by means of  public-private partnership 
courses, of  externalization, privatization and joint management of  public policies. It must 
ensure the containment and the management of  the conflicts produced by the free flow of  the 
interests dynamics: on the one hand, those conflicts must be free to be delocalized and broken 
up; on the other hand, their political load can be reduced by moving – when it is possible – 
their foci to different planes, either technical, scientific or economical ones. Hence, it operates 
horizontally in form of  nets/networks of  collective movers who are engaged in contractual 
processes by means of  mediation procedures and of  consensus building which are aimed to gain 
legitimacy and compliance. The change of  the public space is in part due to the transformation 
of  the traditionally established boundaries, between domestic and international politics, which 
are deeply modified by new movers: independent and/or regulative agencies, corporations of  
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This kind of  de politicization, in the field of  international relations, might 
get Mitrany’s thought close to the federalists’ positions, because it provides 
for the overcoming of  the politics of  power and, within certain limits, of  the 
sovereignty of  the national State13.
In reality, Mitrany goes so far as to overcome the federalist dichotomy 
between national State and Federation and, substantially, to spread the 
criticism related to the national State also to the federations: the real problem 
lies in the existence of  an international system concept based on the world 
division in separated political-territorial units. According to Mitrany, inside 
the federalist perspective, the risk is moving on from rivalries and potential 
conflicts among national States to rivalries and potential conflicts among 
national States and federations and among federations themselves. From 
this point of  view, even the Pan-European project of  Count Richard 
Coudenhove-Kalergi is judged negatively insofar as it stands as a «bulwark 
against the Eastern danger»: 
Pan-Europa recalls in its second main purpose another nineteenth century proposal for 
the union of  Europe. Russia has never been felt to be so much the ‘common enemy’ as 
since the Bolshevik revolution; Pan-Europa has been presented from the very first as the 
only effective bulwark against that Eastern danger. The aim of  Pan-Europa, according 
to Kalergi, is ‘a federation of  states and a customs union for the salvation of  Europe, 
of  western culture and of  the white race’; or again, ‘the struggle for Pan-Europa is 
a struggle against barbarism’. The core of  the Pan-European scheme thus consists 
of  certain economic aspirations, to be surrounded with a protective covering against 
the competitive and the envious. Mercantile and military interests in a weakened and 
impoverished Europe feel the need for a coalition with a common policy and, therefore, 
some form of  central authority14. 
interest, political and economic macro-regional aggregates, international organisms. Notably, 
the appearance of  international regulative regimes – as they are the needed answer to the 
emergencies produced by the processes of  economic and financial globalization – reduces the 
margins of  autonomy of  the state sovereignty, both inside and outside them» (pp. 98, 99).
13 About federalism see c. Malandrino, Federalismo. Storia, idee, modelli, Roma, Carocci, 1998; 
id., «Tut etwas Tap feres»: compi un atto di coraggio L’Europa federale di Walter Hallstein (1948-1982), 
Bologna, il Mulino, 2005. See also f. terranova, Il federalismo di Mario Albertini, Milano, Dott. 
Giuffrè, 2003.
14 d. Mitrany, Regional Pacts: Their Uses and Dangers, in id., The Functional Theory of  Politics cit.., pp. 
152, 153 (from the  paper Pan-Europa: A Hope or a Danger?, London, «The Political Quarterly», 
Sept.-Dec. 1930).
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Not wanting to betray the aims of  peace and international cooperation, it is 
thus necessary to neutralize the causes of  division, otherwise if  we set a limit 
to what would actually be just a territorial reorganization, we would not get 
a solution to the problem, but simply its dimensional variation. Obviously 
in Mitrany’s view, not even a global federation is thinkable: «To have lasting 
effect the solution must be global. In theory it could be done through a world 
state or federation, but even if  desirable such a monstrous construction could 
hardly come about except through conquest»15.
It is rather easy to understand the reasons why Mitrany identifies in the 
overcoming of  politics and in the meantime, in the division of  the world 
in closed and separated political-territorial units the main road towards a 
permanent global peace. From this viewpoint, Alberto De Sanctis, in his essay 
about Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse, highlights the problem of  the differences 
and rivalries among European States: 
In order to keep militarism and nationalism from getting the better of  freedom it was 
necessary to give life to a peoples’ Europe which, according to Mazzini’s teaching, 
would progressively extend the right of  citizenship to the whole continent. Europe 
was characterized, according to Hobhouse, by being what some philosophers defined ‘a 
unity in or permeating differences’. It was a continent, a civilization, it had common 
religious basis behind, a common culture, a long tradition of  close political interactions. 
Nevertheless, ‘this community is split up into different centers, speaking different 
languages, putting a different color and interpretation even on that which they hold in 
common, often divided in the past by bitter antagonisms, inclined to mutual rivalry even 
in peaceful times, and easily inflamed to mutual suspicion. These different centres are 
organized, the common centre is not’16.
Hobhouse, unlike his former student Mitrany, approaches the European 
unification issue from a political viewpoint as whatever «European alliance, 
in order to have any chance of  success, should have been based on the 
15 d. Mitrany, The Prospect of  Integration: Federal or Functional, in «Journal of  Common Market 
Studies», 4, 1965, p. 135.
16 a. de SanctiS, Europeismo e pacifismo nel pensiero politico di L. T. Hobhouse, in M. G. Bottaro 
Palumbo - R. Repetti (edited by), Gli orizzonti della Pace. La pace e la Costruzione dell’Europa (1713-
1995), Genova, ECIG, 1996, pp. 216, 217. De Sanctis quotes L. T. Hobhouse, The World in 
Conflict, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1915, p. 75.
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principles of  nationality and self-determination. ‘I shall content myself  with 
two propositions which I believe to have a bearing, the first on the permanent 
order of  Europe, the second on the prospect of  terminating the war. The first 
is that in proportion as political unity can be brought into accord with national 
sentiment the chances of  international union are improved. The second is 
that as a practical policy the principle of  national choice should at least be 
a limiting condition. I mean that no portion of  European territory should 
be transferred from one government to another without the concurrence 
of  its population, and that concurrence should be expressed by a vote taken 
under the presidency of  a neutral Power. This is a principle which even now 
might be accepted and proclaimed by the Allies as a condition governing 
their policy, without the smallest prejudice to their vigour in the conduct 
of  the war. To hope for it may be Utopian, yet it is but the translation into 
literal terms of  that combination of  the ideas of  nationality and of  public 
law which has been inscribed on our banner by official sanction’»17. Another 
aspect showing the originality of  Mitrany’s theory compared to his professor’s 
thought – even though he was deeply influenced by him – is represented by 
the persistence of  the political-legal dimension in Hobhouse’s thought:  «The 
international anarchy along with the war could only be won if  the dogma of  
State sovereignty had been impaired. That is how Hobhouse’s pacifism might 
be defined a kind of  ‘legal pacifism (peace through law), according to which war 
is an event depending on the existence of  the State for its own sake, […] or 
more precisely on that character that is typical of  every State […]: the supreme 
and exclusive power of  making the ultimate decisions about using the force’. 
In foreign politics Hobhouse hence believed in the institutionalization of  the 
international binding forces as the only possibility to ensure peace. ‘Advocates 
of  non-resistance’ – he stated – ‘will never prevent the shedding of  one drop 
of  blood by telling us not to fight in our own defense. If  they would really 
minimize warfare, they would do better to find a working ethics, a code of  
justice in international relations which men would accept. Of  all statesmen 
Gladstone came nearest to this in his doctrine that the obligations of  States 
were in principle identical with those of  private persons. A code based on this 
principle, and a habit of  detailed application to international politics in the 
interests of  such a code, might build up the international institutions which 
alone, in the end, can supersede war. It might at least avert some wars, while 
the mere reiteration of  an abstract principle averts none’»18.
17 Ibid., pp. 217, 218.
18 Ibid., pp. 219, 220. Among the texts quoted by De Sanctis see L. T. Hobhouse, The World in 
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Following these premises Mitrany sets three possible approaches based on 
«[…] the various ideas for international organization. These have followed in 
the main three lines of  thought. (1) An association of  nations, like the League, 
which would leave the identity and policy of  states almost untouched; though 
comprehensive, would be a loose association merely suggesting the need for 
a measure of  material integration. (2) A federal system, favored because it is 
thought to provide the cohesion lacking in a league; but this would be so only 
within the limits of  some new continental or regional group, and so would 
tend to divide the world again into a number of  potentially competing units. 
(3) The functional approach, which by linking authority to a specific activity 
seeks to break away from the traditional link between authority and a definite 
territory (perpetuated by either an association or federation of  nations). This 
approach resolves the dilemma of  creating either too loose or too narrow an 
international organization by building up authorities which would be both 
comprehensive and solid, in selected fields of  common life”19.
The functional approach allows the concrete realization of  the purpose 
of  going beyond the division among States, because functional divisions can 
replace geographical and physical divisions: “The possibility of  changing our 
view of  nationality and our policy towards it is not visionary. It is the confusion 
in our attitude which has caused such endless suffering and hardened division. 
The essence of  the problem is that ‘the rights of  nationality depend on the 
possibility of  a reasonable adjustment between the interests peculiar to a 
people and those which they share with others. This adjustment, however 
difficult to formulate in abstract and general terms, raises in fact precisely the 
same question as every other function of  government. We have seen just the 
same difficulty in defining the liberty of  the individual’. And in one case as in 
the other the solution is not possible by any geographical and physical division 
of  the respective spheres, but only by a reasonable and liberal adjustment of  
the respective functions of  the private and public domains, of  the national and 
the international domains”20.
Conflict, cit.; id., Questions of  War and Peace, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1916; id., The Metaphysical 
Theory of  the State, London, G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960; n. BoBBio, Il problema della Guerra e le 
vie della pace, Bologna, il Mulino, 1991. About «legalpacifism» see f. terranova, Il federalismo di 
Mario Albertini cit., pp. 66, 67.
19 d. Mitrany, A Working Peace System, in The Functional Theory of  Politics cit., p. 125.
20 d. Mitrany, Nationality and Nationalism, in id., The functional Theory of  Politics cit., p. 145. It 
is rather interesting the relationship between the borders elimination and the rise of  a “global 
administrative law”: about this topic see S. caSSeSe, Oltre lo Stato, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2006. See 
also id., Il diritto globale. Giustizia e democrazia oltre lo Stato, Torino, Einaudi, 2009.
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After all these considerations, Mitrany – aware of  the fact that “creating 
an international system of  ‘law and order’ – and nowadays one must add, of  
‘social security’ - is by far the most difficult task in the history of  modern 
political society”21 - elaborates a model of  international organization based 
on the idea that the functions to be carried out in the course of  international 
activities can generate ad hoc institutions (the Authorities): specific organizations 
for specific functions. Mitrany who, according to me, embraces a sort of  
“evidence naturalism”, this way abandons, within certain limits, the traditional 
organization founded on prearranged jurisdictional subdivisions of  rights and 
powers. The role of  the States, hence, is reduced to its lowest terms: they 
simply have “to ratify” what is evident in nature, setting up all the needed 
Authorities, without making it substantially the result of  a decisional political 
process.
That, if  we may say, represents the “dark side” of  Mitrany’s theory. In fact, 
as it was previously said, a functional kind of  organization is managed by a 
body of  international executives. Those executives can not be merely experts, 
but experts above any affiliation (national, political, and so on). Inevitably, a 
body of  such executives must have the task of  telling the governments, as 
they are necessarily called to set up the various Authorities “what is naturally 
evident”. In connection with the role of  the economist (but that works for all 
the “experts”) Lionel Robbins “[…] claims the impossibility of  pinpointing 
the scientific criteria of  choice among the different kinds of  governmental 
intervention. He states that the economy is ‘neutral towards the ends’, meaning 
it is not able to provide with scientific assessments about them, since they 
imply different kinds of  judgment (moral, political etc.).
This concept of  economics as a ‘positive science’, free from value 
judgment, implies that the economist’s task is not to indicate the aims the 
society proposes each time by adopting measures of  economic politics. 
Their ‘professional’ task is to show the best way, from the scientific point 
of  view, to reach certain aims proposed by others (for example the politicians) 
and not to choose among those aims”22.
In Mitrany’s functional model, there are no politicians to be given the 
suitable tools to implement certain politics. The experts benefit from the same 
property of  “self-definition” which Mitrany thinks typical of  functions and, 
therefore, of  the Authorities. In this sense, exceeding the political dimension, 
21 d. Mitrany, Retrospect and Prospect, in id., The functional Theory of  Politics cit., p. 241.
22 g. caSale - g. gianelli, Il pensiero economico da Platone a Sraffa, Genova, INS-EDIT, 1993, p. 
291.
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which means to delegate the international executives, the “technicians”, chosen 
exclusively according to their expertise - the management of  the international 
economic and social activities, can transform the international system into a 
technocracy.
To better understand this concept, it might be very useful to resort to the 
distinction made by Isaiah Berlin between “monism” and “pluralism”. In fact, 
seemingly, the international organization suggested by Mitrany is characterized 
by a “pluralism” which could be defined “total”, since the functional method 
does not envisage (at least basically) any hierarchical and coordinative structure. 
The international Authorities represent, according to Mitrany’s approach, 
some independent “islands”, which can freely be transformed depending on 
needs, activities to be carried out and problems to be solved.
However, analysing Mitrany’s functionalist proposal we will have to face a 
“unidimensional” approach, characterized by a sort of  “exclusive thought”: if  
the political dimension is the “evil”, the main cause of  wars, the “technical” 
dimension is the kingdom of  the “good”, of  the lack of  conflicts and of  
power struggles. And that is founded on the belief  that following only the 
criteria of  competence and efficiency represents the only way to build a world 
without rivalry and conflicts.
The trust in competence and, it must be underlined, in the technicians’ 
fairness is constantly recognizable in Mitrany’s thought who does not pay 
attention to a very important question: the selection of  international experts23. 
According to the functionalist approach, in fact, the technicians must be 
evaluated and chosen by other technicians having the necessary expertise.
According to me, such a “unidimensional” scheme refers to a vision that 
could be defined “monistic”. It is rather enlightening what Marco Ferrari 
writes about “monism” in an essay about Berlin: “Monocracy in its despotic, 
oligarchical, majority or totalitarian forms, in which the government of  
the ‘one’ gets organized each time, is the political expression of  monism, a 
religious, moral and philosophical ideal, whose critique is one of  the recurring 
themes in Berlin’s work. The most persuasive reasoning lies in the conclusion 
of  the Two Concepts, meaningfully titled ‘ the one and the many’, a proposition 
S. Lukes considers the keystone of  his thought […]. ‘Metaphysical chimera’ 
present in the whole western thought, ‘from Plato to the latest followers of  
Hegel and Marx’, monism is described as the ‘belief  that somewhere in the 
past or in the future, in the divine revelation or in the mind of  a single thinker, 
in the solemn declarations of  history or of  science or in the simple heart of  
23 We can also notice a certain “self-referentiality” of  the body of  international executives.
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a good and honest man, there is a final solution’ where ‘all the positive values 
men have always believed in’, freedom, equality, justice, brotherhood, order 
‘must in the end be compatible and maybe imply each other’. The conflict 
among values makes a complete human realization impossible: accepting 
the choice, the compromise and the settlement implies the renunciation of  
‘equally absolute needs’ and it leads into believing that any means is legitimate 
in order to attain this ‘total harmony’”24.
In these lines we find some parallelism with at least two of  the fundamental 
elements of  Mitrany’s thought: believing in the existence of  a “final solution” 
(a kind of  functionalist international organization) and the aim of  “total 
harmony” (the permanent peace).
Moreover, there is the tangible risk that downsizing the political power25 in 
favour of  the “international experts” could help the birth of  an “international 
technocratic oligarchy”. 
Politics26, in these terms, risks having to face what is considered a 
downright “technocratic ideology”. On this point Michela Nacci writes: 
“Technocracy deems politics irrational: the skills it requests are certainly 
different from the rational choice, from the same economic rationality. But 
the typical rationality of  politics must take into account non-rational factors 
which are at the same time absolutely crucial such as beliefs, emotions, 
general opinions.
Technocracy would like to do without ideologies, values, abstractness, 
recourse to general concepts such as the common good, mediation, negotiation, 
the class of  professional politicians: these are probably requests which politics 
can comply with only effacing itself. […] In the technocratic question the 
expertise, the knowledge take place only on one side: the side of  technique, 
whatever it means, of  the technicians, whoever they are. […] Technocracy is 
an ideology in itself  and as such it must be dealt with and discussed”27. 
It is thus clear the relationship between the blind trust in the “technicians” 
and the onset of  technocracy forms and the potential dangers looming 
on democracy. The latter, in fact, allows citizens to control the political 
power, while technocracy rules out, by its own nature, the democratic 
24 M. ferrari, Berlin: Individuo e governo, in S. Mastellone (edited by), Il pensiero politico europeo 
(1945-1989), Firenze, Centro Editoriale Toscano, 2001, p. 117.
25  Obviously only at international level (but the domestic politics of  the various States must 
“conform” more and more to international politics).
26 And the political ideologies.
27 M. nacci, Tecnica e fine della politica: l’ideologia tecnocratica, in M. Nacci (edited by), Politiche della 
tecnica. Immagini, ideologie, narrazioni, Genova, Name edizioni, 2005,  pp. 273, 274.
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legitimation. Rita Baldi, about the importance of  democratic control, 
recalls what Karl Popper wrote: “The right of  people to judge and bring 
down their government is the only known tool through which we can try 
to protect ourselves against the political power abuse; it means the control 
of  the rulers by the ruled ones. And since the political power controls the 
economic power, political democracy is also the only way the ruled ones 
can control the economic power. Without democratic control there can 
be no reason at all why any government should not use its own political 
and economic power with aims very different from the protection of  its 
citizens’ freedom”28.
On this point, deemed the “dark side” of  his functionalist theory, the 
following question might be put: can Mitrany be considered a theoretician 
of  technocracy? According to me the answer is no, since his functionalist 
theory – founded on the certainty that outside the political sphere problems 
can be solved in a not conflictual way – does not envisage, on the theoretical 
plane, the substitution, in the international relations, of  the “political power” 
with another “power”, but only the reduction of  the “political power” itself. 
In other words, the almost inevitable technocratic drift could be defined as 
a side effect, forseen probably by Mitrany, but considered the lesser evil. In 
fact, we should not make the mistake of  decontextualizing the origin of  the 
functionalist theory of  Mitrany, whose life goes through both World Wars and 
the Cold War29: the real danger is the politics of  power of  the States30.
Another element to take into account is Mitrany’s firm belief  that an 
automatic mechanism can be triggered off, that is founded on the “common 
interest”31, able of  linking governments and even peoples beyond the will 
of  international cooperation and of  good intentions: peace, in other words, 
becomes an everybody’s “interest”. 
A sort of  “invisible hand”32 turns single country’s “interests” into 
28 r. Baldi, La “società aperta” di Karl Popper, in S. Mastellone (edited by), Il pensiero politico europeo 
(1945-1989) cit., p. 101. Baldi quotes K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1945; Italian translation: La società aperta e i suoi nemici, Roma, 
Armando, 1993-1994.
29 It should not be forgotten Mitrany’s objective: peace.
30 National States and federations, that is to say, separated political-territorial units.
31 It is one of  the aspects which most influence had on Jean Monnet’s European Community 
building: “Monnet wondered what could link, before it was too late, France and Germany, 
what could cement a common interest between the two countries”. c. Malandrino, Federalismo. 
Storia, idee, modelli cit., p. 116.
32 Giuseppe Casale and Giulio Gianelli write: “[…] Smith claims that human acting is determined 
by six impulses: selfishness, desire for peace, sense of  ownership, habit of  working, tendency 
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international community’s “interests”. From that it is possible to conclude 
that in Mitrany’s thought there is a sound “anthropological pessimism”: he 
does not trust politics, politicians and, with good reasons, mankind.
In conclusion, the mistrust of  politics and the growing estrangement of  
citizens from it33 fuel technocracy, building up a downright democracy deficit. 
The events linked to the European integration process34 from this viewpoint 
show how the functionalist road leads or can lead to technocratic structures 
which are mostly taken away from the citizens’ control.
In the end, the overcoming of  the political sphere can lead to the 
overcoming of  democracy and to a dangerous chance.
for taking one thing for another,  ‘sympathy’ (= social consensus). Pushed by them, men – who 
are the best judges of  their  own interests – act in a way to realize the maximum of  collective 
utility unawares. ‘It is not from the generosity of  the butcher, of  the baker or of  the brewer 
[…] that we can hope to get our lunch, but from their evaluation of  their own interests. Each 
individual strives as much as possible to use his capital in support of  the national productive 
activity, and to direct then that activity in such a way that its product can get its maximum value, 
each individual necessarily works to make the annual income of  the society as high as possible. 
Actually he does not usually mean to pursue the public interest nor is he aware of  the extent in 
which he is pursuing it…when he directs his activity in such a way that his product is as high 
as possible, he only aims to his own advantage and he is led by an invisible hand […], in this as 
in many other cases, to pursue an aim that does not form part of  his intentions…Pursuing his 
interest, he himself  pursues the interest of  the society in a way more efficient than he intended 
to pursue it’”. g. caSale - g. gianelli, Il pensiero economico da Platone a Sraffa cit., p. 135.
33 In Italy this is especially evident. 
34 Also a renowned constitutionalist  is not satisfied about it: see g. ZagreBelSKy (edited by), 
Diritti e Costituzione nell’Unione Europea, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2003, p. V.
Chapter Nine
polytheism vs .  monotheism: 
some ideas regarding 
the pastoral form of poWer
Pejman Abdolmohammadi
The relation between religion and politics could be stricter than it could 
appear in a general approach on social sciences. In other terms, the form by 
which human mind will shape its own religious and spiritual ideas might also 
influence its socio-political relations. In such context, the differences between 
monotheism and polytheism are relevant. The main Abrahamic religion such 
as Judaism, Christianity and Islam are mostly characterized with an ‘Earth’ 
vision of  life, while the oriental religions such as Zoroastrism, Hinduism and 
Buddhism are more characterized with a “celestial” vision of  life. 
Philosophy is a science who enables man to attain knowledge of  the 
origins of  things and of  the living beings. The ultimate goal of  Philosophy 
is to remove the darkness of  ignorance and to reach the light of  reason. In 
other words, according to Descartes1, the use of  reason and common sense 
1 r. deScarteS, Discours sur la méthode, (Leiden, 1637), Premiere partie: “En quoy il n’est pas 
vraysemblable que tous se trompent; mais plutost cela tesmoigne que la puissance de bien 
juger, distinguer le vray d’avec le faux, qui est proprement ce qu’on nomme le bon sens ou la 
raison, est naturellement esgale en tous les homes; et ainsi que la diversité de nos opinions ne 
vient pas de ce que les uns sont plus raisonnables que les autres, mais seulement de ce que nous 
conduisons nos pensées par diverses voyes, ne considerons pas les mesmes choses. Car ce n’est 
pas assez d’avoir l’esprit bon, mais le principal est de l’appliquer bien”.
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is fundamental to humans in order to distinguish the truth from the false. In 
such process of  acquiring knowledge, also the vision of  life and the religion 
can be relevant. 
The true meaning of  civilization consists in the effort to collect all the 
necessary elements of  nature and human life for the transformation of  society, 
from its primitive and savage state to the civilian one. As a result, the more the 
civilization of  humankind has developed, the higher has been the quality of  
its life. In the state of  nature, the man is weak and defenseless: in addition to 
the fear of  animals, he is afraid even of  his fellow-kinds. The sexual instinct, 
coupled with the need for self-protection from environmental hazards, brings 
Man to develop the desire to aggregate and to build a community. The pre-
social Man lives in solitude and does not tend to join others. Only his relentless 
need for knowledge led him to progress, giving him access to Roshanestan (the 
enlightened place) of  rationality. It is therefore the thirst of  wisdom that is the 
main engine that leads Man to evolve, transforming his bleak and lonesome 
state of  nature to a civil society based on a social contract.
As also Rousseau states men in their State of  nature are born equal and 
inequalities among them arise only with the emergence of  civil society. In this 
sense, I believe in a peaceful and egalitarian essence of  man in the state of  
nature and I am critical of  Hobbes, who argues instead that peace is only a 
temporary element of  the human condition and that war, instead, it represents 
the true primordial nature.
The follower of  monotheism, in their religious history, have often built an 
absolute and unique idea of  their God: they recognized in their sovereign a 
divine figure descended from the sky, believing in one God gifted with all the 
existing positive attributes.
In front of  such a power, there is no possibility for any criticism or 
protest. This type of  behavior, might lead to the establishment of  despotic 
governments in the world. The followers of  monotheistic religions, therefore, 
need a shepherd to guide them to the truth: this leader is infallible and his word 
is indisputable. The people seek in their sovereign “a political shepherd” who 
wants to guide them in an absolute way to the material bliss. Consequently, the 
sovereign becomes infallible: his policies, although absolutist, cannot be called 
into question. 
The idea of  an absolute mono that appears mainly in Middle Eastern and 
Mediterranean religions has led these communities to develop the idea of  
despotic political power and to not be able to develop a real critical consciousness. 
The people of  the West had, in Greek and Carthage civilizations, a polytheistic 
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religious tradition in which there were several Gods with different powers. Each 
of  them enjoyed a wide sphere of  power, but at the same time, this sphere 
found its limit in the presence of  the other Gods. This allowed to Western 
(pre-Christian) religious thought to develop the idea of  non-omnipotence of  
the divine, an idea that has moved from the religious sphere to the political 
one, bringing the Greeks, for example, to not being subjected to the will of  a 
single entity without the opportunity to discuss and criticize. The polytheistic 
roots of  the West helped the enlightened Western thinkers, once freed from the 
Abrahamic monotheistic thought, to lay the foundations for a rational thinking, 
pluralistic and not absolute. The same plural idea of  the divinity existed both in 
the Persian and Roma pre- Islamic and pre - Christian era. In the Zoroastrian 
Persia, we could see a very particular angelology, which is mapping an interesting 
balance of  relations between 6 angels, which represent the light, and the other six 
which represent the evil. The God is represented by Ahura Mazda, (the Lord of  
Knowledge), while his/her main competitor is Ahriman, the Lord of  obscurity 
and ignorance. The Persian Zoroastrian cosmology is featured by contrasts 
and particularly with several players and divine icons. By the arrival (through 
invasion and/or conquest) of  Islam in Persia in the VI century A.D., there was 
a paradigm shift of  the religion and the religiosity. The orthodox monotheist 
Islam replaced the Zoroastrism. However, we could see that, during centuries, 
within the Iranian cultural sphere of  influence, the pure Islamic monotheism 
has been influenced with soft hidden pluralism. The Persian trend towards Shiite 
Islam and Sufism could be interpreted as an important example of  this. 
This basic differences between the philosophy of  religions of  the East and 
of  the West has been significant in the development of  Western thought in 
the direction of  a Republican form of  government and Constitution, while 
in the East the growth of  despotism was due to the monotheistic shepherd 
mentality.
 According to the Persian Rationalism, promoted by Mirza Aqa Khan 
Kermāni (1853-1896)2, who was also influenced by Decartes, the science is 
very important in the Creation and the universe is governed by a series of  
2 On Kermani’s political biography see f. adaMyyat, Andisheha-iye Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, 
Tehran, Payam Press, 1978, pp. 13-48; P. M. Bayat, The Concepts of  Religion and Government in 
the Thought of  Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, A Nineteenth-Century Persian Revolutionary, “International 
Journal of  Middle East Studies”, 5, 4, 1974, pp. 381-400; h. nateQ, Nameha-ye Tab’id, Köln, 
Ofoq Press, 1989, pp. 13-43; M. A. KerMāni, Se Maktub be-kushesh va virayesh-e Bahram Chubineh, 
Essen, Nima Verlag, 2000, pp. 3- 92; M. A. KerMāni, Sad Kehtabeh ba virastar-e Mohammad Ja’far 
Mahjub, Tehran, Nashr-e Ketab, 1990, pp. I – XXXIII.
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natural laws, based on rational intelligence and not on divine intervention3. In 
addition, according to Kermāni, once a man knows the truth, thanks to the 
use of  reason, he must apply it to the progress and for the common good of  
humanity. In fact, for Kermāni, as well as Descartes, it is not enough to be 
endowed with intelligence and knowing the truth, but it is necessary to apply 
it in everyday life. Kermāni, in fact, on his intellectual life, will always try to 
connect the world of  ideas to practical politics, trying to stimulate Persians 
not to be passive towards the tyranny in which they lived, but to intervene in 
their public life and bring down the evil through an anti-despotic revolution4.
The true meaning of  civilization consists in the effort to collect all the 
necessary elements of  nature and human life for the transformation of  
society, from its primitive and savage state to the civilian one. As a result, 
the more the civilization of  mankind has developed, the higher has been the 
quality of  its life. In his description of  the state of  nature, I would consider 
the man as weak and defenseless: in addition to the fear of  animals, he is 
afraid even of  his fellow-kinds. The sexual instinct, coupled with the need for 
self-protection from environmental hazards, brings Man to develop the desire 
to aggregate and to build a community. The pre-social Man lives in solitude 
and does not tend to join others. Only his relentless need for knowledge led 
him to progress, giving him access to Roshanestan (the enlightened place) of  
rationality. It is therefore the thirst of  wisdom that is the main engine that 
leads Man to evolve, transforming his bleak and lonesome state of  nature to a 
civil society based on a social contract.
It is by adopting a part of  Rousseau’s discourse in both his notable works 
“Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of  Inequality Among Men” 
and “The Social Contract”, that I would share the idea that men in their State 
of  nature are born equal and inequalities among them arise only with the 
emergence of  civil society. In this sense, I believe in a peaceful and egalitarian 
essence of  man in the state of  nature and I am critical of  Hobbes, who argues 
instead that peace is only a temporary element of  the human condition and 
that war, instead, it represents the true primordial nature.
However I will not share the pessimism of  Rousseau regarding the institution 
of  society. Th civil society represents an evolutionary and positive step, as 
the only way to develop man and let him achieve prosperity and happiness. 
Through the contract and the law, the order among different human realities 
of  the world is set. An order that needed to run a sovereign organization 
3 Cf. footnote n. 1.
4 heKMat-e naZari cit. in F. Adamyyat, op. cit., pp. 81-83.
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capable of  governing: both religion and the government are artificial creations 
of  men aimed at his social development. In other words, the different forms 
of  government and the different religions that have occurred over time were 
the result of  human reason.
Therefore, civil society itself  is not a source of  inequality, but it can 
become if  the civil government and the spiritual power do not govern 
according to virtue and the proper use of  reason. It is the relation between the 
temporal and the spiritual power that determines the prosperity of  a society 
or its complete darkness. Although state and religion were created following 
a natural human need, they are artificial and therefore susceptible both to 
passions and to reason. Therefore when instinct and passion prevail then they 
create inequality within the society, whereas when reason guides society it 
instead creates prosperity and equality.
Those who represent the general will, will ensure the implementation 
of  justice in order to create a virtuous system; otherwise, if  the head of  the 
community will not be able to be fair, despotism, characterized by torture and 
repression, will prevail.
 According to the Persian thinker Kermāni, despotism is the worst of  evil. 
Two are the tyrannical symbols that cause evil and injustice in Persian society: 
the clergy and the monarchy5. The first one continues to leave the people in 
ignorance and spreads a sense of  fear among the population against God’s 
power, while the latter keeps the people in poverty by creating terror towards 
the use of  violence against men. The influence of  Montesquieu’s thought 
seems obvious. Identifying terror as a principle of  despotism has its origin in 
Montesquieu’s classification of  the various forms of  government, with their 
principles and their different characteristics6. Kermāni, like Montesquieu, is also 
very sensitive to despotism, which he considers the worst of  evil for a society 
and thus must be fought. In one of  his last two political works, Sad khetabeh, he 
states: “When religion and politics are subjected to the despotism of  the rulers 
and to religious fanaticism, the breath will be taken away from that people, now 
subjugated. Its evolution will be suspended and its future annihilated”.
The religious fanaticism of  the clergy or of  those who take interest in 
the spiritual sphere of  society, together with the despotism of  the rulers, are 
considered by Kermāni two worst of  evils of  human society. In his argument 
on the origin of  despotism and its relationship with religion, Kermāni, 
5 M. A. KerMāni, Se Maktub be-kushesh va virayesh-e Bahram Chubineh cit., p. 129.
6 Montesquieu outlined his classification of  governments in L’esprit des lois, (Geneve, 1748), 
Second Book, Chap. II–V. 
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influenced by Voltaire and Rousseau, makes a distinction between polytheistic 
and monotheistic religions.
According to Kermāni, Oriental peoples (referring to the Chinese, 
Mongolians, Semitics and Aryans) in their religious history have often built an 
absolute and unique idea of  their God: “they recognized in their sovereign a 
divine figure descended from the sky or they widened their fantasies, believing 
in one God gifted with all the existing positive attributes”7.
Kermāni believes that this basic difference between the philosophy of  
religions of  the East and of  the West has been significant in the development 
of  Western thought in the direction of  a Republican form of  government 
and Constitution, while in the East the growth of  despotism was due to the 
monotheistic shepherd mentality.
During the second phase of  his intellectual life in Istanbul, Kermāni had 
the possibility to read Montesquieu political text “L’esprit des lois”. Thus, 
influenced by the thought of  the French intellectual, he developed his thoughts 
on the principle of  the relativity of  laws and of  religion.
He argues that when political and religious powers conform to the customs, 
to the history and to the nature of  the people, they may significantly contribute 
to human development and to the promotion of  peaceful coexistence. 
Otherwise, they both will cause the worst of  evils: despotism. In support 
of  this idea Kermāni mentions the example of  Persian history, recalling that 
“when, in the era of  Cyrus, the government followed the nature of  his people 
it managed to achieve a government so virtuous that has been well known 
throughout history. Instead, when Persian governments in other eras forgot 
the nature of  their people they fell into the darkness of  tyranny”8.
These rules, however, are useful only for those socio-political contexts and 
for that specific historical moment. In fact, not only would they be useless in 
other contexts, but they may even be harmful.
Kermāni supports the relativity of  religions. Religion can be in harmony 
with rationality only when it is adapted to the specific nature of  the population 
for whom it is addressed.
For example, the Zoroastrian religion was in harmony with the nature of  
the Persian people, as opposed to the Islamic one, which was addressed to the 
Arab people9.
7 M. A. KerMāni, Se Maktub be-kushesh va virayesh-e Bahram Chubineh cit., speech n. 13.
8 M. A. KerMāni, Sad Kehtabeh ba virastar-e Mohammad Ja’far Mahjub, Tehran, Nashr-e Ketab, 
1991, speech n. 14.
9 M. A. KerMāni, Sad Khetabeh , op. cit., speech n. 9.
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“A religion is solid and perfect only when it is consistent with the nature of  
the population and its way of  life; in these circumstances, religion can bring to 
the moral and cultural development of  that particular people”10.
“Religion is like a medicine that can cure the disease of  a nation. So, 
as a medicine, (religion) will be suitable for a specific disease and must be 
consumed at a given time. As any disease requires a specific medicine, every 
nation needs its specific religion. Consequently, a religion that can constitute a 
cure for a nation, it can be harmful to another population. Indeed, sometimes 
it can turn into poison”.11
Even time plays a key role for religions: the peoples progress and so they 
need new rules that old religions cannot provide. According to this reasoning, 
religions are related to the nature of  the people and are subject to the time 
factor. Abrahamic monotheistic religions such as Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, for example, are now not suitable to modern times and therefore must 
be viewed in a historical perspective.
The human visualises a desirable reign as an ideal place to attain: a 
space where justice, peace and the constructive powers definitively replace 
the negative ones. The ideal reign will be reached at the end of  time by the 
human being; heroic figures will guide him to overthrow the negative powers 
of  despotism. This type of  myth, which envisages the arrival of  a decisive 
moment in human history in which (by the help of  a heroic figure) the human 
being will be freed from the chains of  obscurity, discovering a messianic reign, 
is classified as the ‘myth of  liberation’. It has an apocalyptic vision of  history 
and maintains that, after the final battle between good and bad, a new earth 
and a new sky will be born and there will no longer be any space for tears and 
blood. The ‘myth of  liberation’ constitutes one of  the most important parts 
of  the monotheism way of  thinking. The need of  being guided might be 
confused with the need of  being saved or liberated by a heroic figure, who will 
one day come to save the people from injustice and despotism. In such context, 
the role of  self-determination and rationality might be weaken as the believer 
might prefer to delegate the individual power to a divine representatives who 
could be member of  its own church or mosque. 
Such “tribal” or “pastoral” way of  thinking and way of  being does not 
express itself  only within the form of  States (authoritarism or totalitarism), 
but also express itself  in various socio-cultural forms. In a simple public office 
(with the director), in an Embassy (towards the role of  the Ambassador), in a 
10 Ibid., speech n. 17.
11 Ibid., speech n. 18.
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Newspaper (with the Editor) in the University (with the Full Professor who is 
in charge) and in many other similar places. In other terms, the “monotheism 
syndrome” is partly the result of  pastoral and tribal communities and could 
produce a model of  human relation based on the patriarchal form of  power. 
Today’s post-modern and post-human societies, characterized with mass 
media, social network and other frameworks, could represent an interesting 
instrument to reinforce the pluralism of  ideas and or the polytheism of  the 
values. Such pluralism could challenge also the orthodox and rooted idea 
of  pastoral power. However, a part of  the human mind is so much used of  
tribalism which is able also to create patriarchal and familiar spaces even in 
the post-modern world. Look at for example to the tribes which are created in 
new social medias such as ‘WhatsApp” “Telegram” or even Facebook. Many 
families or group with the same interests, they have trend to create their own 
tribes also in the global and globalized world. This shows that the pastoral and 
tribal minds are rooted in the human mind and that, once they find their new 
way, they are ready to come back protagonist in the social arena. 
Chapter Ten
politiCal and religious monism 
in miChel ‘aflaq’s politiCal thought
Carlotta Stegagno
10.1 the foundation of the ba’th party
Michel ‘Aflaq, the founder of  the Ba’th Party, was an untypical character in 
the Arab world and society: he was a thinker, a philosopher and a teacher who 
inspired an entire generation of  young Arab men.
He was born in 1920 in Damascus, from a Greek-Orthodox family, his 
parents were involved in nationalistic activities against French rule in Syria1. 
After attending the Thajiz High School in Damascus, from 1928 to 1932 he 
moved to Paris to study at Sorbonne after winning a scholarship. The years in 
Paris were the formative ones: the young Michel ‘Aflaq got acquainted with 
European life and society, he studied History and Philosophy; he also became 
familiar with Marxism, Communism and Socialism. But those years were 
important especially because they marked the beginning of  the development 
of  the idea of  unity, the main pillar in Michel ‘Aflaq’s political thought. In 
1 KaMal S. aBu JaBer, The Arab Ba’th Socialist Party History, Ideology and Organization, New York, 
Syracuse University Press, 1966, p. 10.
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Paris, the future founder of  the Ba’th Party was in contact with others young 
Arabs with whom he established an Union of  Arab students; through these 
meeting he become conscious of  the importance of  political unity as a means 
for ending the Western exploitation in the Arab lands.
Once back in Syria, Michel ‘Aflaq begun to teach History and to gather around 
himself  a group of  students with whom he discussed the main contemporary 
political issues. Those meetings, that were usually held on Fridays in Damascus 
coffee houses, represented the first activities of  the future Ba’th Party. In the 
early 1940s ‘Aflaq’s ideology wasn’t fully developed yet and his political activity 
was in its starting phase: the first official statement of  the Ba’th Party was 
issued in 19432 mainly focusing on nationalism and Arabism. Here ‘Aflaq traced 
the outline of  the Arab mission i.e. the Arab people’s awakening and renewal 
after decades of  political fragmentation, exploitation and moral debasement. 
In 1940 ‘Aflaq resigned from teaching to devote himself  to a full-time 
political activity. In this period he got acquainted with nationalist and socialist 
political groups and organizations. Due to his political activity, he was 
imprisoned several times: in 1939, 1948, 1949, 1952 and in 19543. Those facts 
enhanced his public image and his prestige in the Arab world. 
In 1947 ‘Aflaq celebrated the official foundation of  the Ba’th Party in its 
first congress, during which he was appointed General Secretary and the Con-
stitution of  the Party was issued. We can describe the 1947 Constitution as the 
political manifesto of  the Ba’ath and the first formalisation of  Michel ‘Alfaq’s 
ideology. Meanwhile, due to its Pan-Arab identity, the Party spread in other 
Arab countries: in Jordan in 1948 and in 1952 in Iraq and Lebanon. More 
branches were also open in the Nile Valley and in North Africa in the fol-
lowing years.
In 1954 the Ba’th merged with the Arab Socialist Party, founded by Akram 
Harwani in 19464; the union didn’t change the ideology, or the 1947 Consti-
tution, and it was only underlined by the adding of  the adjective socialist (al-i-
shtiraki) to the official denomination of  the Party5. In this new form the Ba’th 
run for 1954 elections, obtaining 17 seats: its strengthening was a consequence 
2 Cit. in D. Roberts, The Ba’th and the Creation of  Modern Syria, Kent, Croom Helm Ldt, 1987, p. 
18.
3 Kamal S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba’th Socialist Party History, Ideology and Organization, New York, 
Syracuse University Press, 1966, p. 13.
4 S. Moubayed, Steel and Silk Men and Women Who Shaped Syria 1900-2000, Seattle, Cune Press, 
2006, p. 246.
5  G. H. Torrey, The Ba’th: Ideology and Practice, “Middle East Journal”, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, Autu-
mn, 1969, p. 455.
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of  the merge, and in particular, of  the widening of  the electoral base that the 
merge has caused6.
In the second half  of  the 1950s the approaching between the Egyptian 
President Gamal  Nasser and the Ba’th begun. This will led to the creation 
of  the United Arab Republic (UAR) between Syria and Egypt in 1958. The 
union represented the climax of  ‘Aflaq’s popularity but also the beginning of  
his political decline. The UAR was the product of  two different forces. On the 
one side we had Nasser’s charisma, that was particularly enhanced after the 
1955 Bandung Conference and the 1956 Suez Crisis. On the other side we had 
the political doctrine of  Michel ‘Aflaq and his original and revolutionary idea 
of  Arab unity. After the 1961 UAR break-up, due to a military coup in Syria, 
Michel ‘Aflaq described the Union and its failure with these words: 
The unity between Syria and Egypt in February 1958 was not sudden nor was it rash 
and unmeditated. It was not an accident brought by circumstances. It had an history 
and a past behind it [...]. The Ba’ath Party thought and declared that behind its inten-
tion to realise the first step in Arab Unity was its will to restore to all the Arabs their 
confidence in the idea of  unity and its capacity for realization, and to make the first 
state of  unity a support and a foundation for the Arab struggle in every part of  the 
Arab homeland7.
The UAR break-up was a turning point in Michel ‘Alfaq’s life and political 
career. In the 1960s a process of  “ruralisation” occurred within the Party led 
to a change in its ideology, membership and even leadership. These transfor-
mations led to the isolation of  the Ba’th founding member: ‘Aflaq retired from 
political life and, after Hafiz al-Asad rise to power in 1970, he went in volun-
tary exile in Iraq, where in 1968 the Iraqi branch of  the Ba’th had seized the 
power. He spent the last part of  his life in Baghdad, in a condition of  increa-
sing isolation from political activity. When he died in 19898, Saddam Hussein 
stated that ‘Aflaq converted to Islam9 and built after him a mausoleum. After 
6 KaMal S. aBu JaBer, The Arab Ba’th Socialist Party History, Ideology and Organization, New York, 
Syracuse University Press, 1966 p. 35.
7 M. ‘Aflaq, The Relapse into Secession, febbraio 1962, in Choice of  Texts from the Ba’th party 
founder’s thought, Firenze, Cooperativa Officine Grafiche, 1977, p. 27.
8 Reuters, Michel ‘Aflaq dies in Paris at 79; founder of  Iraq’s Baathists Party, «The New York Times», 
25 June, 1989 http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/25/obituaries/michel-aflaq-dies-in-paris-at-
79-founder-of-iraq-s-baathist-party.html. 
9 M. Virost, Sandcastles: the Arabs in Search of  the Modern World, New York, Syracuse University 
Press, 1995, p. 31.
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the collapse of  Iraqi regime the mausoleum was converted into a gym for 
rehabilitation of  Us soldiers; this was a sign that Michel ‘Aflaq’s cultural herita-
ge was neither embraced nor preserved by the new generations.
10.2 the ideology of miChel ‘aflaq
Michel ‘Aflaq’s ideology can be summarized in three different topics: sociali-
sm, nationalism and unity. The Ba’th is primarily a nationalist and a Pan-Ara-
bist party, but ‘Aflaq also insisted on the need for socialism to realize the Party 
goals. Thus, socialism is the economic tool of  the Party, for this reason the 
Ba’th Constitution states that: 
The Party of  the Arab Ba’th is a socialist party. It believes that socialism is a necessity 
which emanates from the depth of  Arab nationalism. Socialism constitutes, in fact, the 
ideal social order which allows the Arab people to realize its possibilities and to enable 
its genius to flourish, and which will ensure for the nation constant progress in its mate-
rial and moral output10. 
Arab socialism is different from European socialism since it allows private ow-
nership and inheritance rights. ‘Aflaq utilised the adjectives Arab and human 
to define and describe it: Ba’thist socialism is Arab because it is designed for 
meeting the demands of  Arab society11. It is also human because it is not con-
ceived merely as an economic system but as a combination of  values designed 
to achieve dignity for man through social participation. Thus Arab Socialism, 
for ‘Aflaq, is based on the concept of  justice and co-operation among indivi-
duals and not on class struggle12.
The second key-word in ‘Aflaq’s ideology is nationalism: it is the embod-
iment of  Arab spirit, the path that the Arab people must follow in order to 
ending Western exploitation and colonialism. This goal can not be achieved 
10 Constitution of  the Arab Ba’th Party, in S. G. Haim, Arab Nationalism An Anthology, Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, University of  California Press, 1962, p. 235.
11 M. ‘Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba’th, in M. Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: the Role of  Ideas in 
Politics, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970, p. 157.
12 M. Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: the Role of  Ideas in Politics, Baltimore and Lon-
don, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970, p. 157.
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all at once, but through two main steps: firstly, the emancipation of  Arab 
land from colonialist influences, and, secondly, by the unification of  the Arab 
homeland13. After accomplishing these two steps, the Arab people can achieve 
the Arab mission, that is the re-awakening of  their soul and the establishment 
of  a unitary state amongst all the Arab-speaking countries from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Persian Gulf. 
So we see how unity is both the the starting point and the final goal in 
Michel ‘Aflaq’s nationalism. For ‘Aflaq nationalism is «love before anything 
else’14 and «the same feeling that binds the individual to his family, because the 
fatherland is simply a large household and the nation is a large family»15. For 
‘Aflaq nationalism is an all-embracing feeling, it is open to anyone who sha-
red with the Arab peoples their history, language and culture16, it is a unitary 
idea in which different parts co-work in creating a monist ideology centered 
around the idea of  unity.
Arab unity is, together with nationalism and socialism, one of  the key-
words of  ‘Aflaq’s political thought, but it have the preeminence over them:
There is no doubt that the goals of  “The Arab Baath”, which we have summarized in 
“Unity, Freedom and Socialism” are fundamentally equal in importance and should 
not to be separated from each other or to be postponed. In addition, unity has a moral 
priority and superiority which should not to be overlooked by the Ba’athist lest they 
follow ideological and political currents that are the most remote from the idea of Arab 
renaissance17.
Unity is a general goal and the core of  the Ba’th ideology and Pan-Arabism. 
It gathers under itself  many different goals, such as the struggle against 
colonialism, the liberation of  Palestine and the achievement of  a territorial 
union embracing all the Arab countries from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
Persian Gulf. Unity, is not only just a pragmatic goal but it also has a spiritual 
dimension that refers to an internal re-awakening of  the Arab people by the 
means of  education and religion.
13 Ivi, p. 195.
14  M. ‘Aflaq, The Duty of  Nationalist Action, 1943, in Choice of  Texts from the Ba’th party founder’s 
thought, Firenze, Cooperativa Officine Grafiche, 1977, p. 58. 
15  S. G. Haim, Arab Nationalism An Anthology, Berkeley, Los Angeles, University of  California 
Press, 1962, p. 242.
16  Ivi, p. 243.
17 M. ‘Aflaq, The Revolutionary Nature of  the Arab Unity in Choice of  Texts from the Ba’th party founder’s 
thought. Firenze, Cooperativa Officine Grafiche, 1977, p. 10.
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10.3 the monist Content of miChel ‘aflaq’s politiCal thought 
The idea of  unity, which I briefly drafted in the previous paragraph, is the core 
of  Michel ‘Aflaq’s monism and the unifying principle of  his ideology. Unity, as 
many other political concepts in Michel ‘Aflaq’s political thought has a double 
dimension since the founder of  the Ba’th Party developed this idea with a 
tangible and intangible meaning. It is both spiritual and political.
From a political point of  view, ‘Aflaq saw himself  as the herald of  a new in-
stitutional form which will helps the new generation of  Arab youth to achieve 
his dream of  unity. In the mid of  1950s the political realisation of  Arab unity 
from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf  seems to be easily reachable and 
Michel ‘Aflaq’s Ba’th Party is hardly working for this goal. The efforts will be 
compensate with the establishment of  the United Arab Republic (UAR) crea-
ted by the union between Syria and Egypt from 1958 to 1961.
To have a fully understanding of  why and how Michel ‘Aflaq created a 
monist ideology centered around the concept of  unity, it must be necessary 
to point out that the Arab motherland was in a condition of  fragmentation 
imposed by the Western countries and the Zionist movement: «Unity has 
become axiomatically synonymous with liberation since imperialism fears 
nothing as it fears unity. Unity has also become synonymous with progressi-
veness inside the Arab nation»18. It is for this reason that Michel ‘Aflaq gave 
a revolutionary meaning to the idea of  unity. In 1953 he wrote that «unity, 
as seen by the Arab Baath is a fundamental and living idea. It is a theory in 
the same way as freedom and socialism have theories»19. The final aim of  
the idea of  unity is the overthrowing of  the present condition of  the Arab 
motherland by the means of  struggle and revolution. This struggle must be 
directed against the enemies of  Arab unity: 
Unity is not an automatic act which comes into being by itself  as a consequence of  
circumstances and development. [...] Unity is a concept of  overthrowing and an act 
of  struggle. The onslaught of  imperialism and Zionism is practically confined to 
preventing Arab unity. Imperialism does not need direct intervention to counterfeit 
democracy and progressivism since fragmentation guarantees this as long as its posi-
18 M. ‘Aflaq, There is one Road for Unity, 21 giugno 1957, in Choice of  Texts from the Ba’th party foun-
der’s thought. Firenze, Cooperativa Officine Grafiche, 1977, p. 19.
19 M. ‘Aflaq, The Revolutionary Nature of  the Arab Unity, 1953, in Choice of  Texts from the Ba’th party 
founder’s thought. Firenze, Cooperativa Officine Grafiche, 1977, p. 11.
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tion and logic tempt every part to exploit it with a view of  attaining certain illusory 
benefits at the expense of  the other parts20.
In ‘Aflaq’s mind unity has its own values and steps for the final realization: «it 
has its principles, organized daily and continous struggle as well as its stages 
of  application and pave the way for the final victory»21.
But unity, for ‘Aflaq, is also something different from the simple struggle 
against Western colonialism and Zionism, thus, in 1960, the founder of  the 
Ba’th wrote: «Unity is not addition and connection and a materialist process. 
Unity is a new fusion through the new experience of  the Arabs»22.
As many others Michel ‘Aflaq’s political concepts unity is both a metaphy-
sical and a tangible idea. The first dimension is represented by the cultural, 
political, historical and religious bonds existing amongst all the citizens of  the 
Arab motherland. The guiding principles of  the idea of  unity in ‘Aflaq’s mind: 
Could never claim profundity and genuineness if  they were not inspired by the history 
of  the Arab nation when it was unified and if  the image of  the forthcoming unity does 
not exist continually in the minds and hearts of  people holding these principles23.
The awareness of  these principles is latent because of  the exploitation of  the 
Arab world by Western countries. The solution is a reawakening process achieved 
with a long education work aimed to instill in the Arab minds the ideal of  unity; 
thus the Arab citizen will understand the link that bonds together the different 
parts of  the Arab motherland and he would be conscious of  the power that he 
can use when he acts not individually but on behalf  of  the entire Arab nation.
It is due to the importance that ‘Aflaq assigned to political unity and to the 
fact that he connected the different components of  his thought with a unitary 
principle that I define his ideology as a monist one. 
For ‘Aflaq, monist is a philosophical system that unified the plurality of  the 
existing reality under a single principle and that contested the duality between 
matter and spirit and between world and God. There are two different sources 
of  Ba’thist monism: the Aristotelian idea of  prime mover and Islam as mo-
notheistic religion. We can define the Aristotelian influence as implicit, since 
20 Ibidem.
21 Ibidem.
22 M. ‘Aflaq, Landmark of  Progressive Nationalism, 1960, in Choice of  Texts from the Ba’th party foun-
der’s thought. Firenze, Cooperativa Officine Grafiche, 1977, p. 23.
23 M. ‘Aflaq, The Federation of  Egypt and Syria, 1956, in Choice of  Texts from the Ba’th party founder’s 
thought. Firenze, Cooperativa Officine Grafiche, 1977, p. 16.
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‘Aflaq seemed to be unaware of  it and Aristotle’s thought is mediate through 
Arab philosophy and literature.
In Michel ‘Aflaq’s political thought we can find also Plato and Aristot-
le’s influences mediated by Arab medieval philosophers who translated their 
works and were influenced by them. From Plato he brought the possibility to 
discover the Ideal and the Good, while from Aristotle he derived the idea of  
the Prime Mover, which is combined with the Islamic concept of  Allah. The 
combination of  these two elements is a common feature in the Arab culture. 
Thus, the second component of  Michel ‘Aflaq’s monism is the Islamic religion 
and, in particular the idea that the Prophet Mohammad is the great initiator. 
This principle finds expression in the idea that the life of  the Prophet repre-
sented the golden age of  Islamic civilization and that Prophet Muhammad 
was the embodiment of  the virtues and qualities of  the Arab people in all eras 
of  their civilization. ‘Aflaq made a comparison between the past of  the origin 
of  Islam and his contemporaneity; in 1943 he wrote:
In the past, one person’s life summarized the life of  a nation. Today the life of  the whole 
nation in its new revival should become a detailed exposition of  the life of  its great man. 
Muhammad was all the Arabs. Let all the Arabs be Muhammad today24.
In this excerpt we see how, for ‘Aflaq, the identification with the life of  the 
Prophet is the key for the rejuvenation of  the Arab people. This process could 
succeeded only because Mohammad was the prime principle and represented 
the perfection of  Arab civilization:
The external perception of  the life of  the Prophet has been as a beautiful picture for us 
to admire and treat with holy reverence. However, we should begin to perceive it from 
within ourselves, so we may begin to live it. Any Arab of  the present time can live the 
life of  the Prophet, even in small proportions as the pebble is to the mountain and the 
drop is to the sea25.
24 M. ‘Aflaq, ‘A Zikra al-Rassoul al-arabi [In memory of  the Arab Prophet], Damascus, Ba’th Party 
Publications, 1943. The speech could also found in M. ‘Aflaq, Choice of  Texts., Choice of  Texts from 
the Ba’th party founder’s thought. Firenze, Cooperativa Officine Grafiche, 1977 pp. 55-58. A Spanish 
translation could also be found in Ruiz Bravo, Carmen; Martinez Montavez, Pedro, La controver-
sia ideologica nacionalismo arabe - nacionalismo locales, Oriente 1918-1952. Istituto Hispano-Arabe de 
Cultura, 1976. The Arabic and the English version can be consulted on  http://albaath.online.
fr/English/Aflaq-00-In-Memory-of-the-Arab-Prophet.htm. Here, after a comparison of  the 
different sources, I used this source.
25 Ibidem.
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The relationship with the past is characterized by a constructive approach 
and not by an imitative one since the present can took advantage from the 
lessons of  the past in order to create a better future26. Islam, in the monist 
philosophy of  ‘Aflaq, represented a period of  the history in which the Arabs 
had announced their eternal mission in the most suitable form to the historical 
circumstances:
Islam does not remove itself  from its natural stage, which is the land of  the Arabs, 
and it cannot be removed from the workers and heroes that fulfilled it - all of  the Arab 
people. The nonbelievers of  the Qureish tribe were as important to accomplishing Islam 
as the believers were. Those who fought the Prophet were just as important to the victory 
of  Islam as those who backed Islam and empowered it. However, this effort took more 
than 20 years to accomplish. Allah was capable of  delivering his Quran to Muham-
mad in one day, but despite this, it still took 20 years to accomplish this mission. Allah 
was also capable of  directing all people to his religion in one day, but that too took 20 
years. He was also capable of  bringing about Islam’s appearance centuries before he did, 
and in any of  the many nations he created. However, he chose to make the appearance 
of  Islam at a certain time, and he chose for its deliverance the Arab people and their 
Arab heroic prophet, the Prophet Muhammad. There is wisdom behind all of  this27. 
Because of  that, the Arabs, of  whatever religion they may are, must find in Islam 
the primary source and the origins of  their national culture. By affirming this 
‘Aflaq gave us an historical interpretation of  religion, underlining how Islam 
represented the beginning of  Arabism. He did that also for utilitarian reasons: 
‘Aflaq developed a secular thought in a Muslim word, but he had to insert reli-
gion in his ideology for avoiding the exclusion of  the majority of  voters.
The understanding of  Islam was Arab [...] Muslims were Arabs who believed in the 
new religion; they do that because they acquired the characteristics, the qualities and the 
values essential to comprehend that this new religion it wasn’t just a new religion, but it 
was the Arab drive towards unity, development and force28.
Thus Islam is one of  the main pillars of  the Arab culture and one of  its distin-
ctive and integral parts: 
26 S. N. Babikian, A Partial Reconstruction of  Michel Aflaq’s Thought: The Role of  Islam in the Formation 
of  Arab Nationalism, «Muslim World», Vol. LXVII, No. 4, October  1977, p. 286.
27 See endnote n. 24.
28 M. ‘Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba’th, Damasco, 1959, p. 55.
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The Muslim was the Arab who believed in this new religion because he attained the 
qualities required to understand it, which in itself  constitutes the leap of  Arabism to 
unification, power, and civilized accomplishment29. 
One of  the characteristic of  Michel ‘Aflaq’s ideology, that differentiate it from 
the preceding theories of  Arab nationalism is the connection between the ide-
al and the real, between the theoretical and the practical side of  reality. Even 
regarding the religious theme this characteristic is clear, since Islam, for ‘Aflaq, 
provides the daily basis for men’s life:
Every great nation is deeply attached to the eternal verities and is founded to fulfill an 
ideal of  values. Islam in its own right is the clearest expression of  the Arab nation’s 
effort to achieve eternity and completeness30.
For ‘Aflaq, Islam has an eternal message: the unity of  universe and the omniscien-
ce of  Allah. The Islamic religion is a monotheistic faith in which the creator is not 
detached from everyday life, but he is animated and lively. Allah is close to men, 
he loves them, he takes care of  them and absolves them: there is a communica-
tion process between men and God. The message of  Islam has a tangible value: 
faith is connected to daily life and to human behavior; it set up the basis of  hu-
man action and life. Therefore ‘Aflaq admits the existence of  a single creator, Al-
lah, who gave birth both to the tangible and the intangible aspects of  human life.
10.4 ConClusions
The founder of  the Ba’th, Michel ‘Aflaq, sees reality as a unity, and, to be more 
precise, as inspired by a unitary principle that affects all the aspects of  Arab 
people’s life and thought. Due to the fact that ‘Aflaq describes unity in different 
ways we can speak about a pluralism in the monist idea of  Arab unity. We have 
seen that unity has a practical political meaning that refers to the goal of  the 
Arab motherland’s territorial unification from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian 
Gulf. But, to achieve political unity, it must be necessary that the Arab people 
29 See endnote n. 24.
30 See endnote n. 24.
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must pass through a two-step process - here we have pluralism- : the struggle 
for freedom from Western colonialism and Zionism and, then, the struggle for 
unification. The Arab people must be united not only politically but also mili-
tarily: Michel ‘Aflaq fought in Palestine in 1948 with the Arab army. As many 
other politicians of  his generation points out the lack of  unity in the army as 
the main reason of  the defeat. In ‘Aflaq’s mind, the struggle for unification 
would be fought in a revolutionary way, as an independence battle, but also - 
here we have again pluralism- with social, educational and economic means. 
Socialism will be the economic tool of  unity, while, the creation of  a welfare 
state and the spreading of  public education and the enhancing of  the historical 
and linguistic ties between all the Arab people will be the cultural ones.
From a metaphysical point of  view, the monist principle can be found, as 
we have seen in the previous paragraphs, in the idea of  the Arab mission and 
in the importance that Michel ‘Aflaq assigns to the Islamic religion. The Arab 
mission is a single one that last since the inception of  the Arab history, before 
the Islamic era, during the so-called Jahiliyah (the age of  ignorance) until the 
present day. This unitary idea is related to the re-awakening of  the Arab people 
that must be achieved in a pluralistic way: through the unity of  struggle, the 
unity of  a socialist economic program and through an inner renewal of  the 
Arab spirit that now is detached and fragmented. The Islamic religion plays, 
in Michel ‘Aflaq’s political thought, a major role in this regard. Thus, the Arab 
people must follow the example of  the Prophet Mohammad, who had united 
them for the first time in history, to achieve the goal of  the Arab mission.  So, 
to sum up, Michel ‘Aflaq sees his nationalistic ideology as a civil religion in 
which unity, as a monist principle, is both the source and the final goal of  his 
thought.

Chapter Eleven
sir isaiah berlin: 
against monism (1953-1958)
Sara Lagi
“All forms of  tampering with human beings, getting at them,
shaping them against their will
to your own pattern, all thought control and conditioning is,
therefore, a denial of  that in men which makes them men...”
I. Berlin, Two Concepts of  Liberty (1958)
11.1 introduCing the person and his Work
In the past century Sir Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) embodied one of  the most 
prominent intellectuals of  liberal inspiration we had in Europe. By defining 
Sir Isaiah Berlin as a liberal thinker I am referring to the definition of  political 
liberalism proposed by D. J. Manning in his major Liberalism, according 
to which liberalism implies a view of  power as limited in order to protect 
individual freedom, minorities and “society’s dynamism”, along with a rooted 
fear towards any form of  social conformism1. Having said that, I have no 
intention to reduce or simplify the complexity and originality of  Berlin’s liberal 
thought, but rather to briefly clarify the points of  connection between Berlin, 
1 d. J. Manning, Liberalism, London, J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd 1976 p. 15.
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on the one hand, and the philosophical and political tradition we call liberalism 
on the other. It was Isaiah Berlin to coin the term monism and pluralism in 
the 1950s and his life long he elaborated these two concepts giving them a 
precise philosophical and political connotation. In general terms, by monism 
and pluralism Berlin meant a particular philosophical approach to the meaning 
of  life and reality resulting – according to the English intellectual – in two 
different philosophical views. Pluralism implies recognizing the complexity of  
reality, pluralism of  values and pluralism of  ideas whereas monism refers to 
those philosophies and thinkers trying to reduce such complexity to a single 
model, theory, standard2.
In this essay I want to focus on Berlin’s idea and critique of  monism 
because, in my opinion, it encompasses some of  the key components of  his 
political thought. What I propose in my essay is not so much to examine 
Berlin’s interpretation of  those cultural heritages (notably Enlightenment and 
Romanticism) that, in his opinion, influenced both monism and pluralism – 
for which there is  extensive and excellent academic literature about3 – as much 
as to trace and reconstruct some key aspects of  Berlin’s discourse on monism 
per se, i.e. I want to show, through a series of  writings dating back to the 1950s, 
how his critique of  monism reflects a particular vision of  moral and human 
reality and how, in connection with this, it reflects his liberal spirit in moral, 
philosophical and political terms. 
2 i. Berlin, Two Concepts of  Liberty (1958), pp. 1-32, in Id., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1969, now available online at: www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de. Berlin’s 
famous seminal essay is also included in H. Hardy (edited by), I. Berlin, Liberty, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002. For a summary on Berlin’s life, his scholarly work and his definition 
of  monism and pluralism see: the Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy online: http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/berlin.
3 See: B. BauM - r. nicholS (edited by), Isaiah Berlin and the Politics of  Freedom:“Two Concepts of  
Freedom” 50 Years Later, New York and London, Roudledge, 2013 g. crowder, Isaiah Berlin. 
Liberty and Pluralism, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004; g. crowder - h. hardy (edited by), The One 
and the Many: Reading Isaiah Berlin, Amherst, New York, Prometheus Books, 2006; J. l. cherniSS, 
Introduction to I. Berlin, Political Ideas in the Romantic Age, edited by H. Hardy, London, Pimlico, 
2007; J. l. cherniSS, A Mind and its Time: the Development of  Berlin’s Political Thought, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2013; J. gray, Isaiah Berlin: An Interpretation of  his Thought, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, reprinted version 2013; r. hauSheer, Introduction to I. Berlin, Against 
the Current: Essays in the History o Ideas, edited by H. hardy, London, Hogarth Press, 1979; J. 
reed, The Continuing Challenge of  Isaiah Berlin’s Political Thought, in “European Journal of  Political 
Theory”, vol. 8, n. 2, 2009, pp. 253-262; h. yeh, History, Method and Pluralism: a Reinterpretation of  
Isaiah Berlin’s Political Thought, Phd. Thesis, London School of  Economics and Political Science, 
UK, 2006, available online at: etheses.lse.ac.uk. For a complete and updated international 
bibliography about scholarly works on Berlin see: The Isaiah Virtual Library, available online 
at: berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk.   
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I can commence by saying that Berlin elaborated the fundamental 
dichotomy monism-pluralism through a series of  scholarly works dedicated 
to the history of  ideas and intellectual history. He was firmly convinced of  
the power of  ideas, of  their impact in historical, social, political terms. It is 
Berlin who reminds us of  the German Poet Heinrich Heine’s warning that 
the power of  ideas can be immense: “philosophical concept nurtured in the 
stillness of  a professor’s study could destroy a civilization”4. Berlin argued that 
ideas and their influence should never be undervalued and this is one of  the 
chief  elements characterizing all his intellectual works, including his reflection 
on monism and pluralism. The English philosopher’s profound interest in the 
history of  ideas developed over years and in order to fully understand it we 
must look back at his life and cultural formation. Isaiah Berlin was born in 
1909 to a wealthy Jewish family in the city of  Riga and when he was a child he 
moved with his parents to England where he grew up and received an excellent 
education. He attended Oxford University where he studied philosophy and 
initially had contacts with A. J. Ayer and the group of  logical positivists – a sort 
of  English version of  Viennese logical positivism – whose major objective 
was to conceptually separate philosophy from any form of  metaphysics with 
the declared purpose to coherently change philosophical method into a true 
scientific method. Berlin was impressed and fascinated by logical positivism, 
chiefly as far as the critique of  the traditional philosophical thought embodied 
by Hegel, Fichte, Schelling was concerned5.
In 1939 Berlin published his first major work, an articulated scholarly 
analysis on Karl Marx: his life and Environment (1939), where one can already 
identify two of  the key elements of  his further intellectual reflection, 
namely the necessity for scholars to recognize the importance of  historical 
dimension in the shaping of  political ideas and the profound conviction that 
philosophical, ethical, moral questions could not be studied and explained by 
means of  scientific method. Both aspects emerging from the essay on Marx 
can be considered as Berlin’s personal response to logical positivism and his 
first serious path towards a specific direction of  study focused on “the love of  
literature and ideas”6.
During the 1950s Berlin published some of  his most relevant works, from 
his Russia and 1848 to a Marvellous Decade, from Historical Inevitability to the 
most popular Two Concepts of  Liberty. The topics and figures Berlin discussed 
4 i. Berlin, Two Concepts of  Liberty online version cit., p. 1.
5 g. crowder, Isaiah Berlin. Liberty and Pluralism cit., pp. 1 ss. 
6 c. J. galiPeau, Isaiah Berlin’s Liberalism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 4-5- 21-22.
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in all these writings were highly diversified: from Marx to Rousseau, from 
scientific determinism to Romanticism, from the heritage of  Enlightenment 
to his beloved Alexander Herzen’s populist socialism. 
Yet, within this diversity of  interests and issues, Berlin’s ultimate intellectual 
and political vision is quite clear: he tried to critically reflect on long-term 
philosophical, ethical, political questions, such as the nature of  liberty, human 
dignity, human will and personality, how to protect individuals and individual 
freedom from power abuses7. Investigating and critically thinking about these 
questions – profoundly interconnected with the dichotomy between monism 
and pluralism – corresponded not only to Berlin’s ultimate and most intimate 
philosophical interests, to his aforementioned liberal inspiration, but also, in 
my opinion, to his intellectual and political need to reflect on the idea and 
meaning of  liberty within a complex historical, political and cultural context, 
still influenced by the tragedy of  WWII and totalitarianism. Discussing about 
liberty during the 1950s was much more than a mere academic exercise: it 
was a way to seek an explanation to the moral and political devastation of  the 
previous decade. 
11.2 berlin and the importanCe of thinking like a “fox” . . .
In the early 1950s Berlin was already an internationally recognized scholar 
and in many respects he could be defined as a representative of  the so called 
“free” world. It is true that Berlin was passionately against soviet communism 
but his reflection on monism and pluralism goes beyond his personal political 
sympathies and affiliation8. Already in his scholarly work on Marx, dating 
back to 1939, one can observe Berlin’s opposition to all those philosophies 
and theories – including, in his opinion, Marx’ scientific materialism – trying 
to identify and disclose objective laws capable of  determining and therefore 
explaining an historical, social, political dimension9. A kind of  intellectual 
opposition Berlin would further elaborate some years later, and more precisely 
in his work The Hedghog and the Fox, published in 1953. 
7 See: g. crowder, Isaiah Berlin. Liberty and Pluralism cit.
8 M. ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life, London, Vintage, 2000, p. 193 ss.
9 g. crowder, Isaiah Berlin. Liberty and Pluralism cit., pp. 20-23. 
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The Hedghog and the Fox was above all an elegant exercise of  history of  ideas, 
where one can already identify the core elements of  the dichotomy monism-
pluralism. The title referred to a fragment attributed to the ancient poet 
Archilocus, according to whom “a fox knows many things but a hedgehog 
one important thing”. It was an essay basically dedicated to the human and 
intellectual figure of  Lev Tolstoy, and above all an in-depth analysis of  what 
Berlin thought was the most intimate spiritual and mental conflict characterizing 
Tolstoy, namely the Russian writer’s being torn between his effort to see the 
world through an all-embracing view and his writings where reality and people 
were portrayed in their infinite variety and plurality. In Tolstoy Berlin saw a 
“hedgehog” and a “fox”. To Berlin, a “hedgehog” was that kind of  person 
who sought an universally valid truth, capable of  explaining reality and all of  
its aspects, aiming at finding out the ultimate sense of  everything. Instead, a 
“fox” was that kind of  figure who refused to reduce the awesome variety of  
reality to one single and univocal explanatory model10. 
Starting from this premise, Berlin was able to portray the figure of  Tolstoy 
in his complexity and nuances. To the author of  War and Peace and Anna 
Karenina the British philosopher recognized the fundamental, undeniable 
ability to reconstruct and brilliantly describe his time, his society and single 
personalities with a great sense of  psychological and human penetration, 
grasping their singularity and “multiplicity”, but, at the same time, Berlin 
stressed how profoundly the Russian artist believed in the existence of  a “law” 
determining the “whole”11: 
Tolstoy’s central thesis […] is that there is a natural law whereby the lives of  human 
beings no less than that of  nature are determined; but those me, unable to face this 
inexorable process, seek to represent it as a succession of  free choices, to fix responsibilities 
for what occurs upon persons endowed by them with heroic virtues or heroic vices, and 
called them “great men”12.
10 i. Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox. An Essay on Lev Tolstoy’s View of  History, London, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1953, now available online at: http://uniteyyouthdublin.files.wordpress.com p. 
437. From now on, I will refer to the online version. Berlin writes: “For there exists a great 
chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything to a single central vision, one system, 
less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of  which they understand, think and feel […] 
and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends […] their thought is scattered or diffused, 
moving on many levels, seizing upon the essence of  a vast variety of  experiences and objects 
for what they are in themselves, without [….] seeking to fit them all into […] a unitary inner 
vision”. Ivi, pp. 436-437.
11 ivi, p. 466.
12 Ibid.   
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And Tolstoy believed in this because, as Berlin argued:
He advocated a single embracing vision; he preached not variety but simplicity, not many 
levels of  consciousness but reduction to some single level […] Tolstoy’s genius lies in 
a capacity for marvellously accurate reproduction of  the irreproducible […] But then, 
this same writer pleads for, indeed preaches with a great fury, particularly in his last, 
religious phase, the exact opposite: the necessity of  expelling everything that does not 
submit to some very general, very simple standard13. 
By reading Berlin’s essay one can immediately realize two relevant things: first 
of  all the fact that Berlin introduces, interprets and uses the metaphor of  the 
“hedgehog” and the “fox” to identify the chasm between those professing a 
monistic vision and those embracing the pluralist one. Also, one can see how 
Berlin’s personal sympathies are all for those who think like a “fox” and, in this 
specific case, for the “fox” inside Tolstoy who is interestingly portrayed like “a 
fox who drove himself  mad by trying to be a hedgehog”14. 
A few years later, In a Marvellous Decade (1955), in my opinion, Berlin 
continued to reflect on monism and pluralism, by approaching the group of  
intellectuals and writers who emerged in Russia in the mid nineteenth century. 
Among them Berlin paid particular attention to the personage of  Alexander 
Herzen. Berlin describes Herzen as the father of  Russian populist socialism 
but most importantly he gives us a precious insight into Herzen’s human and 
intellectual personality. The Russian revolutionary is depicted in his complexity: 
he advocated a profound transformation in Imperial Russia; he defended the 
importance of  individual liberty, he was coherently averse to the tsarist regime 
but, at the same time – despite his revolutionary claims – he was also scared, 
according to Berlin, of  the potentially tragic consequences on single human 
lives a revolutionary, violent, radical overthrow of  the Russian authoritarian 
system could have had. Berlin seems to be intellectually and emotionally 
attracted by Herzen’s sincere concern about the tragic effects of  any attempt 
at radically changing a society in the name of  an ideal. In these pages, Berlin 
recognizes to Herzen a “sense of  reality” that is – in Berlin’s opinion – a key 
component of  a pluralist view of  reality and human life15. 
13 Ivi, pp. 466-467.
14 a. ryan, The Making of  Modern Liberalism, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 
2012, p. 406. See: pp. 405-406.
15 i. Berlin, A Marvellous Decade, “Northcliff  Lecture” delivered in 1954, re-issued with the title 
of  A Remarkable Decade, in Id., Russian Thinkers, ed. by H. Hardy and A. Kelly, New York, Viking 
Press, 1978, pp. 189-197. See also about: c. crowder, Isaiah Berlin. Liberty and Pluralism cit., p. 32. 
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Both The Hedghog and the Fox and a Marvellous Decade allow us to understand 
a chief  element of  Berlin’s thought, namely his genuine interest in those 
intellectual figures, writers, thinkers and ideas capable of  grasping and 
describing the complexity and variety of  life, the variety of  values, ends, goals, 
perspectives16. 
Nonetheless, this interest should be put within a broader context of  
reflection that directly regards the relationship between the way one considers 
reality, human existence, on the one hand, and the capital and moral issue 
of  human liberty and dignity, on the other. In my opinion, this particular 
aspect powerfully emerges from Berlin’s essay on Historical Inevitability (1954), 
I want to particularly focus on because of  the critique Berlin moved against 
determinism. By this term, Berlin meant all those philosophies seeking to 
interpret every single aspect of  human life as part of  a broader design, of  a 
broader “whole”, whose subject - as Berlin argued – could vary: it could be the 
Church, the Party, the Race etc17:
To find the the explanation of  why given individual, or groups of  them, act or think 
or feel in one way rather than another; one must first seek to understand the structure, 
the state of  development and the direction of  such “wholes”, as for example, the social, 
political, religious institutions to which such individuals belong; one that is known the 
behaviour of  the individuals […] should become most logically deducible18.  
In Berlin’s view, along with this kind of  determinism a second one does exist and, 
in his opinion, it is much more refined and intellectually elegant. It corresponds 
to those philosophies, theories, ideologies identifying universally valid, objective, 
scientific “laws” supposed to regulate and determine human reality and history. 
This kind of  determinism, whose cultural roots Berlin traces back to modern 
scientism and Enlightenment rationalism, would be based on the assumption that 
society, politics, human life follow universally valid and comprehensible “laws” 
that can be identified in the same way a scientist identifies the laws of  nature:
16 Another important Berlin’s work characterized by this kind of  reflection is Id., John Stuart Mill 
and the Ends of  Life, “Robert Waley Cohen Memorial Lecture” delivered in 1959 at the Council 
of  Christians and Jews (London), re-issued in Id., Four Essays on Liberty cit.
17 i. Berlin, Historical Inevitability, “Auguste Comte Memorial Trust”, Lecture n. 1 delivered on 
12 May 1953 at the London School of  Economics and Political Sciences, London, New York, 
Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 5 ss.
18 Ivi, p. 25.
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If  Newton was able in principle to explain every moment of  every particular constituent 
of  physical nature in terms of  a small number of  laws of  great generality, is it not 
reasonable to suppose that psychological events […] could be explained by the use of  
similar methods? […] If  this is (as surely it is) the theoretical ideal of  such sciences as 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, historical explanations will, if  they are successful, 
simply consist in the application of  the laws of  the sciences to specific individual 
situations. […] The inevitability of  historical processes, of  trends, of  “rises” and 
“falls”, is merely de facto for those who believe that the universe obeys only “natural 
laws” which make it what it is19.     
The interesting aspect for me is not so much to evaluate the objectivity (or lack 
thereof) in Berlin’s interpretation of  determinism as much as to follow him 
step by step in his reflection. Both types of  determinism shared, according to 
Berlin, one basic element, namely a particular idea of  individual’s freedom:
All one common characteristic of  such outlooks is the implication that individual’s 
freedom of  choice is ultimately an illusion, that the notion that human beings could have 
chosen otherwise than they did usually rests upon ignorance of  facts20.  
Berlin’s discourse on determinism represents, in my opinion, an aspect of  
great relevance for two reasons: on the one hand, his definition and critique of  
determinism reflects once again – even more powerfully than in his previous 
works – Berlin’s intellectual hostility towards omni-explanatory theories, 
ideologies, philosophies, and on the other the ultimate root of  such hostility, 
i.e. the drastic limitation of  individual’s freedom that, according to Berlin, 
inevitably results from those theories assuming to be able to explain the extreme 
complexity of  human life by identifying special “forces”, “wholes” or special 
“laws” (to obey). Being monist seemed to imply for Berlin the acceptance of  
determinism, being pluralist implied a critical attitude towards it. 
If  it is clear that Berlin preferred foxes to hedghogs and this preference passed 
through a clear critique of  determinism(s), one key question arises: in what 
sense, and to what extent Berlin’s reflections just discussed are essential to 
understand Berlin’s liberal view and his idea of  liberty?
19 Ivi, p. 19.
20 Ivi, p. 20.
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11.3 tWo ConCepts of l iberty: against monism
A response to this question emerges from Berlin’s most popular writing, his 
Two concepts of  liberty (1958)21, in which he identified a positive and a negative 
liberty. We will see how Berlin’s interpretation and definition of  positive and 
negative liberty recalls – in part – his previous works. My purpose is to focus 
on the first type of  liberty identified by the English philosopher, because it 
allows us to better comprehend the significance of  monism. 
Negative liberty was, according to the British philosopher, involved in the 
answer to the following question: “what is the area within which the subject 
– a person or a group of  persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is 
able to do or be, without interference by other persons?”, whereas the second 
form of  liberty was involved in the answer to the question of  “what, or who, 
is the source of  control or interference that can determine someone to do, or 
be, this rather than that?”22. 
The definition of  negative liberty was clearly influenced by the intellectual 
lesson of  Mill, Constant, Tocqueville whom Berlin openly referred to. Negative 
liberty essentially meant “being free from interference”.23 Positive liberty 
coincided with individual’s ability to be master of  his/her own. Negative and 
positive liberty apparently seemed to encompass a very similar idea of  being 
free. Instead – as Berlin stresses – they were profoundly different, because, in 
his opinion, they answered two radically different philosophical (and moral) 
questions: 
The answer to the question “who governs me” is logically distinct from the question 
“How far does government interfere with me? It is in this difference that the great 
contrast between the two concepts of  negative and positive liberty, in the end, consists. 
For the “positive” sense of  liberty comes to light if  we try to answer the question, not 
“What am I free to do or be?”, but “by whom am I ruled?”. [….] The desire to be 
governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by which my life is to 
21 The title refers to the inaugural lecture Berlin delivered at the University of  Oxford on 31 
October 1958, after accepting one year earlier the prestigious Chair of  Social and Political 
Theory in the same University. The lecture appears in Four Essays on Liberty – the collection of  
a series Berlin’s writings – in 1969. Recently, Two Concepts of  Liberty was re-issued in Id., Liberty 
cit. As stated at the beginning of  this essay, I will refer to the online version of  Berlin’s writing, 
available at available at: www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de.
22 Ivi, p. 2.
23 Ibid.
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be controlled, may be as deep a wish as that for a free area of  action, and perhaps 
historically older. But it is not the desire for the same thing24. 
I want to focus my attention on the positive significance of  liberty and more 
precisely on the capital implications (philosophical and political) the question 
“by whom am I ruled?” had in Berlin’s opinion.
If  being free in the positive sense of  the word means to govern myself, 
how – Berlin wonders – can an individual carry out a perfect positive liberty, 
neutralizing the impact of  external factors (from laws of  nature to activities of  
other men)? In his essay Berlin identifies two responses: on the one hand, the 
first option could be “the retreat in the inner citadel”, that means the refusal 
of  external world, by training oneself  to avoid any form of  desire, expectation, 
ambition25. On the other hand, the second option – philosophically more 
relevant to Berlin – implied the perfect identification between “being free” 
and “being autonomous”:
[According to the positive sense of  liberty] I identify myself  with the controller and 
escape the slavery of  the controlled. I am free because, and in so far as, I am autonomous 
I obey laws I have imposed them on, or found them in, my uncoerced self  26.    
In Berlin’s opinion, both Kant and Rousseau seemed to embrace this particular 
kind of  liberty. More precisely, Kant – Berlin writes – tended to identify an 
individual’s freedom, namely an individual’s autonomy, with an individual’s 
ability to govern oneself  by reason27. In this sense, in Berlin’s interpretation 
of  Kant, the “Rational Myself ” - that basically  meant “True Myself ” - had to 
prevail over the “Irrational one” – that basically meant “False Myself ”, and by 
doing so the “Rational Myself ” had to coerce the “Irrational Myself ” because, 
from this perspective, “the only true method of  attaining freedom […] is by 
the use of  critical reason, the understanding of  what is necessary and what is 
contingent”28. 
Berlin observed that the contrast between “Rational/True Myself ” and 
“Irrational/False Myself ” seeped into Romanticism that, according to him, 
ended up identifying the “Rational/True Myself ” with the “Will” capable 
24 Ivi, pp. 7-8.
25 Ivi, p. 10.
26 Ivi, p. 15.
27 Ivi, pp. 16-17.
28 Ivi, p. 18.
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of  creating, changing every aspect of  life, as long as G. W. Fichte – as a 
representative of  German Romanticism – went as far to identify this “Will” 
with the “Will of  the Nation” capable of  submitting single, individual wills in 
the name of  a superior ideal29.
Once delineated Berlin’s idea of  positive liberty, what is really interesting to 
me is to follow the conceptual trajectory the English philosopher was tracing 
in his essay of  1958: what happens – Berlin wonders – whether the philosophical idea of  
positive liberty is applied to political reality? What kind of  consequences could it generate? 
If  we replace the “Rational/True MySelf ” with a Charismatic Leader, a Vision 
supposed to be the Absolute Truth, with the Leading Party, with a Church, or 
more simply with a Commonwealth the immediate consequence – as Berlin 
argues – is the inevitable imposition of  this supposed Rational and therefore 
Just, True, Perfect Subject to the whole community, to the single individuals, 
who – by obeying this Subject – will become perfectly free because by doing 
so they will behave according to principles of  Rationality30.
Liberty, so far from being incompatible with authority, becomes virtually identical 
with it. This is the thought and language of  all declarations of  the rights of  men in 
the eighteenth century, and of  all those who look upon society as design constructed 
according to rational laws of  the wise lawgiver, or of  nature, or of  history, or of  the 
Supreme Being31.
Berlin thought that we can directly or indirectly find this kind of  assumption in 
many prominent thinkers of  European political tradition: Spinoza, Rousseau, 
Kant and in some respects even Locke and Montesquieu. In all of  them Berlin 
identified one basic idea, that freedom does not mean “to do what is stupid 
or irrational”, but rather to behave according to rational principles and, in his 
opinion, all these thinkers basically tended to associate these rational principles 
with laws32.
Berlin emphasized the dangers implied in the identification of  autonomy 
with authority, liberty with law. Following this reasoning, what happens then 
– Berlin wonders – if  someone rebels against the law and authority, what 
happens if  someone, led by irrationality, passions, instinct, refuses this kind 
of  liberty? 
29 Ivi, p. 20 ss.
30 Ivi, p. 18 ss.
31 Ivi, p. 18.
32 Ivi, pp. 17-18.
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In an ideal society, Berlin argues, these individuals should be coerced, 
that means, they should be “forced”  to be free because the only way they 
have to be free is to obey the law. Berlin correctly insists on one important 
point: the idea that being free basically means to obey the laws of  reason and 
the identification between the laws of  reason and a specific political system 
inevitably encompass a powerful threat to individual freedom and rights 
because in the name of  Reason (or any other ideal supposed as universally 
valid and rational) a political regime, a single Leader, a Party can justify any 
form of  coercion. It is no coincidence that Berlin quotes Fichte who said: “no 
one has...rights against reason”33.
It is quite clear that Berlin’s definition of  positive liberty and the dangers 
it might imply was a critique of  every form of  political ideology or regime 
that, in the name of  a superior ideal, or in the name – like in this case – of  
the “true” idea of  freedom commit abuses of  power. But I think that Berlin’s 
reflection on the meaning of  positive liberty – along with his attack against 
determinism(s) – is also an integrative part of  his discourse on monism and 
pluralism. Berlin did not want to say that the only “good” or “just” form 
of  liberty was negative liberty in contraposition to the positive, or worse 
that obeying laws was something unjust. He rather wanted to stress that the 
positive concept of  liberty had a strong monistic connotation: behind the idea 
of  positive liberty he believed to recognize that forma mentis, typical of  monism 
– and I would add typical of  determinism – according to which there must be 
one single principle, one single theory, one single element capable of  explaining 
everything, capable of  giving a reason to everything, capable of  showing us 
the intrinsic harmony of  reality. A kind of  forma mentis characterizing, as I have 
tried to show earlier, the different forms of  determinism as well as all those 
intellectuals, thinkers who could be defined as “hedgehogs”. 
The positive idea of  liberty seems to have a monistic connotation and 
this is why, according to Berlin, it could potentially nurture and justify the 
establishing of  despotic regimes. Yet, one fundamental question remains to 
be clarified about Berlin’s idea of  monism (in contraposition to pluralism), 
i.e. trying to understand the profound philosophical and moral root of  
monism. It is Berlin who clearly explains this important aspect in his essay: 
in his opinion, monism and more precisely all those monistic political 
systems professing the existence of  one single universally valid and just 
Belief, ready to sacrifice “individuals on the altars of  the great historical 
ideals”, are fundamentally based on the idea that “all the positive values in 
33 Ivi, pp. 19-20.
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which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even 
entail one another”34.   
In these pages, Berlin declares once again and even with more force to 
be against those philosophies, ideologies and political systems believing and 
seeking to reach a supposed “final harmony in which all riddles are solved, all 
contradictions are reconciled”35. Against those armed with unshakable faith in 
a “total harmony of  true values”, Berlin advocates the power of  “empirical 
observation and ordinary human knowledge”36.
In doing so, Berlin seems to embrace and maintain the British philosophical 
tradition, skeptical and reluctant towards excessively abstract and omni-
explanatory theories:
The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with 
choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of  
some of  which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of  others. Indeed, it is because this 
their situation that men place such immense value upon the freedom to choose; for if  they 
had assurance that in some perfect state, realisable by men on earth, no end pursued by 
them would ever be in conflict, the necessity and agony of  choice would disappear, and 
with it the central importance of  the freedom to choose37. 
In my opinion, in this passage we can fully grasp the ultimate bond between 
Berlin’s critique of  monism and his liberal attitude. He is critical towards 
monism and he is a thinker of  liberal inspiration because he fundamentally 
sees in monistic theories, philosophies, ideologies the refusal of  that 
immense pluralism of  ends and values representing – in his opinion – one 
of  the conditions to the “freedom to choose”. This liberal heart of  Berlin’s 
thought emerges even better and more powerfully from the reflections he 
dedicates to pluralism in contraposition to monism. Berlin declares his 
philosophical (and moral) preference for pluralism. At the beginning of  
this essay I wrote that pluralism, according to the English philosopher, is 
that view recognizing the variety and complexity of  reality and the  human 
condition, so diversified and complex they can not be reduced to one single 
standard. But just because it means all these things, pluralism, in Berlin’s 
opinion, will tend to accept freedom to choose and it does it because, unlike 
34 Ivi, pp. 29-30.
35 Ivi, p. 30.
36 Ivi, p. 29.
37 Ivi, pp. 29-30.
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monism, it recognizes more than one single end, more than one single value 
supposed as universally true:
Pluralism, with the measure of  “negative” liberty that it entails seems to me a truer 
and more humane ideal than the goals of  those who seek in the great disciplined, 
authoritarian structures the ideal of  “positive” self-mastery but classes, or peoples, 
or the whole of  mankind. It is truer, because it does, at least, recognize the fact that 
human goals are many, not all of  them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with 
one another. […] It is more humane because it does not (as the system-builders do) 
deprive men, in the name of  some remote, or incoherent, ideal, of  much that they have 
found to be indispensable to their life as unpredictably self-transforming human beings38.  
In this passage Berlin defends pluralism in opposition to monism – as a “more 
humane ideal” because it recognizes individual’s freedom that, for Berlin, 
means individual’s dignity. When writing about “system-builders” depriving 
“men in the name of  some remote ideal” – it seems to me – Berlin is referring 
not only or simply to tyrannical systems but more precisely to the twentieth 
century totalitarian regimes with their ambition of  creating a new Race, a new 
Mankind, Justice and Equality on earth. Behind Berlin’s discourse on monism 
and pluralism there is the persistent shadow of  totalitarianism and in many 
respects we could interpret Berlin’s reflection on monism as an attempt at 
finding the philosophical, ideological and moral roots of  the totalitarian 
tragedy39. 
However, even from this perspective one element clearly emerges from 
our analysis, namely Berlin’s refusal of  any “dogmatic certainty”, and his idea 
that reality is too complex, diversified, characterized by too many different and 
equally absolute ends to be philosophically explained and politically governed 
by a monistic credo, faith, ideology. In Berlin, accepting and internalizing this 
complexity means to defend individual’s ability and right to choose – regardless 
with the content of  the choice –  because just this “necessity of  choosing” that 
gives “its value to freedom”40. 
But, in Berlin’s opinion, this “necessity of  choosing” does concretely exist 
and can be preserved only within a (political) space granting individual freedom, 
rights, recognizing the ultimate value pluralism, paradoxically including the 
38 Ivi, p. 31.
39 c. aarSBergen-ligtvoet, Isaiah Berlin. A Value Pluralist and Humanist, View of  Human Nature 
and the Meaning of  Life, Amsterdam-New York, Editions Rodopi B.V, 2006, pp. 27 ss.
40 i. Berlin, Two Concepts of  Liberty cit., p. 31.
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risks such pluralism might cause. In other words, Berlin’s refusal of  monism 
seems to be indissolubly interconnected with anti-dogmatism that, in my 
opinion, represents one of  the core elements of  his being a liberal intellectual. 
Against any form of  monism, against any form of  “dogma”, Berlin opposed 
the infinite complexity and variety of  reality, the idea of  freedom to choose, 
pluralism of  values and goals. If  we look at our world, Berlin’s lesson seems to 
be still extraordinarily current and evocative. 

Chapter Twelve
monisms and pluralisms 
in the history of politiCal thought: 
some (not ConClusive) remarks 
Sara Lagi
The essays collected have shown us how nuanced and highly articulated the 
dichotomy between monism and pluralism can be, especially if  analysed and 
discussed – as we have actually done – through the lens of  the History of  
Political Thought. 
In the Preface we commenced by declaring the ratio of  our work and more 
precisely the reasons why several scholars of  the History of  Political Thought 
had gathered together to reflect, discuss and write on the meaning of  monisms 
and pluralisms. Far from being moved by a mere attraction for “erudition”, this 
research group devoted a particular attention to how and to what extent the 
often oversimplified monism/pluralism dichotomy – interpreted according to 
a specific methodological approach – could tell us something not only about 
how specifically several authors and thinkers of  the past time considered and 
defined monisms or pluralisms, but most importantly what, only through these 
authors and their political reflections, we can “learn” and grasp about relevant 
political issues. It is relevant to all of  us, living in the twenty-first century 
within a historical and political context, which poses complex challenges. 
We think that there are two core, relevant – as we were just saying – thematic 
directions emerging from the essays collected here: the nature of  power and the 
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nature of  the moral and ethical sphere; both intimately interconnected. All the 
essays seem to share one fundamental basic question: can political unity exist and 
how? We will seek to show, by following the aforementioned thematic lines, 
how the essays collected here have tried to reflect on this capital question. 
In his The Achaean of  Homer and those of  Hobbes: from a Pluralistic Monism to 
Absolutism, Andrea Catanzaro proposes a comparison, between the Achaeans 
described in the Homeric text and those of  Hobbes’ s translation of  the 
Homeric poems, through an in depth analysis of  the linguistic dimension 
of  the text. In doing so, the author is able to emphasize the political and 
ideological dimension of  the Hobbesian translation and most importantly 
how behind them there is a concrete and tangible will (political) to transform 
the pluralist monism characterizing the “political structure” of  the Achaean 
army into a true absolutist political vision. If  in Homer, Agamemnon holds 
“a monocratic power”, although not “completely absolute”, in Hobbes’s 
translation Agamemnon becomes “as similar as possible to the sovereign […] 
described in the Leviathan”. In this sense, Hobbes continues to theorize and 
profess the monistic and absolutist view of  sovereign power by modifying 
the lines of  the Homeric poem which do not fit into his particular idea of  
sovereignity: “in my opinion – Catanzaro argues – the passage from the 
Homeric pluralistic monism to a more absolutist vision is one of  the most 
remarkable pieces of  evidence that Hobbes really wants to use the Iliad and 
the Odyssey as a «continuation of  Leviathan by other means»1.  
From Catanzaro’s essay, monism and absolutism emerge as the key-terms 
and the key-concepts to  analyze Hobbes’ political thought and his conception 
of  the ultimate nature of  political power. In some respects – even though 
within a different historical, political and cultural context – the French 
philosopher Nicolas Boulanger, who lived in the early 18th century, analysed 
by Iolanda Richichi in her Nicolas Boulanger’s Portrait of  “Irrational Monism” in 
Postdiluvian Humanity, reflected on the origin and meaning of  a specific political 
model, “theocracy” and more precisely “civil theocracy”. As Richichi stresses, 
Boulanger rejects theocracy because he sees in religion “the only responsible 
of  all evil”. According to the French Philosopher, the theocratic political 
model has a profoundly monistic connotation; a monistic connotation he 
directly relates to a form of  “despotism” in the sense that “theocracy was 
a universal, primitive and absolutely negative model” and Boulanger’s aim 
“was to demonstrate that the despotic regimes of  the East […] were the 
1 For the internal quotation cf. e. nelSon, Translations of  Homer. Iliad, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p. XXII.
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consequence of  the existence of  a primitive theocracy at the origins of  
humanity” rather than – as explained by Montesquieu – the consequence of  
“la volonté momentanée et capricieuse d’un seul”. 
Andrea Catanzaro’s and Iolanda Richichi’s essays provide us with examples 
of  figures who seem to be focused on the monistic side of  power, although the 
two thinkers undoubtedly decline this aspect in different ways, living within 
different historical backgrounds and responding to different political problems. 
On the one hand we have Hobbesian absolutism as a way to think and justify a 
stable, unitary, strong kind of  political power, on the other hand we have a 18th 
century French philosopher whose critique of  theocracy should be situated 
within a broader political and philosophical discourse on secularization.
Nonetheless, notably in the case of  Hobbes and Boulanger, we are basically 
dealing with thinkers who reflect on sovereignty, political power and political 
unity. A substantially identical kind of  problem emerges from Alberico 
Gentili’s and Romano Guardini’s intellectual and scholarly work, respectively 
analysed in David Suin’s essay Religious Pluralism and International Community: 
Alberico Gentili’s Contribution and Carlo Morganti’s essay Plurality and Decision. 
State and Society in Romano Guardini. Yet, as we can observe, both Alberico 
Gentili’s and Romano Guardini’s reflection on political power seem to entail a 
series of  relevant pluralist elements. 
Historically speaking, Gentili and Guardini belong to different periods and 
are influenced by different political and cultural situations: Alberico Gentili was 
a sixteenth century jurist and academic lawyer reflecting on the development 
of  a modern international political system based on the  emergence of  modern 
states. He comes to terms with a growing pluralist international system whose 
development runs parallel to the fragmentation of  Christianity due to the 
Reformation. To Gentili, the latter and chiefly the Catholic reaction represent 
a source of  a powerful pluralism, which might – and actually did – lead to 
struggles and bloody contrasts threatening any form of  political unity. As a 
response to this, Gentili thinks that it is essential to separate politics from 
religion in order to “preserve State stability and unity” and, at the same time, it 
is vital to respect “religious pluralism” as a means to support the “community’s 
political and juridical organization”.
A substantial and continuous tension between monism and pluralism as 
a hallmark of  political power, chiefly in times of  crisis and radical changes, 
characterizes the German philosopher and Catholic theologian Romano 
Guardini’s political work. His political profile is linked to the Weimar Republic, 
namely to a time of  profound social, ideological and political divisions. We 
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could be tempted to labeling Guardini’s political thought as monistic because 
of  the central role the state plays in his writings. It is by means of  the state 
that – in his opinion – “a community develops politically and historically”. 
Guardini’s core idea of  the state as “God’s representative in worldly things” 
might be considered as even more monistic, so far to establish and justify a 
potentially “authoritarian” political view. But, as Morganti argues, Guardini 
actually tries to find a balance between monism and pluralism in the search 
of  a more human, peaceful and renewed political order: a democratic order 
which is monistic (the state) while being based on pluralism of  persons with 
their ideas, interests, peculiarities, who are able to cooperate with one another, 
far from being mere “atoms”. Re-establishing a just and stable political order 
means finding a compromise, a balance between the request for unity (political 
system) and pluralism (society).  
The problem of  political unity is effectively crucial to the political thinker 
and political activist Michel ‘Aflaq. The founding father of  the Ba’th party, 
analysed by Carlotta Stegagno in her essay Political and Religious Monism in Michel 
‘Aflaq’s Political Thought, promotes a well-defined ideology based on “socialism, 
nationalism and unity”. Unity – in particular – seems to be “the starting point 
and the final goal in Michel ‘Aflaq’s nationalism […] For ‘Aflaq – Stegagno 
writes –  nationalism is an all-embracing feeling, it is open to anyone who 
shared with the Arab peoples their history, language and culture, it is […] 
centered around the idea of  unity”, and more precisely with the idea of  “Arab 
unity”. Stegagno identifies the more pluralist elements characterizing ‘Aflaq’s 
political theory, whereas she highlights how his political discourse remains 
essentially monistic. In fact, ‘Aflaq’s monism ends up to coincide and embrace 
noble values of  emancipation, liberation, dignity for the Arab peoples: “Aflaq 
traced the outline of  the Arab mission i.e. the Arab people’s awakening and 
renewal after decades of  political fragmentation, exploitation and moral 
debasement”. 
If  unity and monism represent the key-words to describe Michel ‘Aflaq’s 
political project, pluralism and pluralist – although within certain, specific limits 
we are going to mention –  are central both to Federica Falchi’s contribution 
on Frances Wright. Liberty as a Founding Principle of  Republican America and to 
Stefano Parodi’s essay on Beyond Politics: Organizational Pluralism and Technocratic 
Monism in the Functionalist Proposal of  David Mitrany. 
Falchi introduces us to the figure of  the Scottish political thinker Frances 
Wright whose voyage  across the Atlantic Ocean – which took place in 1818, 
many years before Alexis de Tocqueville – turns into a unique opportunity 
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to explore and investigate the American republican spirit. Wright tends to 
emphasize the central role played by liberty in the development and aftermath 
of  the American Republic. Liberty which – as Federica Falchi clearly 
stresses – is, according to Wright, the source and the consequence of  a truly 
pluralist political and social system: “Frances Wright – Falchi writes – sensed 
the presence of  liberty, the essence of  pluralism, not just in a theoretical 
dimension, as was the case in Great Britain, but on a practical level as well. It 
was perceptible in all sectors of  society, in political and social institutions, to 
the extent that there was no distinct barriers separating the governed from the 
governors, nor conditions of  oppression and domination, but rather a balance 
borne of  a common consensus”. Moving ideally from the early nineteenth 
century to the second post war period, we “encounter” another interesting 
personage coming to terms with the problem of  pluralism and its political 
implications: the Rumanian David Mitrany. 
During the 1940s, Mitrany, Economist at the London School of  Economics, 
thinks about how to reform and pacify the post WWII international order 
by elaborating a “functionalist theory” based on a “total mistrust towards 
ideologies and politics” and concretely consisting in the establishment  of  
“specific organizations for specific functions”. Behind this project there is 
the idea that these “functions” have to be carried out by “ad hoc institutions” 
(“Authorities”), namely a body of  international executives who have to work 
in “selected fields of  common life” without any actual political legitimacy. 
Mitrany seeks to imagine a new pluralist international system which can 
overstep the traditional bond between sovereignty and territorial divisions, 
even if, according to Parodi, just this pluralist system potentially entails a 
monistic side because it seems to be “characterized by a sort of  «exclusive 
thought»: if  the political dimension is the «evil», the main cause of  wars, the 
«technical» dimension is the kingdom of  the «good»”. Mitrany believes in a 
solution – the creation of  a functionalist international organization –  capable 
of  restoring a “total harmony”. 
Parodi’s essay ideally creates a kind of  “bridge” between the two sections 
of  this work, corresponding – as aforementioned – to two specific thematic 
lines. In the authors discussed so far – and despite belonging to different 
historical contexts – the dichotomy monism-pluralism is essentially related 
to the dimension of  political power and to the establishing or re-founding of  
political order, chiefly in times of  crisis and changes. The second section of  
essays we want to briefly discuss highlights the more moral, ethical and even 
epistemological aspect of  such dichotomy; an aspect which remains profoundly 
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intertwined with the problem of  political power, and more precisely with the 
problem of  how to reach and preserve political unity.   
Giuseppe Sciara’s essay on Benjamin Constant the “Fox” and the Ideal of  Freedom 
between Politics, History and Religion, defines the Swiss thinker’s liberalism as a 
political view based upon the idea of  the intrinsically limited nature of  political 
power in the name of  a supposed “sacred” sphere of  individual liberties. 
After observing that Constant’s idea of  liberalism might paradoxically sound 
univocal, not to speak of  monistic, the author seeks instead to prove how 
profoundly pluralist Constant’s liberalism actually is. By a critical approach to 
the Enlightenment heritage, to Utilitarian and Kantian views of  morality and 
moral life, the Swiss thinker re-discovers the importance of  the individual’s 
inner life, the complexity of  moral life elaborating a reflection (political, moral 
and philosophical) which is liberal because it is pluralist and it is pluralist 
because it refuses absolute truths: “For Constant […] an ethics valid for all 
does not exist, neither does one single system of  vales, nor does one single 
lifestyle that everyone has to follow, and happiness cannot have the same 
meaning for all”. 
Although conscious of  the particular and historically defined background 
Constant belonged to, the passage just quoted could be applied in many 
respects to two prominent twentieth century thinkers: Eric Voegelin and 
Isaiah Berlin. The Americanized political Scientist and the British philosopher 
seem to share a basic mistrust towards one single, universally valid political 
or moral model to be applied. Influenced by the tragedy of  totalitarianism, 
both tried to come to terms with the intellectual and political challenges posed 
by the post-WWII period. Eric Voegelin, portrayed by Nicoletta Stradaioli in 
her Monism and Pluralism: Eric Voegelin’s Contribution, focuses his attention on 
the problem of  the State and society, whereas Isaiah Berlin, introduced by 
Sara Lagi in her Sir Isaiah Berlin: Against Monism (1953-1958), is particularly 
fascinated by the problem of  liberty both in political and ethical terms. Yet, 
both thinkers pose themselves (and all of  us)  substantially the same kind of  
problem: the tragedy of  the 20th century, marked by totalitarianism, barbarian 
ideologies, the Holocaust, could be considered in part as the extreme result of  
a society nurtured – and distorted – by the poisoning “fruits” of  a certain type 
of  scientific rationalism and determinism, by the conviction to find a common 
solution to all problems, to create a perfect, radically new political order. Both 
Voegelin and Berlin seem to share the idea that totalitarian systems essentially 
stem from the will to create political unity eradicating any form of  pluralism. 
If  it is true that Voegelin, as Stradaioli argues, identifies in part the roots 
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of  such conviction in the widespread gnosticism of  the twentieth century 
liberal society – whereas this kind of  argumentation is absent in Berlin’s 
work – it is also true that both thinkers speak about “totalitarian monism” 
which is above all and first of  all a philosophical, moral, epistemological 
vision refusing the complexity and plurality of  human and moral existence 
even before being a concrete and historically determined political system. As 
Stradaioli writes about Voegelin’s political thought: “monism is intended [by 
Voegelin] as a model of  science desirous to build with mathematical certainty 
the right political order. A unique and definitive reality that distorts reality 
itself  ends up producing ideological deformations, which find their maximum 
expression in […] totalitarianism”. It is interesting to observe how a thinker 
– who is historically and culturally distant from Berlin and Voegelin – a 
nineteenth century Persian philosopher Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, influenced 
by Descartes, Voltaire, Rousseau and portrayed by Pejman Abdolmahammadi 
in his Polytheism vs. Monotheism: some ideas regarding the pastoral form of  power, seems 
to share just with the British philosopher and the American political scientist 
the same profound mistrust toward any form of  monism. He criticizes the 
monistic nature of  religious faith and more precisely the dangerous “myth of  
liberation”, according to which: “the need of  being guided might be confused 
with the need of  being served or liberated by a heroic figure, who will one 
day come to save the people from injustice and despotism. In such context 
[...] the believer might prefer to delegate the individual power to a divine 
representative who could be a member of  one’s church or mosque”. But this 
kind of  “delegation” might lead – in Kermani’s view – to a “despotic rule”. 
Against a “pastoral” way of  thinking, characterized by a monistic connotation, 
Kermani advocates the critical use of  reason. 
Although the authors, thoughts, political projects proposed and discussed 
so far are objectively diversified –  in terms of  content and in terms of  
historical, political and cultural backgrounds taken into account – an attempt 
to critically reflect on all of  them allows us to identify some capital aspects. 
Generally speaking, monism seems to refer to the key problem of  sovereignty 
and political unity; at the same time we can observe that the political and 
philosophical question of  how and to what extent political unity can be 
established or restored – and therefore the search of  a monistic order in the 
sense of  a unitary and stable political system – does not necessarily imply the 
elimination of  any form of  pluralism. In this sense, the complex connection 
between monistic and pluralist elements is declined and interpreted in different 
ways according to the author and the historical-cultural context considered: 
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we pass from thinkers such as Hobbes theorizing and justifying absolutism 
to Boulanger who identifies monism as one of  the hallmarks of  a regime 
he rejects, i.e. “civil theocracy”; from Guardini’s monism which seems to be 
open to pluralist instances to ‘Aflaq’s revolutionary and emancipatory monism 
aiming at the “awakening” of  the Arab people. We pass from Mitrany’s 
institutional pluralism which is conceptually situated within a theoretical and 
philosophical framework having a monistic connotation, to Voegelin who 
re-thinks the foundations of  political community in terms of  political unity 
and society’s pluralism, while rejecting single omni-explanatory models and 
political solutions. 
At the same time, the particular perspective characterizing these essays – the 
perspective of  the History of  Political Thought – allows to see how concretely 
the different ways to elaborate and decline monistic or pluralist theories as well 
as monistic and pluralist theories are basically conditioned and influenced by 
concrete and historically determined contexts. It is the relationship between 
political theories, projects and proposal, on the one hand, and historical 
dimension, on the other hand which show us the impossibility to reduce 
monism and pluralism to univocal definitions and therefore the importance of  
recognizing the historical existence of  diversified monisms as well as diversified 
pluralisms.
Moreover, if  we tried to ideally “match” all these aspects, we could finally 
observe that not always and not necessarily the different kinds of  monism 
signify something intrinsically negative or that monisms and pluralisms 
inevitably and necessarily belong to two totally separate dimensions. This is 
obviously not a conclusion, as we said, but – we hope – a first path towards 
a further elaboration on the meaning and the implications of  monisms and 
pluralisms.
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